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Any form of post-encoding distraction, known as Nonspecific Retroactive Interference (NRI), 
may cause forgetting (Keppel, 1968; Wixted, 2004). However, recent experiments have not 
always found evidence for NRI and its effect may be very mild. NRI was tested across five 
experiments which aimed to take the epistemological approach of cognitive memory and 
forgetting research, and to incorporate the educational psychology domain of motivated 
learning through interest development. This enabled the exploration of factors which may 
affect NRI based forgetting, including wakeful rest, mind wandering (MW), and various 
forms of interest. Verbal memory was tested within a short-term (five-minute retention 
intervals) learning and recall setting by comparing conditions where NRI (usually elicited by 
spot-the-difference tasks) was present or absent. This project carefully manipulated the role 
of prior-tasks, measurements of interest and MW (depending on conceptualisation), and the 
NRI task. As a result, the thesis was able to explore the role of fatigue vs. cumulative 
similarity interference, the reliability of NRI effects, and provide a cognitive explanation of 
interest-based learning. The results demonstrated that (1) overall effects of NRI were more 
reliable than first hypothesised. (2) Interest is separate from NRI within this paradigm as it 
increases recall during the encoding phase, with interesting facts being retained more, but 
experiencing a similar susceptibility to interference as less interesting facts. (3) Subjective 
interest increases recall, with dispositional individual interest modulating the amount of 
situational interest evoked by the stimuli. (4) MW decreases recall but any interaction with 
interest requires further exploration. (5) Recall was consistently worse if the NRI condition 
was late-occurring, and there was limited evidence for a fatigue explanation. It is put forward 
that NRI is a low-level form of diversion interference which can accumulate with similarity-
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Our memories are fragile once initially formed, making them prone to interference-
based forgetting. Retroactive interference (RI) occurs when newly learned information 
hinders the recall of previously learned information thus increasing forgetting and hindering 
learning and recall. Imagine boiling a kettle then having a conversation while it boils. The 
conversation may distract you from the task even though it is not related to the task, causing 
you to forget the initial action. This is known as nonspecific retroactive interference (NRI). It 
is nonspecific as the distracting and therefore interfering information is different and 
unrelated to the previous learned event. This NRI is purported to be the primary cause of 
everyday forgetting (Keppel, 1968; Wixted, 2004b) as it is common to switch attention 
between unrelated tasks throughout the day (did you remember to lock the door on your way 
to work this morning?). However, interference itself can be prevented, or at least minimised. 
It has been found that the later the onset of the interfering task post encoding (the initial 
acquisition phase of the memory), the greater the recall performance (having the conversation 
shortly after boiling the kettle will increase the influence of interference, whilst delaying the 
conversation would provide a form of ‘wakeful rest’ that increases the consolidation potential 
of the memory (Dewar, Alber, Butler, et al., 2012; Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 2015; Mercer, 
2015).   
The introduction will begin by defining forgetting and broadly exploring the historical 
background literature of the two main theories of forgetting: Decay vs. Interference 
(similarity vs. nonspecific). The second section will explore the literature surrounding NRI 
including prevalence, salience, and underlying mechanisms. Following from the 
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understanding of the mechanisms of NRI the final section will explore an educational 




  Forgetting is often seen as a nuisance, an annoying phenomenon which plagues 
individuals through different aspects of life. It is commonly accepted that learning is a by-product 
of the processes involved in memory, whilst forgetting is a failure to learn, a failure of memory, 
and the result of a defective memory – resulting in the inability to retrieve previously stored 
information (Cubelli, 2010). Nairne and Pandeirada (2008, p. 179) stated that “forgetting is a 
scourge, [] nuisance [and] breakdown in an otherwise efficient mental capacity”. However, rather 
than simply a failure of memory, mechanisms of forgetting have formed over time to have an 
adaptive purpose, with the forgetting of irrelevant memories allowing for more adaptive and 
flexible behaviour (Bekinschtein, et al., 2018). For example, we may forget or ‘inhibit’ 
competing items in memory to make other similar items more readily available (MacLeod, 2002). 
Imagine, for instance, trying to find where the car is parked today on a multistorey carpark where 
it had been parked numerous times previously. All the previous instances would provide 
irrelevant competing information to sort through, hindering recall efficacy (Anderson & Neely, 
1996). In this way both memory and forgetting processes are complimentary to the learning 
process, involved in the construction and maintenance of useful memory representations 
(Markovitch & Scott, 1988). 
 Despite the positive and adaptive value of forgetting, a failure to accurately recall 
information can be problematic. Similar to the concept of the ‘seven deadly sins’ in Christianity, 
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Schacter (1999) argued that there are seven basic ‘sins’ of memory. The first three sins are the 
most relevant to this thesis and will be looked at in more detail as they are forms of forgetting: 
transience, absent-mindedness, and blocking. Following this there are three sins which cover 
types of distortions: misattribution, suggestibility, and bias. The final sin, aptly named 
persistence, relates to intrusive or hard to forget memories. Returning to forgetting, transience 
refers to the temporal element of forgetting – first explored by Ebbinghaus’ (1885) forgetting 
curve – whereby the recall of a memory trace becomes more difficult over time. It is seen that 
forgetting in this way is a power function of time. This means that forgetting is initially very 
rapid and whilst the total amount of forgetting continues to increase over time when experienced 
without maintenance or rehearsal of the memory trace, the rate of forgetting decreases or plateaus 
over time. Simply put, forgetting rapidly occurs within seconds of the initial memory trace and 
while forgetting continues to happen, the speed of forgetting slows down over time creating the 
forgetting curve. Absent-mindedness is the form of forgetting which occurs when a memory is 
insufficiently attended to during the initial encoding phase (the phase where a memory [trace] is 
first formed). An example of this is the misplacement of items (keys, wallet, phone etc.) while 
multitasking as the lesser attended to task/stimuli receives poorer, shallower and superficial 
processing. This leads to a poorly encoded and weak memory trace, exemplifying the traditional 
conceptualisation of forgetting as memory failure and a prevalent everyday nuisance. The third 
form of forgetting is blocking. Schacter mentions that one of the most prominent examples of 
blocking is the “tip of the tongue” state, whereby the memory trace exists but the retrieval is 
hindered, partial (similar phonological sounds, or semantic information) or delayed (but 
potentially fully retrievable). This fits within the cue-overload paradigm (see page 13).    
Misattribution, bias, and suggestibility — sins of distortion — are attributes which 
influence the memory understanding and quality. Misattribution refers to a distortion of the 
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engram affecting the accuracy of specific details around a memory, i.e., remembering an 
instance but confusing the time (see retrieval induced failure and temporal distinctiveness 
theories below). Similarly, suggestibility shows how the recollection of specific details of an 
event may be warped by the phrasing of the questions i.e., in eyewitness testimony. Personal 
beliefs and prior knowledge have also been found to bias the type of information recalled 
(that which conforms to your beliefs may be easier to remember) as well as your emotional 
state – a negative emotional state leads to more negative recollection of instances.  
The final sin involves intrusive memories that cannot be forgotten and – as with bias – 
is linked to emotional valence, i.e., strongly negative memories being recalled outside of the 
individual’s deliberate control. Similarly, a positive emotional state, such as evoked 
‘interest’, may increase the strength of a memory trace to increase learning and this learning 
will be the secondary focus of the current thesis, with the main focus being cognitive 
forgetting. 
The early study of memory and forgetting such as decay theory (see below) viewed 
forgetting as a loss of information over time, potentially leading to permanent loss. However, 
while this complete loss of storage remains a theoretical possibility, Davis (2008) argued that it is 
currently impossible to scientifically test this on humans as the complex neural circuitry would 
need to be fully mapped out. Davis (2008) argues that the only true evidence of this strong form 
of forgetting can be provided once all cellular and molecular events resulting from a memory’s 
formation return to the original state (Roediger, Weinstein, & Agarwal, 2010). This strongly links 
to the evidence of neuroplasticity (the process within which new connections are made and 
changed by neurons and synapses in the brain to make associations, adapt, and learn) being 
crucial to the learning process (Gulyaeva, 2017). Bjork (2014) defines forgetting as a decrease in 
retrieval strength at a given point of time, within the presence of retrieval cues. Modifying this 
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definition for the purpose of this thesis, forgetting results from an inadequate process of retrieval 
of previously learned information, resulting in weakened accessibility or a potentially 
inaccessible memory trace. This definition befits learning scenarios such as written exams where 
retrieval cues are not present.   
Explaining forgetting: decay or interference? 
How can the above types of forgetting be explained? The two major theories of 
forgetting are decay and interference. 
Trace Decay  
 
 As with Schacter’s (1999) sin of transience, ‘Trace decay’ theory argues that a memory 
may decay and atrophy (like a muscle) over time, potentially resulting in the permanent loss and 
erasure of a memory (Thorndike, 1913).  This was developed to explain the forgetting curves 
produced by Ebbinghaus (1885) from one of the first known studies of memory. Ebbinghaus 
found that forgetting occurred rapidly immediately after the learned period, with the rate of 
forgetting plateauing over time. Peterson and Peterson (1959) found that increasing the length of 
time of the retention interval before recall led to a decrease in recall scores within a relatively 
short period of time, with recall performance matching the pattern of the early forgetting curve 
within the time frame of just 0-18 seconds.  Whilst there may be a biological premise to decay 
theory, a behavioural explanation is trickier as not all memories are lost over time. As decay 
theory uses the absolute passage of time to explain forgetting, the theory has received numerous 
criticisms for its over-simplistic nature which fails to explain why forgetting happens, and for 
uncertainty over the mechanisms that are involved.  It is also unable to explain instances where 
memories last overtime, such as consolidation (linked with sleep benefits), serial positioning (the 
primacy and recency effect), reminiscence, and hypermnesia (Brown, 1923; Brown & 
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Lewandowksy, 2010; Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978; Healy, et al., 2000; Jenkins & Dallenbach, 
1924; McGeoch, 1932; Roediger, WeinStein, & Agarwal, 2010; Talamini et al., 2008).   
The strongest source of support for a time-based decaying theory of memory within the 
modern literature is provided by the study of rapid forgetting (within seconds) and adopted by the 
Time-Based Resource Sharing (TBRS) model proposed by (Barrouillet et al., 2004).  
The TBRS model states that “recall performance is an inverse function of time during 
which attention is engaged in processing, impeding the refreshing of memory traces.” (Portrat 
et al., 2008, pp. 9-10). Through this theory forgetting results from a lack of memory 
maintenance caused by the ‘trade off’ between the processing of information and the storage 
of information within the Working Memory (WM) system: “WM is the system enabling 
online maintenance of representations for ongoing cognition” (Souza & Oberauer, 2016, p.1). 
Memory traces decay rapidly within the WM and executive attention is required to rapidly 
switch between the refreshing and maintenance of the memory traces, and the processing of 
cognitive tasks/newer information (Glavan & Houpt, 2019). The longer the time attending to 
other tasks the less time or attentional resources available to prevent forgetting. This is 
moderated as a function of cognitive load (how difficult or mentally taxing an activity is) 
with the higher cognitive load tasks experiencing worse processing trade-offs leading to trace 
decay (Barrouillet, 2015). 
To test the temporal decay hypothesis Barrouillet et al. (2012) utilised complex span 
tasks and manipulated the cognitive load of attention processing to measure rapid forgetting. 
Participants were asked to remember a sequential list of 16 (eight per condition) memory 
items (either letters or spatial locations) for 1000ms while verifying the accuracy of 
multiplications with a keyboard response. Attentional processing was manipulated via 
presentation i.e., 6 x 7 = 42; six x seven = forty-two, with the latter condition taking longer to 
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process. Both conditions contained the same period of time for remembering stimuli and 
differed only in the processing manipulation. On average participants took longer to respond 
to the digit problems (504ms longer for the letter list, 371ms for the spatial locations) and this 
processing vs. storage processing ‘trade off’ led to significantly decreased recall scores in the 
letter condition. This is consistent with the rapid decay theory (occurring during 1 second and 
1.5 seconds) and the TBRS model, with the additional attentional processing being argued to 
hinder the refreshing of the memory traces in the WM capacity necessary to prevent decay. 
However, the TBRS model is often criticised by alternative interference-based/ event-based 




As noted above, the major alternative to decay is interference theory, which is a theory of 
forgetting where interfering events disrupts the process of learning, as associative information 
compete for a “place” in the retention of memory. An early example was reported by Bergstrom 
(1893), who found that when placing cards (with an associated word attached) into place, 
participants appeared more confused and placed cards more frequently into positions they had 
placed them in previous rounds. This experiment discovered the interference of associations. 
There are two main forms of interference within the learning theory: Retroactive interference 
(RI) and Proactive interference (PI). PI occurs when previously learned information interferes 
with the retention of new stimuli/information (Underwood, 1957). Retro (meaning previous) 
active interference occurs when newly learned information interferes with previously learned 




In the early literature, the emergence of PI led to a temporary loss of confidence in RI 
theory (Dewar et al., 2007; Wixted, 2004b; 2005) and decay theory as a way of explaining time-
based forgetting (McGoech, 1932; Underwood, 1957). PI is particularly evident if the stimuli are 
similar in nature. In fact, one of the main early theories of PI, termed ‘cue-overload theory’ 
(Wixted, 2005), will be explored as a mechanism of PI and discussed in the similarity 
interference section below due to PI’s strong prevalence as a form of associative forgetting.  
 Bower (2000) provides a great everyday example: If you have trouble remembering the 
name of someone’s second husband because the name of their first husband keeps coming to 
mind, this is an example of PI (and an awkward conversation!) Keppel and Underwood (1962) 
retested the rapid forgetting experiment by Peterson and Peterson (1959) with the aim of testing 
PI. The hypothesis was that forgetting occurred not from decay over time, but from increasing PI 
from the prior trial. By testing the initial trial for each interval (trials without PI), the same rate of 
decline was not found, supporting PI. However, this finding was not consistent when re-tested 
with a more difficult verbal list (Baddeley & Scott, 1971). Instead, one of the best ways of testing 
the prevalence of PI is to measure how long it takes for participants to respond accurately and 
correctly. As PI results from previous representations, participants may not forget these items but 
instead may experience a greater confusion of items and have to ‘sort’ through associated 
memory traces. This is found in numerous experiments utilising the ‘recent probes’ task (e.g., 
Berman, Jonides, & Lewis, 2009; Jonides et al., 2000; Nee et al., 2007) and has been found not 
just to decrease response certainty but to induce time-based forgetting effects. Mercer and Duffy 
(2015) used similar but unfamiliar (abstract) visual items using the recent probes task. 
Participants were asked whether a target image matched the previous exemplar and responded 
‘match’ or ‘no match’ within a trial. The interval lengths between each trial were manipulated 
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between 0.3-8.3s. Whilst participants believed that their recognition accuracy (correct ‘yes’ 
responses) were measured, with the recent probes task the experimenters are interested in the 
unmatched ‘no’ responses, as this is where PI is manifested. The results showed that response 
accuracy was much lower if the target image was shown in a previous memory trial (recent 
negative) than if the target image was novel (not a recent negative—the ‘control’) and that this 
also occurs as a function of time, with the worst accuracy occurring at 0.3s and increasing to the 
control accuracy at 8.3s. This indicates that PI may also function within the rapid-forgetting 
timeframe found by Peterson and Peterson (1959), and is parsimonious with Campoy’s (2012) 
time-based finding that information may be lost over the short-term but also found that PIs 
influence may decrease in prevalence over time.   
 
Retroactive Interference (RI) 
As noted above, the major alternative to PI is RI. Müller and Pilzecker (1900) pioneered 
research into RI, which was first called retroactive inhibition, by discovering its effects on 
memory consolidation during their research. In their first experiment (demonstrated in Figure 1.1 
below), participants were provided with six paired syllables from List A, followed by a rest 
interval of 32 seconds and then eight syllables of List X (the interfering list). Cues were then 
provided testing for a mixture of A and X responses, of which only the retention of A was 
recorded (condition 1). To see if List X interfered with memory for List A, a control condition 
was added without interference. The participants learned the paired syllables but only 
experienced a retention interval and no interference list. In condition 1, participant’s correct recall 
percentage was 23% compared to 48% for the control List B. Therefore, this was one of the first 
studies to uncover the effects of RI, as the correct responses from participants were more than 
halved by the stimuli from List X. As List X was similar in nature to the stimuli of List A, this 
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provides support for Bergstom’s (1893) study, as List X facilitated RI and impaired overall 
memory retention in comparison to the control list (Lechner, Squire, & Byrne, 1999). 
 
Figure 1.1. Reprinted from Lechner, H. A., Squire, L. R., & Byrne, J. H. (1999). 100 
years of consolidation—remembering Müller and Pilzecker. Learning & Memory, 6(2), p.80. 
The figure shows the method of Muller and Pilzecker's first experiment. 
 
A second experiment by Muller and Pilzecker (1900) aimed to test whether RI was 
present for unrelated material as well. The second experiment was set up similar to the first, with 
the distractor task of List X being replaced with visual stimuli: three landscape pictures which 
participants were to describe before recalling List A (a control List B was again included). As 
with the previous experiment, the retention of List A was lower than the retention of control List 
B (24% vs. 56%), as the distractor task, although unrelated to the stimuli of List A, facilitated RI 
Figure redacted for online publication to prevent copyright 
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and impaired recall. Muller and Pilzecker argued that RI reduced the ability of participants to 
achieve a ‘preservation tendency’ (unprompted repetition in thought) that otherwise would have 
induced greater potential for consolidation. However, it is also argued that the RI impairment may 
not be specifically due to the preservation tendency, as much as how mentally effortful the 
interference task is. i.e., The greater mental effort needed to perform the task, the lesser the 
potential for consolidation. This is congruent with the TBRS model and resource depletion (the 
concept that there are limited cognitive resources for attention and memory; [Chen et al, 2017]).  
An adaptive value of RI has been demonstrated by Hensley et al. (2019), who found that 
negatively emotional memories can be subjected to RI. When negative picture lists were followed 
by interfering picture lists, there was a reduction in the ability to recall the previous negative list, 
reducing the amount of negative memory items accessible during free recall which is an 
experimental recall condition where individuals attempt to recall stimuli in any order, without 
retrieval cues/prompts. Furthermore, an adaptive and experimental value of RI as an explanation 
of time-based forgetting is provided by Georgiou et al.’s (2019) ‘Retroactive Interference Model 
of Power-Law Forgetting’. Here, the power of the memory trace is assumed as a function of its 
importance, with the primary assumption of the model being that the maintenance of the memory 
system involves replacing less important information within the memory system with newer, 
more important information (items with greater valence/power). Older items may be retained if 
the newer items have a lower valence power. Utilising a recognition task intermittently amongst a 
sequence of 500 words and including data from participants who achieved perfect 2 n-back 
results (recognition of words shown two sequences prior), Georgiou et al. found that RI with the 
multidimensional valence of importance component within the model was sufficient to explain 
the results without the need for PI or consolidation interpretations, and was consistent with the 
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historical forgetting/retention curves. RI, therefore, is an important component of the forgetting 
process which will be explored further throughout this thesis.  
 
Evidence for congruence between Decay and Interference 
Portrat et al. (2008) conclude that it is possible for the two forgetting mechanisms 
(decay and interference) to be related. Support for this idea can be seen in an experiment by 
Pertzov at al. (2017) on visual WM (VWM), where participants had to use their memory to 
revert a coloured item back to its originally experienced orientation. Pertzov et al. found that 
memory errors increased as a function of both the number of items (different coloured 
shapes) and the passage of time (1-3 seconds), indicating that both the previous memory 
representations (interference) and the temporal element of rapid forgetting were connected as 
a function of accurate recall. Campoy (2012) concluded that rapid loss of a memory trace 
from the WM system from the TBRS account occurs over a matter of seconds, then the 
interference of representations takes over. However, most of this evidence is based on VWM 
and as stated by Mercer and McKeown (2014), who also found decay in short-term nonverbal 
memory, the case for verbal memory is still open. While decay theory has received a lot of 
criticism as a behavioural explanation of time-based forgetting - interference theory remains a 
prominent experimental focus in the empirical literature.    
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The previously mentioned research, theories, and examples of interference of memory 
representations predominately centre around the findings that memories hinder the recall of other 
competing similar and associative memories/stimuli. The prior studies of PI above are prime 
examples of this, along with the previously discussed research on RI, as the primary method of 
measuring interference was conducted using the associative memory procedure the A-B A-C 
paradigm or associative stimuli lists. Within the A-B A-C paradigm, participants learn a list of 
paired words (A-B) such as dog (A) with door (B), and a second list (A-C) with the same A cue 
and different C cue i.e. dog (A) with car (C). When provided with prompt A (dog), participants 
attempt to recall cue C (car) from the later list when testing PI, and prompt B (door) from the 
preceding list when testing RI. Delays in reaction times, inaccurate responses, or decreased recall 
therefore indicate an interference of associations or ‘cue-overload’ (for more examples of the A-B 




Cue-overload theory is focused on context-specific memory during the process of 
retrieval, whereby continued retrieval of similar item/events subsumed under a specific cue leads 
to overload, reducing the accessibility of other similar items for retrieval (Earhard, 1967; Watkins 
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& Watkins, 1975). This is most prevalent when the information is associative and processed 
semantically (highlighting an influence of higher levels of processing [Parkin, 1980]).  
The concept supports similarity interference theory, with previous associative cues 
interfering with retrieval of other interpolated stimuli as a major factor of PI (Roediger et al., 
2010; Watkins & Watkins, 1976), and similarity RI (Dewar et al., 2007).  However, the testing of 
this phenomena had been conducted primarily via the A-B, A-C paradigm mentioned above 
(Roediger, 1973; Roediger et al., 2010, Watkins & Watkins, 1976). The theory therefore received 
criticism from Wixted (2005) for its lack of ability to explain forgetting caused by interference 
induced within everyday life or a natural learning environment. For Wixted, forgetting is better 
explained by NRI interfering with a fragile memory trace before it has a chance to consolidate. 
Due to the nonspecific nature of the interference cue-overload cannot explain NRI and is best 
contextualised within a similarity-based interference paradigm. 
Therefore, whilst the findings of similarity-based interference are well documented they 
are largely experimental and may not fully translate onto everyday forgetting, as individuals 
continually switch between different types of task during everyday activities. As noted by Skaggs 
(1933) and Dewar et al. (2007), both PI and similarity-based RI appear to affect a memory in the 
same way, during the retrieval phase (rather than encoding or, as might be expected, 
retention/storage). This may be due to the similarity and confusability of the stimuli/memory 
items, which occurs mostly in experimental environments.  With Wixted (2004b) critiquing PI for 
its inability to explain everyday forgetting, and Skaggs, and Dewar et al. arguing that similarity-
based RI is akin to PI, then in order to explain everyday forgetting within the interference 
literature, evidence of forgetting from dissimilar, un-associated interference must be considered. 
This type of forgetting is referred to by Dewar et al. as ‘diversion RI’, as it diverts attention away 
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from maintenance, differing not only in the type of stimuli/memories affected but where the recall 
hinderance occurs during the retention/storage phase.  
 Despite the early findings of Muller and Pilzecker in discovering RI of associated stimuli, 
the findings of un-associated material causing RI were critiqued by Dewar et al. (2007) on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence. They argued that although an un-associated experiment was 
attempted, the pictures were verbalised and therefore contained the potential for association. 
Thus, evidence for similarity-based RI was more robust than that of the dissimilar, or nonspecific, 
RI effects. This critique is supported by Skaggs (1933), who asserts that the interpolated stimuli 
should be as different from the original stimuli as possible, short in duration in order to control 
the mind-set of the individual (to reduce mind wandering) and presented shortly after the original 
stimuli.  Skaggs asserts that research following these parameters indicate the importance of the 
temporal positioning of the interpolated material. This follows the Temporal Gradient of RI 
described by Muller and Pilzecker (1900) and reviewed by Wixted (2010). 
Other factors of interference are discussed further in the sections below, as the hindering 
effect of the RI phenomena itself can be evidenced and fit differently within multiple paradigms, 
from interference of similar stimuli causing an overwriting effect on VWM representations, to 
distorting a memory trace before it can solidify through consolidation, or distortions caused by 
reducing the retrieval potential of temporally cluttered information by reducing the 
distinctiveness of the memory trace. Distinctiveness demonstrates that the more similar the 
interfering stimulus, the more strongly interference appears to occur. However, following from 
the criticisms of Dewar et al. (2007) and Wixted (2004b) regarding the experimental nature of 
similarity interference failing to account for everyday forgetting the next section will focus on 




Whilst it has already been discussed that both associative and interpolated interfering 
stimuli of associative memory tasks disrupt recall, interference is not just a function of 
associative stimuli competition. Increased forgetting has also been found to result from 
information within a non-specific, non-associative task. This is known as non-specific 
interference. Succinctly, nonspecific interference is a form of forgetting which occurs when 
non-associative information gained from a dissimilar task interferes with recall.  Following 
on from Muller and Pilzecker’s (1900) early work into RI (which discovered nonspecific 
interference effects), Dewar et al. (2007) conducted a study that supported the theory that RI 
causes forgetting along with unrelated material (the before mentioned diversion RI). Within 
the study six groups of participants attempted to recall a list of 15 nouns after an interval 
containing a task specific to each group: control (unfilled rest period), audio (listening to a 
radio show), serial (visual) recall, (visual) recognition, maths tasks, and audio tone detection. 
It was found that any task or stimuli that causes a distraction increases forgetting, regardless 
of whether the stimuli are relevant to the experiment or not, with no meaningful difference 
between the recall of the distracting tasks which all had lower recall than the control. Another 
argued conclusion of the study was that RI has two forms: Diversion and similarity. 
Diversion RI hinders learning on the consolidation level, whilst similarity RI hinders the 
processes of retrieval of memory. This distinguishes the importance of the types of stimuli 
used for the ‘to be remembered’ and interference stimuli retrospectively.  
This reinforces the concept that interference is not just a function of associative 
stimuli competition. Another important aspect of non-specific interference is that it is akin to 
natural every day forgetting, as even autobiographical internal thoughts which occur naturally 
have been shown to interfere with recall (Craig et al., 2014). Across four experiments Craig 
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et al. (2014) demonstrated that both a visual (picture search) task, and internal 
autobiographical thinking induce significant NRI effects. Using three word lists and three 
counterbalanced condition-orders, the experiment contained three conditions. Participants 
immediately recalled each word list post-presentation to establish baseline equivalence, 
followed by the nine-minute manipulation: wakeful rest, picture search, and autobiographical 
thinking. This was followed by the next list until all conditions had been completed. In the 
thinking condition participants heard a sound and were required to recall past (or imagine 
future) scenarios. The results showed that both the picture tasks, thinking tasks, and external 
sound induced thinking tasks resulted in hindered recall. This suggested that NRI hinders 
consolidation both externally and internally.  In amnesic patients the NRI condition of 
listening to piano notes significantly impaired recall of prose stimuli compared with a 
controlled delay condition (Dewar et al. 2010). Dewar et al. (2010) used this to demonstrate 
that interference can occur not just within a context that is item-specific such as during 
retrieval, but by distractions that are not item-specific, thus nonspecific, which hinders 
memory consolidation. This is a key example of the similarity vs. diversion interference/ item 
similarity vs. mental effort argument (Dewar et al., 2007).  
To conclude, the final study example is that of Brokaw et al. (2016) who compared 15 
minutes of wakeful rest (with eyes closed) with the NRI task of playing the video game 
‘snood’. Snood is a simple video game in which you match coloured balls to make them 
disappear. Wakeful rest significantly improved delayed recall of story details (provided 
auditorily) whilst the video game condition hindered accurate recall and increased false recall 
(recall of incorrect details). This is an example of how a simple and non-demanding activity 
can significantly reduce recall in a real-life scenario. i.e., someone who ops to ‘wind down’ 




  So far it has been demonstrated how NRI can occur through any form of mental 
distraction. The next section will focus on the reliability and replicability of this effect within 
the literature. 
 
How consistent are the effects of non-specific RI? 
 
The concept that forgetting is induced by new information or a subsequent task of a 
nonspecific nature displacing or diverting attention away from the maintenance of a memory 
trace (for example rehearsal) is intuitive, particularly as an explanation of everyday forgetting 
over time. Craig et al. (2014) found NRI effects from internal thoughts and a visual searching 
task, and Dewar et al. (2012) from spot-the-difference tasks (S-T-D). Both are distractors 
which require attention but are not cognitively demanding, indicating NRI prevalence.  
However, within the recent literature, studies of NRI from low-demand cognitively 
distracting tasks have not always supported this assertion.  
Two experiments by Fatania and Mercer (2017) explored whether verbal memory 
performance was hindered by subsequent nonspecific S-T-D tasks for children (aged six and 
seven) and adults. A list of 20 words were used followed by a five-minute interval, which 
included visual S-T-D tasks in the interference condition, or an equivalent wait period for the 
control (condition orders were reversed for counterbalancing). Results from the first 
experiment found decreased recall scores were caused by the distractor for the children but 
not the adults. This indicated that the adults may have been able to resist this form of NRI 
whilst the children could not. The second experiment repeated the methods of the first with 
another sample of children but extended the length of time available to participants during the 
encoding (word presentation) and retrieval (free recall) phases. When the time constraints 
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were relaxed the children were able to resist the effects of NRI, leading to recall scores non-
significantly different from the control. Although there was some evidence of NRI caused by 
the S-T-D tasks, the ability for adults to resist these effects, and for children to resist under 
more relaxed conditions, raises questions for the strength and prevalence of this form of 
forgetting.  
Similarly, a study conducted by Martini et al. (2017) used immediate recall followed 
by the condition manipulation.  Another S-T-D based distractor was used with the main aim 
of measuring the effects of an eight-minute wakeful rest (vs. a NRI distractor) on long term 
memory retention following a seven-day delay. The results found that an eight-minute 
wakeful rest period and the NRI distractor produced no difference between recall scores after 
seven days. The converse was found in a later study where an additional recall phase 
occurred shortly after, with an interference effect – caused by a visual problem-solving task – 
lasting over seven days (Martini et al. 2018). Similar results were shown using a visual film 
task for children aged 10-13 (Martini, Martini, & Sasche, 2019). 
Varma et al. (2017) used a similar procedure measuring immediate recall vs. subsequent 
recall after the manipulation. They aimed to test wakeful rest and NRI throughout six 
experiments whereby the encoding of stimuli was followed by either a wakeful rest period or a 
low-demand n-back task (2-back, followed by 3-back). It was found that consolidation was not 
hindered by interference from the n-back tasks as the tasks include minimal semantic 
involvement and episodic memory processing. This indicates that a passive wakeful rest period is 
unnecessary for continued consolidation processing. However, the participant accuracy of >90% 
during the n-back tasks may indicate a lower cognitive load incapable of creating interference 
greater than the interference caused by autobiographical memory reactivation (Craig et al., 2014) 
during wakeful rest periods. Within this scenario the n-back task would provide a form of active 
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rest, whereby consolidation processes are maintained in spite of the resource demand, due to 
reduced interference in comparison to the autobiographical thinking interference in a passive 
wakeful rest state and providing a balance/trade off (Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 2015). 
These results present a view of NRI as a less potent form of forgetting which may be 
resisted or negated, so the question arises: In what circumstance does NRI result in recall 
hindrance?  
If a nonspecific distractor task does not induce greater NRI than that of natural mind 
wandering (MW) or everyday autobiographical thinking, this could mean that NRI is potentially 
an always present but low form of forgetting which may be exacerbated or elevated under certain 
conditions. This may include the level of cognitive load, the amount of encoding and retrieval 
time, and the point at which NRI is experienced. Within this contextualization, the later 
conditions of NRI which were counterbalanced by the research above may experience repeatedly 
worse RI effects that are masked beneath global overall effects. This indicates not that NRI does 
not occur, but that it may be a lower form of interference with an ever-present cumulative effect. 
This is one of the key manipulations that will be explored within this project.  
Furthermore, the experiments by Varma et al. do not consistently represent verbal 
memory, as firstly, the experiment aimed at verbal memory contained 20 words which may be too 
simplistic to measure forgetting. Secondly, the distractor used was a low-level cognitive demand 
task (2-back). It is plausible that the 2-back task which has the lowest form of load in some 
cognitive load studies (Reed et al., 2017) did not decrease learning sufficient to cause overall 
interference effects.  Varma et al. acknowledge that both of these factors could prevent the 
interference effect. This led to an experiment with a greater encoding and demand task but on a 
different memory system (facial recognition). Instead, it is put forward that a more demanding 
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free recall test would better indicate intentional learning and more differences alongside the more 
demanding interference task. Thirdly, due to immediate recall the delayed interval is not a 
retention interval consistent with everyday life with participants immediately attempting to recall 
the list post encoding. This creates an additional novel recall event. This means participants may 
benefit from attempting to re-recall the words they remembered previously (providing a testing 
effect) AND the memory of the initial encoding phase, allowing the simplistic re-
remembered/rehearsed stimuli to become more consolidated against interference post-retrieval. 
Within the contextualisation provided, following immediate recall a more demanding visual NRI 
task would be necessary to elicit interference effects and not produce an active-rest effect due to 




With RI being such an established factor of forgetting, understanding how to reduce RI 
effects induced by newer information would be advantageous to the learning process.  
A study by Koen and Rugg (2016) found that if memory reactivation occurs or is 
elicited during the interference task then RI is reduced, increasing recall scores, though the 
recollection (“reactivation”) of the memory during the interference task returns it to a state in 
which it may be influenced again by RI. This indicates that retrieving a memory can 
strengthen the recall-ability of the memory trace, but potentially leave it open to further 
interference/distortion upon reactivation and can be elicited from something as subtle as the 
way a retrieval question is phrased. This was found by Loftus and Palmer (1974) during two 
experiments which aimed to test the reliability of eye-witness testimony. Participants were 
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placed into groups differing only in the phrasing of the post-event interview questions. 
Participants viewed a video of a car crash incident and were subsequently asked questions 
about the event. Participants in the group that were asked how fast the cars were going when 
they Smashed into each other provided higher estimates of speed than the groups where the 
questions were phrased “how fast were the cars going when they ‘hit’ or ‘bumped’ each 
other?” When interviewed a week later, participants in the group who heard the phrase 
“smashed” were more likely to answer ‘yes’ to whether they saw broken glass on the floor of 
the incident. This highlights the influence of inaccurate/false recollection of certain features 
of the memory. In this way, understanding the role and impact of RI has a strong applied 
value for the evaluation of the reliability and validity of eye-witness testimony.  
Whilst reactivation has been shown to increase the strength of a memory trace against 
RI to some extent, there are other factors seen to bolster a memory trace’s resistance. One 
such factor is known as priming. Priming occurs when a prior learned memory representation 
or response positively influences the response anticipation, certainty, and/or accuracy of 
newer actions. For example, if you are to respond ‘match’ or ‘no match’ to colours in a 
Stroop test, if the font colour of prior trials remained the same then participants would be 
primed to anticipate and respond quicker to another colour congruent trial than to a newer 
incongruent trial. This would be an example of colour priming (Kristjánsson & Campana, 
2010). In relation to RI, Bower et al. (1994) found that when the category of the stimulus 
word predicted the response word category, and the response was unique within that 
category, then learning was rapid and the influence of RI was negligible. Conversely, when 
the cues and response stimuli were unrelated the recall scores were significantly reduced. 
This reduction in recall performance was highly attributed to RI.  
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One memory process triggering another is an example of an implicit memory process 
(Kristjánsson & Campana, 2010). This differs from declarative and deliberate memory processes 
necessary for free recall, i.e., being explicitly asked to retrieve a list of items, such as naming as 
many states in the U.S. as possible within a short period of time. Therefore, whilst priming may 
reduce the influence of RI through the implicit memory system, it cannot be fully applied to 
declarative memory processes indicative of traditional learning and retrieval. This is because 
explicit learning is typically intentional (Diekelmann et al., 2009), i.e., exams where an individual 
learns material and must deliberately recall them at a later date explicitly and without retrieval 
cues.  
As previously highlighted, Dewar et al. (2012) found that delaying the onset of 
interference increases recall potential and that this consolidation effect has long term benefits. 
Although, (as highlighted above) this was conducted using S-T-D tasks which may be a form of 
diversion RI itself, the effectiveness of wakeful rest as a technique to reduce both PI and RI and 
therefore boost memory is gaining precedence in the recent literature (Dewar et al., 2012; Ecker, 
Tay, & Brown, 2015; Mercer, 2015). With empirical research into RI showing its hindrance of 
retention and consolidation it is important to understand potential factors that may facilitate an 
individual’s susceptibility to RI. Whilst some research is emerging on factors that reduce RI, 
more is needed as accounting for these factors would reduce the degree of forgetting, increasing 





Mechanisms of NRI 
 
In order to explore factors that may reduce the hinderance of NRI on recall it is important 
to first understand how and why RI occurs, and whilst RI as a form forgetting has been 
researched and demonstrated since the 1900s there has been some debate regarding the 




One explanation for RI hindrance is provided by consolidation theory. Consolidation 
refers to the processes involved in memory which seek to stabilize the memory trace post-
acquisition (Dudai, 2004). The primary assumption of this theory is that a memory trace/engram, 
once encoded, is fragile before consolidation processes take place (Maquet, 2001). After 
consolidating and storing the memory, it is then protected from interference, disruption, or decay. 
The early work of Muller and Pilzecker (1900) (discussed on page 9) highlighted the effect of 
consolidation after discovering that accurately recalled verbal information required a few minutes 
post-training to fixate before new stimuli is presented, disrupting the process and hindering 
memory (Dudai, 2004; Lechner, et al., 1999; Muller & Pilzecker, 1900) (see retroactive 
interference, page 9).  
As an explanation of a strengthened memory trace over time, consolidation theory 
complies with Jost’s Second Law of forgetting. The law states that two equivalent memory traces 
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or associated cues, separated by time, experience different retrieval strengths, with the older 
memory being stronger than the other, as the younger memory trace will be lost at a faster rate 
(Britt, 1934, 1935; Jost, 1897; Wixted, 2004a). Though the claim is that this results from a 
‘strengthening’ or consolidation of a memory trace has been challenged by Brown and 
Lewandowsky (2010) (see temporal distinctiveness, page 28).  
 Despite an early conception, consolidation theory still has a place within the modern 
literature, buttressed by modern sleep studies which theorise that consolidation processes are 
strengthened through sleep, particularly for procedural learning (non-declarative memory) 
(Stickgold, 2005) and episodic memory performance (Grieder et al., 2017) through slow-wave 
sleep (SWS); Mander et al., 2013). However, the evidence for consolidation for semantic 
declarative memory (the storing of facts) is weaker, as the increased recall could be better 
explained via a lack of interference provided by sleep (Stickgold, 2005). Yet the Non-Rapid Eye 
Movement (NREM) stage of sleep with SWS brought through small periods of sleep (1-2hrs) has 
been linked to increased declarative memory consolidation of associated word lists similar to the 
A-B, A-C interference paradigm (Diekelmann et al., 2009; Grieder et al., 2017). This provided 
evidence not only for consolidation, but for similarity-based RI as well. As Wixted (2004b) 
pointed out, the theory of PI failed to account for greater memory consolidation provided by 
sleep, which reduces RI (Jenkins & Dallenbach, 1924), even within a condition where PI is 
present (Ekstrand, 1967).  This is further supported by Lechner, Squire, and Byrne’s (1999) 
review of 100 years of consolidation and the research of Muller and Pilzecker (1900) when they 
first uncovered the effects of RI. Muller and Pilzecker (1900) found that a longer rest period after 
the initial learning phase, before the interference task (six minutes rather than 17 seconds), 
increased the strength of recall for learned syllable lists in comparison to shorter periods. This 
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was one of the first studies to provide supporting evidence for consolidation theory, in which 
consolidation reduces the influence of RI.   
Furthermore, Dewar et al. (2012) found that a period of wakeful rest immediately after 
post-learning caused significantly greater recall than a filled spot-the-difference task and this 
significant difference was maintained when participants were asked to recall after seven days. 
This shows that an immediate short-term rest can increase the retention of memories into the long 
term, potentially resulting from the stabilising of the memory traces through consolidation before 
interference can occur. In keeping with this was the findings of a recent study by Sosic-Vasic et 
al. (2018), which indicates that faster learners may experience a greater RI hinderance to recall 
than slower learners during a 12-minute consolidation period (the faster you intake information, 
the greater the interference potential from newer information). However, Dewar et al. did not take 
into account the potential interference caused by the spot-the-difference tasks as they were 
unrelated to the memory stimuli (participants were asked to recall features of a story).  
Due to the strength of support provided by modern sleep studies, consolidation is an 
important component of learning and, therefore, the forgetting process, particularly for a 
neuroscientific or biological account of memory. However, within the cognitive theoretical 
framework of forgetting consolidation has received opposition, with the forgetting function of a 
memory trace strengthening over time being conceptualised within a different theoretical 
paradigm of distinctiveness (Brown & Lewandowsky, 2010; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). The 





 NRI within consolidation.  
 An explanation of NRI within the consolidation theory framework is provided by Varma 
et al. (2017). According to Varma et al. the primary cause of this form of forgetting is the 
reallocation of brain resources from memory consolidation processes to other resource 
demanding tasks (such as language, encoding and retrieval of task irrelevant information, sensory 
processing and language, etc.). This causes memory consolidation processes such as maintenance 
and memory trace reactivation to be ‘put on hold’ or suspended during demanding cognitive 
processing tasks (such as the S-T-D tasks found within this thesis), though Varma et al. argues 
that wakeful rest may not be necessary to prevent NRI (see page 19).  As a wakeful rest period 
may not fully reduce the interference of consolidation processes with autographical thinking 
occurring during wakeful rests, and the concept that demanding tasks create the NRI hinderance, 
a low demand task may be beneficial. This was explored by Ecker, Tay, and Brown (2015) who 
induced a form of active wakeful rest by filling the rest period with a low cognitive demand tone 
detection task. The results found that both prestudy and poststudy (to a lesser extent) rest 
provided by the wakeful low demand task had a beneficial effect on free recall. This study 
provides support for interference-based forgetting over memory consolidation processes, as 
consolidation theory would not expect a greater effect of prestudy rest, than poststudy rest. 
Rather, a better explanation is provided by Temporal Distinctiveness theory, in which the recall of 
individual items is an exponential power function of the memory traces’ temporal isolation. 
Studies testing this theory through temporal isolation (Brown et al., 2006; Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 
2015; Morin et al., 2010; Rönnberg, 1980) found that the greater the temporal isolation of the 
memorandum from competing or distracting information, the more ‘distinct’ the memory trace, 





The temporal distinctiveness model attempts to explain time-based forgetting within a 
paradigm where consolidation failure is an inefficient interpretation of the temporal effects of 
forgetting. The positive effects of rest periods noted above are subsumed within the temporal 
distinctiveness model to be a function of time rather than consolidation specifically. Temporal 
distinctiveness falls within an interference framework, whereby forgetting is caused by a 
disruption or displacement of a memory trace resulting from its temporal positioning. The main 
model of temporal distinctiveness is known as SIMPLE (scale-independent memory, perception, 
and learning; Brown et al., 2007).  
SIMPLE contains four main assumptions; (i) memory items can be seen as independent 
items across the temporal dimension; (ii) The retrievability of a specific memory item is a 
function of its discriminability from other temporally local memory traces; (iii) This 
discriminability is in ratio to the temporal distances from the time of retrieval; (iv) Finally, 
discriminability of a memory trace is inversely proportional to its confusability from other 
memory traces resulting from the relative distance between the items in ratio with time of 
retrieval.   
This means that within this model recent items are less confusable and therefore more 
memorable than older items (at the time of retrieval), whilst items which were temporally 
cluttered (presented with little to no time-gap between) are significantly more difficult to recall as 
the memory trace is less distinctive from other associative cues within that time phase/period. 
Similarly, through the passage of time the spaces between memory items decrease relatively as 
they recede into the past thus becoming more cluttered relative to each other and less 
discriminable over time. Conversely, more recent memory retrieval cues which are spaced out 
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temporally are less confusable (receiving less interference), and therefore are more distinctive 
and easier to recall during the process of free recall.  According to Brown and Lewandowsky 
(2010) temporal distinctiveness removes the theoretical value of decay as a time-based forgetting 
interpretation by explaining temporal effects relatively (relative to other memory traces/events). 
Temporal distinctiveness also uses primacy and recency effects to explain consolidation effects, 
with earlier items in the list (primacy) being recalled more due to a reduction in PI, and newer 
items (recency) receiving less RI.  Through this theory the temporal isolation of a to-be-
remembered item would greatly boost its distinctiveness resulting in greater recall (Brown, 
Morin, & Lewandowsky, 2006; Ecker, Brown, & Lewandowski, 2015; Lewandowsky et al., 
2012). 
Within this model the increased recall resulting from immediate rest found by Dewar et 
al. (2012) results not from consolidation but from the immediate reduction of RI leading to a 
greater degree of temporal isolation and therefore distinctiveness. However, as Dewar et al. 
states, temporally the difference between the S-T-D task groups and the wakeful rest groups 
would be less distinct over time. This would likely lead to a decrease in the differences in recall 
scores between conditions at the seven-day interval than the short-term interval (15-30 minutes), 
as over time they become less temporally distinct relative to each other. This was not found, 
causing Dewar et al. to conclude that consolidation was the primary cause of the maintained 
increased recall over the long-term. Finally, the positive effects of temporal isolation have not 
always been replicated in memory studies, such as probing or serial recall (Lewandowsky et al., 
2006). The concept that temporally isolated items may benefit from greater recall than cluttered 





 NRI and attention 
 
With one of the primary mechanisms of NRI involving the distraction from maintenance 
of the memory trace, factors which induce or reduce distractions can influence recall. The 
following sections will cover attention and cognitive arousal, MW, and various forms of 
interest/interestingness to evaluate their role in learning and assess whether these factors 
influence whether NRI is found.  
There are numerous articles which evaluate the different forms of attention and focus 
and the role in which it plays in the encoding of memories, along with its importance within 
WM functions.  Attention is the cognitive ability to selectively process information to enable 
information to be retained within an accessible state of WM (Fougnie, 2008). Conway et al. 
(2001) explain that individuals with a smaller WM capacity lack the ability to focus on the 
task and therefore struggle to ignore distractions highlighting the strong relationship between 
attention processes within the WM system, which may link to an individual’s susceptibility to 
NRI.  
Attention as a selective process can be directed to – and by – perceptual information 
(such as the visual focusing on an object) and to/ by information within the WM system, as a 
form of internal focus of attention (Souza & Oberauer, 2016). Evidence towards the internal 
focus of attention within WM is provided by the Retro-Cue paradigm which is reviewed by 
Souza and Oberauer. The Retro-Cue consists of a spatial cue which is used to indicate a 
higher importance/relevance of a targeted stimuli known as cue reliability, this effect 
increases the performance of the cued item, whilst hindering the recall of non-cued items 
(Griffin & Nobre, 2003; Landman et al., 2003). This highlights the importance of selective 
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focus provided by the retro-cue, and potential directed forgetting of non-cued items through 
decreased attention (MacLeod, 2012) with non-cued items having attention ‘diverted’ away 
from maintenance, which is one of the primary explanations of NRI. 
Therefore, the role of attention is crucial to the memory process, with attention used 
to deliberately inhibit recall of irrelevant/unwanted information which are not maintained 
(Conway et al., 2000; MacLeod, 2012; Wilson & Kipp, 1998; Zacks et al., 1996). 
Conversely, attention when focused facilitates learning with increased recall. A study by 
Pertzov et al. (2013) used the Retro-Cue after the presentation of the to-be-remembered 
stimuli and the results showed that attentional processes during maintenance of the engram 
increased accuracy and recall which was present even if elicited by the cue retrospectively. 
As mentioned previously, Souza and Oberauer (2016) highlighted that the role of 
attention within WM is crucial for avoiding disruption of the memory trace. In fact, the 
primary form of forgetting assessed within this thesis is NRI, which disrupts and weakens a 
memory trace after initial encoding. Therefore, focused attention could be crucial in 
providing resistance against this form of forgetting.  
This was explored using three potential mechanisms to explain the effect: item 
retrieval prioritisation, decreased interference of subsequent stimuli, or reduced temporal 
decay. For decreased interference of subsequent stimuli, a study by Landman et al. (2003) 
found that the average person is typically bad at noticing small visual changes, with a small 
amount of visual items being represented in the brain at a time (these are the items the 
individual is currently focusing on). Landman et al.’s study found evidence that indicate that 
a large portion of the participants’ memory representations became overwritten by post-
change displays, showing that the memory representations had been interfered with after 
encoding, as long as attention has not already focused upon one of the item representations 
(such as the focus provided by the retro-cue). This was used to explain ‘change blindness’ 
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using a change detection task, which indicated that participants had a large capacity for visual 
representations for cued items (>4) which remained for 1500ms after the stimuli had 
disappeared, two stimuli representations within this period allowed the correct change 
detection, while the non-cued items at 1500ms period capacity remained at just four. This 
finding was consistent with Becker et al.’s (2000) study where an attentional cue was used to 
indicate the location of the stimuli change. Again, the results showed that without the 
attentional cue, the second occurring stimulus overwrites the visual representation of the first 
stimulus, and Becker et al. argue that this is due to the inability to hold two representations at 
the same time.  
Makovski et al. (2008) provides evidence towards a resistance of interference, 
however they explain that the retro-cue effect itself cannot be explained by decay or the 
reduction of interference itself, but by the change in the orientation of focused attention upon 
a memory item creating a robustness for resisting the effects of interference in VWM. 
Makovski and Jiang (2007) found evidence that VWM is weak and prone to interference 
caused by subsequent information when attention was spread-out across multiple memory 
items, but when attention is focused on a particular memory it solidifies and becomes robust 
against interference of subsequent information. The Pertzov et al. (2017) study also found 
that multiple memory items stored simultaneously were more prone to forgetting/interference 
than single memory items, consistent with the Temporal Distinctiveness model (see page 28).  
Cognitive arousal: Alertness. A link between attention and a reduction in interference 
has been established, but what mechanism is behind it?  A high level of alertness is one of the 
main components of attention (Posner & Boies, 1971). Therefore, if an individual was 
cognitively aroused by the task it may modulate selectivity of attentive focus towards task-
relevant information and towards arousing stimuli (the opposite of an NRI/diversion 
distractor), which would make the process of retrieval of the stimuli from WM easier, 
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through the cognitive processes involved in encoding, maintenance and updating of the 
information whilst being attentive (Fougnie, 2008; Sharot & Phelps, 2004; Souza & 
Oberauer, 2016). The tendency to focus attention towards more cognitively arousing stimuli 
items causes similar effects to the Retro-Cue, with less arousing stimuli experiencing a 
hindered recall by a narrowing of attention towards arousing stimuli, and away from the 
lesser arousing stimuli (Easterbrook, 1959; Sharot & Phelps, 2004). This indicates that 
alertness and attention are related constructs, with cognitive arousal mediating attention and 
alertness towards task-relevant goals. This is how focusing on task-relevant information aids 
in learning and recall. An understanding of this role may help to further reduce the effects of 
interference.  
A case has been made for the positive effects of attention, alertness and focus in 
reducing NRI, but what if the attention to task-relevant information is low? One such 




MW is usually defined as self-generated task-unrelated thought (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015), and MW whilst encoding new memories is costly (Risko et al., 2012). MW during 
encoding may also exacerbate the effects of RI, as the recall hinderance caused by MW may 
result from the same processes as NRI (through hindered rehearsal and maintenance). However, 
this has not been properly tested in prior research and MW can occur during encoding, whilst 
NRI is operationalised during the retention/storage phase.  
External distraction and MW are considered within the recent literature of attention as two 
distinct constructs with overlapping and correlating variance, therefore incorporating the two 
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constructs within attention fuels understanding of cognitive abilities such as WM capacity and 
fluid intelligence (e.g., problem solving or identifying patterns [Unsworth & McMillan, 2014]). 
As Unsworth and McMillan mention, the ability to focus attention on goal-related information 
and sustain this attention against distractors is one of the key hallmarks of cognitive ability, as it 
is needed to prevent undesired and unsolicited lapses of attention which may result in detrimental 
performance. Both MW and external distractions can invoke task unrelated thoughts (TUT). 
External distractions are distractions away from task-related attention caused by the external 
environment (such as noise pollution from an open window or visual information from video 
billboards whilst driving). The influence of this form of distraction is reduced/controlled for 
within the experiments in this thesis due to exam conditions within quiet rooms.  
MW is considered to be part of a meta-cognitive process known as ‘meta-awareness’ 
whereby individuals do not realise that they are engaging in TUTs and must become aware before 
re-directing attention back to the task (Smallwood et al., 2007). Smallwood et al. argue that when 
an individual engages in MW the awareness of the external environment ceases to be of impact, 
with a focus now towards a natural process of inner thought processing. MW represents a 
‘baseline’ of thought processes which discontinue during the focus of a task, but the mind 
naturally reverts back to following a lack of external engagement (Mason et al., 2007; Schooler, 
2004). This is further supported by a study conducted by Mason et al. (2007) which found that 
MW is associated with default brain regions which activate when the brain is at rest, with periods 
of reduced executive command producing increased incidences of MW. Therefore, a mentally 
engaging task may reduce the frequency of MW occurrences. 
Finally, MW can be described as an internal factor which can be influenced by the 
external environment (befitting the findings of Craig et al., 2014), and MW whilst encoding new 
memories is costly (Risko et al., 2012). A notable feature is that recognising and attempting to 
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correct MW (in an attempt to increase attention) is a meta-cognitive function whereby some 
individuals may struggle and therefore become more susceptible to MW, thereby suffering the 
negative impairing effects upon learning potential cause by internally, nonspecific interfering 
thoughts. 
Flow 
The antithesis of MW is the ‘flow state’ whereby individuals are ‘in the zone’ thereby 
effortlessly present and strongly focused on the task at hand to the extent that a suppression 
of self-consciousness occurs (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). It is a positive experimental state that 
is linked to motivation and occurs when the skill of the individual equals the challenge of the 
task (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Jackson & Marsh, 1996). One of the preconditions of entering 
flow is the development of interest in a challenging activity where the individual has skills to 
achieve clearly defined goals. In this way flow is argued to be “a force for expansion in 
relation to the individual’s goal and interest structure, as well as for growth of skills in 
relation to an existing interest.” (Nakamura, & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014, p. 92). 
To construct an a priori position on factors that may reduce NRI and MW resulting 
from task irrelevant information and thought, it is logical to explore motivational factors of 
learning and attention— such as interest development— that induce the opposing state of 
MW: Attention and flow.   
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Learning and Interest 
 
When aiming to explore factors which may reduce the hindering effects of NRI on recall, 
investigating factors which increase learning (the antithesis of forgetting) and attention may be 
useful. The motivational factor of ‘interest’ will be explored to see if the positive effects of 




The current interest literature has two main points of focus: (i) individual interest in 
content or preferences for particular object domains; (ii) interestingness as a modulator and 
trigger of situational interest (interest in the environmental factors such as the experimental task 
or the interestingness of text). Krapp, Hidi, and Renniger (1992; 2014) separate topic and 
situational interest as psychological constructs linked with increased knowledge and positive 
emotions along with an increased reference value (similar pattern of results enabling accurate 
predictions).  Situational interest is considered to be evoked suddenly from the environment and 
therefore is typically short-term and can be shared by individuals within the same environment, 
following certain themes. For example, something shocking and dangerous happening in a talent 
show creates novelty and therefore evokes situational interest amongst a large number of 
audience members within potentially similarly shared themes and could therefore potentially lead 
to a long-term basis of individual interest (i.e.  a new individual proclivity for going to talent 
shows or magic acts). In such a way, situational interest evokes a positive emotional state that 
brings individuals to be more present and focused in a similar way to the other person-activity 




Within the context of this thesis, interest has been contextualised using Renninger et al. 
(2014) as a guide (see Figure 1.2). Topic interest is contextualised as actualized interest. 
Actualized interest is content specific with an intrinsic motivational orientation, which means that 
an individual with personal interest in the topic will be more motivated to continue learning 
within it. Within this thesis, actualized interest can also take the form of subjective interest 
(McGillivray, 2013) through dispositional individual interest factors modulating the experience 
Figure 1.2. Figure reprinted from Krapp, A., Hidi, S., Renninger, K. A. (1992). 
Interest, Learning, and Development. In K. A. Renniger, S. Hidi, A. Krapp (Eds). The Role of 
Interest in Learning and Development, (p. 10). Elbraum Associates. The figure shows the 
separation and link between types of interest. 
Figure redacted for online publication to prevent copyright 
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of interestingness (Rotgans & Schmitt, 2018) experiences relating to interestingness of the stimuli 
formed by personal pre-existing individual interest dispositions (Rotgans & Schmidt, 2018). 
Situational interest is best conceptualized as a measure of ‘interestingness’ i.e., of the learning 
environment and therefore, shared interestingness of the text or experimental task itself. It has 
been shown that the experience of interest results in intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
Topic interest (TI) is a form of actualised interest, which is content specific. The interest 
generated is personal and seen as motivational, leading to continued effort in the face of setbacks 
which may increase performance (Schiefele, 1991; Schraw & Lehman, 2001).  
Due to the lack of a lead cohesive contextualisation of both topic interest and situational 
interest among researchers, the study literature rarely compares/measured topic interest and 
situational interest together in the way this thesis intends (actualized interest vs. interestingness 
vs. individual experience of interestingness). Therefore, for the purpose of exploring interest 
within this thesis, the above contextualisation of topic interest as actualized interest (and 
interestingness as a form of situational interest) is adopted and will be developed throughout.  
Evidence for a link between interest and learning can be seen in studies of text-based 
interest (Schiefele & Krapp, 1996). The previous literature between text and interest show a 
positive connection between the two, within a learning context (Garner & Gillingham 1991; 
Hidi & McLaren 1988; Schiefele, 1996, Shirey & Reynolds, 1988). This text-based interest is 
formed as a result of the emotional state being aroused by certain features/characteristics of 
the text. In this way, text-based interest is seen to measure the ‘interestingness’ of the 
different aspects of the text. Therefore, the text-based research may be linked as a form of 
situational interest.  
It is useful to look at text-based interest within its own domain and the aspects within 
it. When researched separately from situational interest, text-based interest provides the 
39 
 
researcher with themes and characteristics of interestingness within a text. The importance of 
these themes/characteristics was first highlighted by a study conducted by Bernstein (1955). 
This study indicated that there were two components towards a text’s interestingness: (i) the 
characteristics, and (ii) personal aspects of the reader (Bernstein, 1955).  
These themes were further supported by Krapp, Hidi, Renniger, et al. (1992) on 
novelty, character identification, life themes, intensity of actions, and the imagery value 
(Anderson et al., 1987; Hidi & Baird, 1988). The influence of the personal characteristics to 
the reader (within the text) was first found by Hid and Baird’s (1988) content analysis that 
‘interestingness’ of the text increased the understanding of concrete, specific and personally 
involving information. However, no significant differences were found for the acquisition of 
abstract and scientific information.   
Craik and Tulving (1975) argued that the deeper the level of cognitive processing 
during the encoding phase, the easier it is to activate the episodic memory trace during 
retrieval, leading to a greater potential for recall, consolidation and a greater degree of 
understanding of the stimuli/material. Related to this point, Marton and Säljö (1984) found 
that students who were less interested in the materials were less motivated to perform during 
the task and less likely to display a great level of understanding of the stimuli in comparison 
to those who were more interested. More interested individuals attempted to find a deeper 
level of understanding of the text, leading to greater semantic processing.  
A later study by Schiefele and Krapp (1996) supported the link between interest and 
semantic processing with regards to greater performance and understanding, as the complex 
and deep comprehension questions presented as text stimuli were found to be highly 
significant predictors of recall when combined with highly interested participants. Combined, 
these studies show that interest and semantic thought are interlinking factors to be considered 
when conducting an experiment into RI susceptibility. When choosing the to be remembered 
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stimuli, the intrinsic meaningfulness potential of that stimuli should be considered to increase 
the elicitation of semantic thought processes, whilst the participant’s individualistic and 
extrinsic interest levels should be measured to observe the overall impact of semantic 
processing. 
Both topic and situational interest have been shown to increase memory retention in 
participants (Hidi, 1990) as interest causes a facilitative effect on text-based learning (Hidi, 
1990). Hidi found that higher levels of situational interest induce greater text recall, creating a 
positive effect on learning. As such, greater interest in memorised material may help decrease 
RI. 
A meta-analysis of psychological research spanning 60 years with 60 studies of 
interest (involving 568 correlations) was reviewed by Nye et al. (2012). The correlations 
were analysed using a regression-based approach (the mean score as a total was taken from 
each study for multiple factors), examining the extent to which interest influences 
performance. Nye et al. found a positive correlation between high interest levels and a high 
level of performance within the learning context, providing a large evidence base for the 
assumption that interest is an important motivational factor. It is reasonable to conclude that a 
larger degree of semantic processing (greater thought about the nature of the stimuli) may be 
elicited due to interest and therefore the encoding and retrieval of the information to and from 
the long-term memory store is made easier, creating a better condition for learning.  
Another explanation for the increase in recall resulting from interest is that of the 
potential link between interest and the flow state. It has been shown that both are factors of 
motivation that leads to a positive experiential experience of increase in attention resulting in 
improved performance.  In contrast, a lack of interest in the subject material may lead to a 
disengagement from it, and MW (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015). Further increasing the 
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potential for NRI related recall hindrance. This will be explored throughout the thesis to 




To measure the effects of interest on learning and recall it is important first to choose 
the stimuli that best elicit it. Sadoski et al. (1993) examined the characteristics of stimuli, 
including interest, and concluded that ease of imagery was the most important factor in 
determining recall. Following from this, and understandably, the type of stimuli has been 
shown to have a large influence on the level of information lost to RI. For example, Bower et 
al.’s (1994) study showed that if the stimuli list was congruent (consonant with consonant, 
numbers with numbers) rather than mismatched, then the recall would be much greater. With 
the nature of the stimuli being shown to be largely important in relation to the elicitation or 
resistance of RI, it is important to understand what type of information/material helps to 
facilitate learning. This provides further support for Craik and Tulving’s (1975) semantic 
processing hypothesis. 
As seen previously, the study of text-based interest and of deeper processing theories 
of learning contain a strong semantic/verbal component. In exploring interest and RI together 
there must be some cohesion in the stimuli used. Exploring forgetting through the use of 
meaningful verbal stimuli would allow for greater parsimony to be found between these 
factors.  
In line with the shallow-processing theory, an experiment into RI by King and Cofer 
(1960) used Miller-Selfridge lists which contained a series of passages which differ in 
contextual constraint to differ the degree of connectedness of the stimuli. This uncovered a 
complex link between meaningful connectedness and RI. By utilizing prose stimuli, King and 
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Cofer concluded that with no connectedness RI occurs, but with complete connectedness RI 
had rarely been obtained. Anderson and Myrow, (1971) argued that this was due to the 
verbatim recall used within King and Cofer’s experiment combined with rote learning and 
Young (1974) argues that this results from the participant anticipating the recall phrase 
immediately following one phrase, as they are presented in the same order. This would 
encourage recall in order of presentation rather than revealing potential links between 
connections and meanings of the stimuli. 
Although meaningful verbal prose contains a complex link to RI with a potentially 
weakened (though important) impact (McGeoch & McKinney,1934), the nonsense syllables 
used in historical RI studies would not elicit measurable or comparable interestingness effects 
between stimuli, as measured during text-based interest studies.  As this thesis aims to 
examine the effects of MW and interest on NRI, the stimuli produced should also involve 
verbal learning. This would be consistent with the previous interest literature, be more akin to 
real life learning (as opposed to nonsense syllables) and allow for an exploration of the 




The Current Project 
 The primary focus of the research covered in this thesis involves taking the 
epistemological approach of cognitive memory and forgetting research, while incorporating 
the educational psychology domain of motivated learning through interest development. This 
enables the exploration of factors which may decrease NRI-based forgetting and thus increase 
learning potential. Factors such as wakeful rest, MW and various forms of interest were 
tested within a short-term (five-minute retention intervals) learning and recall setting by 
comparing conditions where NRI is present contrasted against a control.  
As previously covered, there is a lack of congruence within the literature regarding 
overall effects of NRI. A novel investigation of the findings is provided by this thesis by 
incorporating condition-order variables into the analyses. This is in an attempt to investigate 
cognitive load/processing (i.e., TBRS) or temporal distinctiveness models of forgetting, and 
establish whether these factors influence the likelihood of uncovering NRI effects.  The 
current thesis therefore aims to test the reliability, through replicability, of NRI findings.  
Secondarily, a behaviouristic cognitive processing account for interest effects on memory 
will be explored by testing the role and measurement of different forms of interest covered in 
the literature: Individual and subjective interest, situational interest, and interestingness. 
Main research questions 
(i) How reliable are the findings of NRI effects on verbal recall? (ii) Are the effects of 
NRI best explained by rapid decay through cognitive load processing or mechanisms of 
interference such as consolidation or temporal distinctiveness? (iii) Can interest in the 
stimuli or environment modulate MW and NRI effects in a short-term learning 
environment? (iv) How do the various forms of interest increase learning within a short-





NRI, MW, and interest are factors that have been shown to influence recall scores. 
Specifically, greater interest scores have been shown to have a positive impact on learning whilst 
NRI and MW has been shown to have an adverse effect. However, a link has not yet been tested 
between these three factors within an experimental design. These factors will be explored within 
an experimental design with a correlational element utilizing a regression analysis and measured 
using self-report scales and the prob-capture method of MW. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the meta-analysis of 60 years of interest and learning studies 
conducted by Nye et al. (2012) used a regression-based approach to determine that interest was a 
significant motivational factor of learning, demonstrating that interest in the material is well 
established as a factor of increasing learning potential. Conversely, a lack of interest in the 
subject material may lead to a disengagement from it, facilitating MW (Smallwood & Schooler, 
2015) as a form of NRI. Measuring MW is difficult due to its role within meta-cognitive 
functioning and awareness (explored in page 33), however, Schooler (2004) states that the probe-
capture method which measures MW through occasional overt prompts/probes does not require 
meta-awareness and thus is a useful baseline for measuring the frequency of MW occurrences.  
Following this, Smallwood et al. (2009) conducted a study which tested the extent to 
which interest influenced TUT of a prospective or retrospective nature.  A participant’s interest in 
the stimuli was measured on a self-report scale from 1-5. Results showed that interest greatly 
reduced both retrospective and prospective TUT (or MW), leading to greater recall scores.  
However, the study failed to take into account that there are two types of situational interest. This 
meant that situational interest generated by the task itself was not measured and the increased 
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focus resulted from the participant’s interaction with the interestingness of the stimuli. 
Consequently, the results may be attributed to the influence of interestingness (naturally 
generated stimuli-based interest (Krapp et al., 1992), and state-dependent situational interest was 
not accounted for and will be explored within the current experiment to test whether state-
dependent situational interest reduces instances of MW. This then relates to NRI as attention is 
one of the primary components of WM, as one of the main functions of WM is the ability to resist 
the distraction (both internal and external) and disruption of encoding or consolidation of the 
memory trace caused by irrelevant information (Fougnie, 2008; Oberauer et al., 2012) and task 
irrelevant information is a primary form of NRI. Finally, eliciting NRI with use of S-T-D tasks 
will further test the null NRI findings of Fatania and Mercer (2017) and provide greater context to 




With a re-emergence of RI as a research focus, along with the recent attempts at 
contextualisation and reaching uniformity on the concept of ‘interest’ as a factor of memory, it is 
important to increase the knowledge surrounding potentially influential factors surrounding RI, 
and to distinguish what role interest plays within an interference-filled environment. For example, 
it is important to understand whether interest in the stimuli or the experiment (learning 
environment) could provide a greater amount of resistance to forgetting caused by RI whilst 
testing the reliability of NRI effects.  
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This study will measure the relationship between state situational interest, topic 
interestingness, and MW to observe the influence this has (if any) on a memory’s resistance to 
RI.  
Firstly, it is hypothesized that there will be a negative effect of NRI on recall. Secondly, 
the higher the score of MW the lower the recall score (vice versa). Thirdly, it is hypothesised that 
high scores of both situational and topic interest will reduce the influence of MW, leading to 
greater recall in both the control and interference groups, indicating a reduction in information 
lost due to RI and a greater potential for consolidation (Krakauer et al., 2005). Conversely, with 
the link already established by Smallwood et al. (2009), lower topic interestingness ratings will 
lead to a more significant amount of MW than situational interest in the experiment, with interest 
mediating the effects of MW. Finally, it is hypothesised that if no overall NRI effects are found, 





Participants were first year undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Wolverhampton. There were 121 participants in total (101 females, 17 males, 3 unspecified) aged 
18 to 53 (M = 23, SD = 7.59). All students were assigned to one of six groups for the university 
module; therefore, sample size was determined by the opportunistic nature based on module 






A projector was situated at the front of the classroom which displayed a PowerPoint 
presentation which contained facts lists (A and B). There were 40 facts in total (see appendix A1) 
which were gathered via a Google search for facts/interesting facts; each fact was of 
approximately similar word length, and the facts spanned different topics (history, sports, 
animals, etc.). They were chosen at random. The accuracy of the facts was simply assumed, and 
all facts were randomly assigned to either List A or List B, keeping a reasonable spread of topics 
within each. Below are some examples of facts used:  
“Camouflaging polar bears cover their black noses with their paws”. 
“The average NFL game consists of 12 minutes playing time”. 
“The Bible is the most shoplifted book in the world”. 
A consent sheet was used which informed participants of the ethics involved. An answer 
booklet was provided containing eight sections. Firstly, there was a demographic information 
sheet requesting details about participant sex and age. This was followed by the list 1 section 
which included 20 interest scales for each fact (40 in total, one per fact). Interest was rated from 
one (not at all interested) to five (extremely interested). Three MW prompts were used and 
Figure 2.1.  S-T-D task example. 
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included the prompt “Please rate the extent to which you were mind wandering.” Participants 
responded on the MW scales from one (not mind wandering at all) to 10 (mind wandering 
completely) as part of the probe-capture method (Schooler, et al., 2004). The next part of the 
booklet included either the control waiting sheet (“You will now be asked to wait for five minutes 
in silence. Please do not turn over the page until instructed to do so”), or seven random and 
simple S-T-D tasks (See Figure 2.1 below) which were obtained by free online sources from a 
quick Google search (see appendix B1). 
 Section 4 contained a free recall answer sheet for list 1. The second half of the answer 
booklet repeated sections two and four whilst replacing section three with the opposing condition. 
Finally, the answer booklet concluded with two self-report scales. One measured situational 
interest (using a 1-5 scale) where participants rated how interesting the found the study as a 
whole. Another 1-5 scale rated the interest of the spot-the-difference tasks (this applied to the 
interference condition only (see appendix C1). Finally, a debrief was used to detail the purpose 
and aims of the study. 
Design 
 
The present study contained a repeated measures design which provides a greater control 
over participant (individual differences) variables, and a large sample of volunteer participants. In 
return for their voluntary participation, participants/students received a simplified sample dataset 
(whereby the demographic information was fictionalised to aid anonymity) to work on in their 
module. The facts lists were counterbalanced for the six groups as shown in Table 2.1. However, 
the number of participants available and the opportunistic nature of the sample meant that the 





The study employed an experimental design at its core, with a correlational element. As a 
repeated measures design, all participants were subjected to both of the (IV1) conditions: control 
(C) vs. interference (I). These conditions were presented in two separate orders: I-C, C-I (IV2).  
The number of facts correctly recalled was measured (DV).  
For the correlational component the study also measured the influence of different 
predictor values on recall (DV). These were levels of MW (PV1), topic interest (PV2), situational 
interest (PV3) and interest in in the interference task itself (PV4). 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place on two consecutive days. Each day consisted of three 
consecutive groups (one group per hour) and each group experienced both the control and 
interference tasks. Participants on the first day received the control condition first then the 
 C-I  I-C 
A-B 19 49 
14 B-A 39 
 Table 2.1 
Number of participants within each group of the Interference-Control (I-C) 
and the Control-Interference (C-I) conditions 
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interference condition (C-I order), whilst the participants on the second day received the 
conditions in a reversed order (interference followed by control; I-C). 
Under exam conditions, participants were presented with a PowerPoint presentation at the 
front of the classroom, then briefed on the process and aims of the experiment, along with 
information on ethical issues (the demographic dataset returned to students was fictionalised to 
aid anonymity) and rights to withdraw/voluntary participation. Following this, participants were 
handed the consent form to sign before participation, and the answer booklet. On the first page of 
the booklet participants were required to write down their demographic information (sex and age) 
before the experiment started.  
 
 
From this stage each experiment took approximately 30 minutes from start to finish. The 
timings were pre-set into the presentation to ensure that the structure was followed, with different 
Figure 2.2. Three phase methodology used in Experiment 1. 
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versions of the slides being used to provide the order necessary for that group.  The arrangements 
for each separate group are shown in Table 2.1 above.  Each group experienced the same design, 
differing in the list order and condition order.  
As Figure 2.2 shows, each condition (interference/control) contained three phases. Phase 
1 was the fact presentation. Participants were shown 20 facts from either List A or List B. These 
facts were presented individually, for eight seconds each, during which participants were asked to 
report in the answer sheet how interested they were in the fact presented. This was reported via a 
Likert scale provided within the answer sheet (one per fact). The slides changed automatically 
after eight seconds, with no delay between the slides. After the sixth, fourteenth and twentieth 
facts, participants were prompted with a MW question, where participants rated the extent to 
which they mind wandered or engaged in TUT at that moment in time. These three scales were 
positioned at the bottom of the page. Participants were provided with nine seconds to do this.  
Following the fact presentation was phase 2: The retention interval. Both the control and 
the interference condition’s retention interval were equivalent in time (five minutes), and during 
the control condition participants were prompted to remain silent for a quiet resting period. They 
had previously been informed not to use their mobile phones in an attempt to reduce interference 
and replicate the “wakeful rest” arrangement used by Mercer (2015). However, in some instances 
this proved to be difficult to quietly prevent within the large classroom. During the interference 
retention interval participants were instructed to attempt the S-T-D tasks within the answer 
booklet. This was included to facilitate NRI.   
After the retention interval participants were asked to write down as many facts (or partial 
facts) as they could remember, in Phase 3 of the experiment. Participants had four minutes to 
recall as many as possible.  This process was then repeated for the corresponding condition. If 
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participants experienced the controlled waiting period first, the interference task was next, and 
vice versa. Similarly, if the participants experienced List A first, List B would be second, and 
vice versa.  At the end of the experiment participants were requested to fill out a final self-report 
sheet.  This contained two Likert scales reporting the level of interest (situational) in the 
experiment, and the level of interest in the distractor task. Finally, participants were thanked for 
their participation and reminded that an X at the front of their booklet would omit their responses 




A strict scoring procedure for marking the accuracy of the responses was adhered to and 
was as follows:  If the participant had reported half a recalled fact which is still resembling a fact, 
it was given ½ a mark.  A fact which was fully incorrect scored 0, however, if the full phrase was 
half correct, half incorrect, it was awarded ½ a mark. Also, if the fact was different in only one 
way (i.e., number) it was classed as correct and awarded 1 mark, but only if the new meaning was 
not incorrect. Finally, if a fact was presented and correct but details were lost that are greater than 
one difference, ½ a mark is awarded (see Appendix A4 for a marked example). To account for 
missing data for interest scores of each fact (20 per fact list), the total interest scores were 
averaged, as long as the number of missing variables did not exceed five per variable, in which 
case the participant data was omitted. An average was also provided for the MW scores to 
account for similar instances of partial responses (i.e., one missing scale of six would lead to the 
sum divided by five). To deal with the missing data an average score across all probes provided 
an indication of the overall level of MW without removing the whole participant data. 
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Fifteen participants’ responses were removed for attempting to recall the S-T-D tasks, 
missing five or more interest ratings, or attempting to recall the same facts list twice. This left 
121 participant data for analysis from the original 136. Intrusion recall errors from prior lists were 
uncommon (less than 20 from all participants). 
Individual list comparisons 
Figure 2.3 shows mean averaged interest ratings per list per group, indicating that there 
was a slight overlapping difference between List A (M = 3, SD = .63) and List B (M =3.2, SD = 
.63).   
  




Figure 2.4. Mean Fact Recall for List A and List B. 
 
The t-tests found a significant difference between List A (M = 5.24, SD = 2.18) and List B (M 
= 4.79, SD = 2.15)  (t[120] =  2.1 p =.04, d =.19) for recall, indicating that more facts were 
recalled from List A than List B, in spite of the overlap shown in Figure 2.4. List A facts (M 
= 3.04, SD =.63) were rated as slightly less interesting than List B facts (M = 3.15, SD = .62) 
on average as well, with a mean difference of .11 (t [121] = -2.3, p =.02, d =.21) indicating 
that there is a slight increase in recall for List A. The extent to which this impacts the 




The Effect of Interference  
 
 
Figure 2.5 shows a decline in mean recall from the first task to the second task for I-
C, with overlapping confidence intervals indicating a small difference. A larger decline 
occurs for the second task in the C-I condition. For the between-subjects’ comparisons, the 
control conditions show very similar recall occurred whilst the comparison between the two 
interference conditions show a larger difference with no overlap. In summary, having the 
interference condition after the control condition led to the lowest recall scores. 
  




A Two-Way Mixed ANOVA was conducted to compare recall scores in the control and 
interference conditions, along with the condition order, to test whether one memory task 
condition influenced the other within a repeated measures design.  
Condition had no significant effect on recall scores, F (1, 119) = 0.9, p = 0.34, ηp
2 < .01. 
This suggested no difference between recall in the control (M = 5.1, SE = .21) and interference 
(M = 4.9, SE =.18) conditions. For the between-subjects effects, the order of the conditions was 
non-significant (F [1,119] = 2.22, p = 0.14, ηp
2 = .02 ), therefore whether the experiment was 
completed under order I-C  (M = 5.25, SE = .23) or order C-I (M = 4.76, SE = .24)  caused no 
significant difference on recall scores. However, the results showed there was a significant 
interaction between condition order and condition itself, (F[1, 119] = 26.40, p = 0.002, ηp
2 =  
0.08), as both conditions (interference and control) experienced lower mean recall scores for the 
second memory task when compared to the respective condition’s mean scores in the first 
memory task (see Figure 2.5).  
To explore the interaction further, paired t-tests were conducted to compare recall scores 
for the control and interference conditions when split by order. The difference between recall 
scores was not significant when the control condition was second and interference first (I-C; t[62] 
= -1.5; p = 0.14, d = 0.19). However, the results for C-I – where interference occurred after 
control – show that the difference was significant, t(57) = 3; p = 0.02 d = .39. Combined with 
Figure 2.6, it is clear that recall scores were significantly lower when interference was the second 
memory task.  
A second set of independent t-tests show that when interference was the first condition (I-
C) compared to when interference occurred later (C-I), there was a significant difference t(119) =  
-3.18, p < .01, d =  0.58. This shows that participants in the late-occurring interference group had 
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greater interference effects and hence lower recall scores compared to those who experienced 
interference in the first task. All t-tests p values were corrected using the Holm--Šidák correction.    
This decrease was not present for the early control vs. late-occurring control, t(119) = .42, 
p = .68, d = 0.07. Decreases in recall scores for the late condition only occur between groups for 
the interference condition, which had significantly lower recall scores for both within and 
between-subjects comparisons.  
Regression 
 
Table 2. 2   
Means and Standard Deviations for Interest and MW (averaged) scores split by Condition 
 M SD 
Interest Control 3.1 .62 
Interest Interference 3.07 .64 
MW Control 4.06 1.92 
MW Interference 4.06 1.92 
 
Table 2.2 shows that MW and Interest scores were very similar for both conditions.  
It was hypothesised that higher interest scores would lead to higher recall scores, but higher MW 
would decrease recall scores. Two multiple regression analyses were conducted to determine 
whether the three predictor variables (MW, situational interest, and topic interest) were 
significant predictors of recall. Regressions were performed separately for the control and 
interference conditions.   
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Predictors for the control condition.   
The first regression measured the effects of the three factors (MW, situational interest, 
and topic interest) on recall scores in the control condition. The results showed that when 
combined, the model significantly predicted recall scores for the control condition, F(3, 117) = 
6.76, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.15, R2adjusted = 0.13. 
Each factor was measured individually to test the strength of the predictors and provide a 
more detailed understanding of their effects. 
The results showed a significant negative relationship between MW and recall in the 
control condition (t(119) = -1.98, p = 0.05). This shows that recall scores were lower and 
therefore negatively affected when MW was high, indicating that MW is a significant negative 
predictor of recall.  
Situational interest was found to be a strongly significant positive predictor of recall, 
t(119) = 3.96, p < 0.001. This suggests that the participants who, when thinking reflectively, 
reported their situational interest to be high achieved higher recall scores.  
Topic/individual interest scores (measured during the retention phase) had no significant 
impact on recall scores for the control condition (t(119) =  -0.25, p = 0.8), indicating that 





Predictors for the RI condition.  
 The second regression measured the effects of the same three factors (MW, situational 
interest, and topic interest) on recall in the interference condition.  When combined the results of 
the regression were similar to the control condition, as the overall model was significant, F(3, 
117) = 7.03, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.15, R2adjusted = 0.13). 
Again, each factor was measured individually to test the strength of the predictors and 
provide a more detailed understanding of their effects. This potentially reveals a difference 
between the predictors of recall within an RI setting vs. a control.  
For the interference condition, topic interest was a strongly significant positive predictor 
of recall for the interference condition, t(119) = 2.92, p < 0.01. Therefore, the higher the averaged 
interest score for the facts, the better the recall.  
Like with the control condition, MW was shown to be a significant negative predictor of 
recall scores for the interference condition, t(119) = -2.45, p = 0.02. 
The final factor measured within this regression, situational interest, was shown to be a 
non-significant predictor of interference recall, t(119) = 1.35,  p = 0.18. This suggests that 





Mediation analysis for control condition 
 
To test hypothesis 3 of a potential link between interest, MW and recall, a mediation 
analysis was conducted to test whether situational interest mediated the effect of MW on 
recall for the control condition.  MW did not predict situational interest scores with the model 
only explaining 1% of the variance, F(1, 199) = 1.29, MSE = 1.11, p = .26, R2 =. 01, b = .06, 
t(1, 119) = 1.14, p =.26, confidence intervals at 95% [-.04, .16]. Figure 2.6 shows the b 
coefficients and significance for each pathway. There was a no significant indirect effect of 
MW on Recall (b =.04 with confidence intervals of 95% crossing 0 [-.03, .13]) showing that 
there was no significant mediation.  
  




Mediation analysis for the NRI condition  
The next mediation analysis examined performance within the NRI condition. This 
was tested again with topic interest replacing situational interest to see whether topic interest 
mediated the direct effect of MW on recall. MW did not predict topic interest scores with the 
model only explaining .3% of the variance, F(1, 119) = .45, MSE = .41, p = .51, R2 < .01, b = 
.02, t(1, 119) = .67, p =.5, confidence intervals at 95% [-.04, .08]. Figure 2.7 shows the b 
coefficients and significance for each pathway. There was no significant mediation effect of 
MW through topic interest on Recall (b = .02, with confidence intervals of 95% crossing 0 
[.02, .34]) showing that there was no significant mediation effect. 
 
  





The experiment aimed to explore the role of NRI effects in hindering recall, while 
investigating three other factors: the negative effect of MW, the positive effects of interest, and 
the potential mediation of MW by interest.  
 
MW and Interest 
The results for interest differed based on type and condition. State situational interest 
was associated with increased recall scores during the control condition but not the 
interference condition. Global topic interest ratings were associated with increased recall in 
the NRI condition but not the control. As explained by Krapp et al. (1992), state situational 
interest is a low-level form of interest which is short lasting and environmentally cued. 
Personal or individual interest, however, is more enduring than situational interest in the 
environment (Schiefele. 1999; Schraw & Lehman, 2001). Should a subsequent link between 
interest and NRI be established it would be accepted that the more enduring individual 
interest was necessary to increase recall during the more demanding task (NRI), whilst 
situational interest in the environment was sufficient to increase recall during the less 
demanding task while not salient enough to carry over to a more demanding task.  
The results for both regression analyses within this experiment further support previous 
literature that higher levels of MW during the encoding phase results in impaired recall (Risko et 
al., 2012; Smallwood et al., 2009).  One possibility for this is the theory that MW such as that 
elicited by autobiographical thinking provides an internal form of concurrent NRI within the 
encoding phase (Craig et al., 2014; Dewar et al., 2014), and poorer encoding of the memory trace 
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or a failure to encode (Fougnie, 2008; Risko et al., 2012). This concept is supported within this 
experiment, which found a hindering effect of MW on recall in both conditions, though a 
cumulative effect of NRI could explain the larger effect found in the interference condition, when 
compared with the control.  
Contrary to the findings of Smallwood et al. (2009), a link between either global 
topic/individual interest or state situational interest and MW was not established. However, as 
MW was measured directly at various points using thought probes, it is possible that any TUT 
resulting from external distractors would be measured by participants as MW, as the cue itself 
was too specific and failed to distinguish between task-related interference of thoughts, external 
distractions, and MW. This means that participants may report any external distraction or 
deviation in conscious effort as MW (internal distraction; Unsworth & Mcmillan, 2014). 
Stawarczyk et al. (2011) found that 21% of thought probes were MW-related and 20% were 
caused by external distraction. Therefore, to explore this effect further subsequent experiments 
should encompass each possible distraction or TUT to account for each variable’s salience.  This 
more in-depth separation of TUT would enable a more accurate exploration as to whether a 
variable of interest valence would mediate MW within recall, as previously argued by Smallwood 




The lack of an overall main effect of NRI on recall falls in line with the prior null findings 
of NRI (Fatania & Mercer, 2017; Martini et al., 2017; Varma et al., 2017). However, exploring 
the interaction through condition-order effects provides a more in-depth analysis into the 
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overlooked minutiae effects involved in the function of NRI, providing a more complex view of 
NRI. One effect revealed here is a potential ‘fatigue effect’ of RI where the late-occurring1 
interference condition experienced the greater ‘drop-off’ in recall scores.  
Further exploration is needed to uncover the true nature of this unique finding. It seems 
plausible that participants may have suffered from an increase in cognitive fatigue, which led to a 
more prevalent effect of RI in the C-I arrangement. However, a number of alternative 
explanations for these results need to be considered before this hypothesis could be accepted. 
Firstly, the two recall tasks were equivalent in both duration and nature, differing only in the 
events of the retention interval.  This means that the prior task list contained associative verbal 
stimuli which may elicit PI, hindering the encoding and thus retrieval of the second task list. 
Secondly, the lack of a statistical difference between the first and second control groups could 
highlight the effectiveness of wakeful rest in reducing the effects of RI, PI or fatigue (Ecker, Tay, 
& Brown, 2015; Mercer, 2015). Wakeful rest refers to a controlled waiting period of reduced to 
low interference. This has been shown to increase recall scores within relatively short periods of 
rest (often a few minutes) and the effects remain up to seven days after encoding (Dewar et al. 
2012). Thirdly, an accumulative cognitive load of associative stimuli and memory task could 
produce response competition and retrieval failure which exacerbates interference effects, 
particularly if this effect requires similar cognitive memory processes (similar type of memory; 
see similarity-based interference section, page 13). Therefore, if the prior memory task was 
visual, this could increase distinctiveness (reducing similarity interference, i.e., feature - 
 
1 Within this thesis late-occurring refers to the latest occurring condition and is not a reference to 
temporal length. The timeframe of the experiments in this thesis remained short (approximately 30 minutes) 
consistent with other  short-term memory experiments. 
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overwriting; Oberauer, 2008) effects and allow more encoding and consolidation resources for 
verbal stimuli (reducing cognitive load effects, i.e. resource depletion; Chen et al., 2017).  
Limitations 
With interestingness of the facts being measured globally, the true individual differences 
nature of a potential mediation of interestingness on the amount of MW elicited by an individual 
is not captured, and prior knowledge of the ‘facts’ was not measured.  
One of the facts in List B was consistently rated low for both interestingness and recall 
and may have influenced the equivalency. Mean and standard deviation scores showed a large 
overlap between mean scores between the lists, but the slight differences were consistent. 
However, List A (which has the higher recall scores) did not influence the ANOVA results as the 
late-occurring interference group which received the worst overall recall consisted mostly of 
participants who experienced List A (therefore the effect may have been slightly stronger 
comparatively). Finally, groups situated nearer to 5pm experience more external distraction from 
outside traffic which was not accounted for in this study.  
 
Conclusion 
Global ratings of interestingness experience differing salience on recall between 
conditions and must be evaluated or reconceptualised. MW and late-occurring diversion/NRI 
have been demonstrated to hinder recall scores during this experiment, though there was a 
nonsignificant effect for overall NRI. This presents a more intricate effect of NRI than covered in 
previous experiments and warrants further exploration. Explanations such as cognitive load, 
similarity-based interference, and cumulative interference (diversion and similarity interference) 






The following experiment is a follow-up study exploring the potential “Fatigue Effect 
of NRI” found in the first experiment (Chapter 2). The first experiment found that within a 
repeated measures design consisting of two memory tasks, the recall of the stimuli was 
significantly impaired when the second memory task contained interference rather than a 
quiet waiting period. It appeared that individuals became less capable of resisting RI when 
they had previously undertaken a memory task, which is termed for the sake of this thesis: 
The Fatigue Effect of NRI. 
“Fatigue is defined as a condition or phenomenon of declined ability and efficiency of 
mental and/or physical activities caused by excessive mental and/or physical activities (…)” 
(Tanaka et al., 2014, p.1). Mental fatigue caused by Time on Task (TOT) has been previously 
shown to impair cognitive performance. In Lim et al.’s (2010) study, fatigue caused by a long 
period of time (16-20 minutes) on the reaction task caused a significant decrease in reaction 
time performance when compared to earlier reaction times (0-4 minutes condition). However, 
the study did find there to be robust individual differences in the rate of fatigue/increased 
reaction times amongst participants. The study also found neuro-imaging differences (not to 
be measured within the present experiment) which showed that TOT led to decreased activity 
of the fronto-parietal network, which plays an important role in directing attention when 
compared with pre-task activity.  
This mental fatigue resulting from task difficulty or TOT is a direct component of 
cognitive load (cognitive load = difficulty of task/time). Barrouillet et al. (2004) argue that 
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cognitive load occurs from two factors in the form of time and resource sharing (captured by 
their TBRS model). As outlined in Chapter 1, this model argues for the mechanism of 
forgetting to be decay resulting from a processing trade-off in WM. The extent of decay is 
dictated by the level of cognitive load, as the main mechanism of cognitive load within WM 
is attention which is necessary for focusing the resources on the maintenance and processing 
of a memory. The time-based aspect is the concept that a memory trace will decay when the 
attention is swapped away from maintenance and the forgetting is caused by longer durations 
on the distractor task as a result of increasing the cognitive load (Lewandowsky et al., 2009).  
Barrouillet et al. (2004) also state that traditional models argue that concurrent tasks (such as 
the rating of each fact for interest during the encoding phase of Experiment 1) increase 
cognitive load by using multiple cognitive resources and therefore significantly hinders 
recall. However, Barrouillet et al. state that this concurrent task is not necessary within the 
TBRS model, with time constraints playing a more significant role through preventing the 
refreshing of decaying memory traces by the moving/reprioritising of attention resources 
within shorter periods of time. In this way, any other attention-demanding task pulls attention 
away from memory maintenance, leading to decay.  
The TBRS model was tested by Oberauer and Lewandowsky’s (2008) study, which 
found that both decay and temporal distinctiveness (which are time-base theories) were 
inadequate at explaining forgetting. Instead, within their study Oberauer and Lewandowsky 
tested three models of forgetting: two time-based models and one interference model. The 
study found that longer delay intervals after encoding did not lead to decreased recall (a 
finding supported by Mercer’s 2015 ‘wakeful rest’ experiment) and rather, the interference 
experiment provided more reliable predictive impairment when cognitive load was high. This 
was due to the evidence that event-based experiments remove decay over time while still 
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preventing the refreshing of memory traces. However, the work on TBRS has focused on 
very short-lived WM for the role of decay in rapid forgetting (see Chapter 1) and may not be 
fully transferable to forgetting that occurs over the course of the experiment or during the 
retention intervals used in Experiment 1 (22 mins in total, five min retention intervals). For 
the fatigue explanation, TOT increases cognitive load, mentally fatiguing cognitive WM 
resources necessary for learning, making one more susceptible to NRI effects.  
Another possibility for the reduced recall within the second memory task in 
Experiment 1 is PI. PI is interference caused by previously learned information hindering the 
retention of newly learned information. In the control group of Experiment 1, there was no 
significantly reduced recall even when the control condition was second. This argues against 
PI. However, it may be possible that including an interpolated RI task with associative 
(similar) stimuli within the second memory task may increase the prevalence of PI itself, 
which could explain the greater degree of recall hindrance to some extent. However, as PI is 
most prominent with associative stimuli that would be linked with response competition and 
cue overload theory, this would suggest that both conditions would experience equally 
hindered recall in the second task. As this was not the case, there must be a more extensive 
look into the role and prevalence of associative vs interpolated PI on recall performance via 
exploring the effects of different forms of engaging cognitive prior-tasks.    
Rationale 
 
This experiment will provide a deeper understanding of the results found in 
Experiment 1 by examining the effects of a prior task on NRI. Different prior tasks were 
provided in different conditions, including a similar memory task (SMT; another verbal fact 
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list) and dissimilar prior tasks (a dissimilar memory task; DMT) and a non-memory task 
(NMT). The intention was to determine whether different prior tasks experience the same 
‘fatigue’ or a ‘cumulative interference’ effect of hindered recall when NRI was present. To 
focus on the prior-task effect, MW is removed here and is explored within Chapter 5 instead.  
The SMT group measured the influence of similarity-based PI or verbal memory 
resource depletion (cumulative effect). The dissimilar task was included to elicit memory 
resource depletion but of a dissimilar nature, whereas the NMT (Stroop) contained a mental 
task to remove the memory fatigue. Finally, a no prior task (NPT) group acted as the control 
condition. The experiment also tested the different role of interest found within Experiment 1. 
Two main hypotheses were tested. HYPOTHESIS 1: By combining the TBRS 
account of cognitive resource sharing with a potential increase in PI and thus response 
competition, it is hypothesised that there will be a linear decline in recall performance for 
these different tasks. Recall will be best in the condition with no prior task, steadily 
decreasing in NMT, to the DMT, and finally leading to the worst recall in the similar 
(associative stimuli) memory task. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Situational and topic interest will be significant predictors of recall, 
with topic interest being most important when interference is most prominent (in line with the 
results of Experiment 1). 
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Figure 3.1. Diagram showing the experimental method used with each of the four groups 
containing identical conditions and order, differing only in the first task condition. The first 
condition lasted 11 minutes and 30 seconds for the first three groups and 0 seconds for the no 












A G*Power analysis based on the C-I effect size (ηp
2 = .14) in Experiment 1 α = .05 
and power of 80% indicates a sample of 18 participants per group 72 in total due to 
recruitment difficulties the experiment consisted of 62 participants (50 females, 12 males) 
split into approximately 15 per group (17 in the no-prior memory task) were recruited. 
Participants had a mean age of 26.7 (SD = 9.14) and were recruited via an opportunity sample 
at the University of Wolverhampton. They consisted primarily of undergraduate psychology 




All experiments were conducted within a University booked room which contained a 
projector for the stimuli. Each experiment had an individualised ‘Information sheet’ which 
differed only in the procedure. A consent sheet was used to obtain informed consent from 
participants via signatures. Each prior condition had an answer booklet consisting of a 
demographic questionnaire requesting the age and sex of the participant, a series of ‘S-T-D’ 
tasks which were identical to Experiment 1 (see Chapter 2), an answer-sheet for participants 
to write down the recalled facts, and a ‘Self-Report’ form. This form contained three Likert 
scales rated from 1 to 10, where participants reported their interest levels for the facts 
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presented (topic interest), the experiment itself (situational interestingness), and the 
interfering task (S-T-D).  
As with the information sheet, the answer booklet differed in the prior task condition 
(which preceded the ‘S-T-D’ stimuli). A PowerPoint presentation was used to show the 
stimuli. The interference task (which succeeds every prior task condition) contained the same 
set of 20 facts as Experiment 1, with one fact per slide. 
 
 Example of facts used across all tasks: 
“An individual blood cell can travel around your body in 60 seconds”. 
“The world’s first paper money was created in China”. 
“The Ancient Egyptians used slabs of stones as pillow”. 
 
Similar Memory Task and No-Prior Task 
 
The SMT procedure was identical to the C-I group in Experiment 1 using the same 
facts, whilst the NPT experienced no control group and proceeded immediately to the facts 
presentation phase for the interference group (see figure 2.2). With the additional recall phase 




The Dissimilar Memory Task  
Fribbles explanation.  To create the DMT, it was necessary to use an activity that 
uses memory but involves stimuli very different to the fact list. A protocol developed by 
Mercer (2014) is thought to be suitable as this involves remembering non-verbal visual 
stimuli over brief delays. The visual stimuli are known as Fribbles and participants performed 
a same/different matching task (see Figure 3.3). Exemplars contain four different parts (or 
appendages), and each part is represented by a different colour. After the delay the test 
exemplar was shown and was either identical to the exemplar or two parts differed in shape 
or colour. In the example below, the two items differ. Participants were asked to indicate 
whether these were the same or different, but the scores were not calculated as this was a 
distractor task. The answer sheet contained two tables (one per level) for participants to 
respond to the Stroop stimuli.   
The presentation contained 22 Fribble trials per level. Level 1 lasted 4 min 2s and 
Level 2 lasted 6 min 58s. The DMT contained an answer sheet with two tables (one table per 
level. See Appendix C2) for participants to respond to the ‘Fribbles’ task. 
Figure 3.1. Fribbles example. Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the 





Non-memory (Stroop) task 
The NMT contained two levels with equal time length. The first level of the Stroop 
involved three changing word colours of changing font colour (49 trials/5min 43s).  The 
second level involved five changing words and font colours (38 trials/5min 42s). To create 
the NMT the classical Stroop task of executive control was used. As the design was simple 
and timed two rounds (5m 30s each) were used to reduce the practice effect and maintain 
participant engagement throughout the 11 minutes. In Figure 3.3 are two of the instruction 
slides.  Participants were asked to respond whether more of the target words are congruent 
than non-congruent in the answer sheet (see Appendix C3).  
  





The present study was an independent measures design measuring the differences 
between four groups, each with a different prior-task (IV). Recall scores were recorded (DV). 
All prior-task groups (SMT, DMT, NMT, & NPT) experienced the same subsequent 
interference task. One group, the SMT group, was identical to Experiment 1’s C-I group. 




All participants experienced the same facts followed by an interference (S-T-D) task 
and a subsequent free recall period. Each group of participants were recruited separately and 
tested within a small experimental room with a maximum of eight participants at a time 
(typically recruitment happened individually). 
The participants were provided with the information sheet corresponding with the task 
condition. A projector showed the PowerPoint slides which explained and provided examples 
of the tasks the participants would be asked to complete, should they consent. The 
experimenter then explained these slides before reiterating ethical concerns, such as the 
ability to withdraw, right to self-determination, confidentiality of the results, and how to 
claim the participation pool credits after completion of the task. Following this, the 
participants were provided with a consent form. After the participants had decided to consent 
to the study, they were handed an answer booklet where the participants filled out the 
demographic information of age and sex, along with their participant pool number for credits. 
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Once this had taken place, the experiment began. The experiment groups lasted 
approximately 30 minutes from this point, as the timings were pre-set within the presentation. 
The timing of the prior tasks of each group (except NPT) were roughly equivalent at eleven 
and a half minutes each. 
 As the NPT group began with the facts list of the interference condition, this 
condition was 11 and a half minutes shorter to conduct. For the DMT, participants were 
shown an exemplar Fribble for 1s, which had to be remembered, followed by a 2 s or 10s 
delay (see above). The delay was followed by either the same or a similar exemplar for 5s. 
For the NMT, a Stroop test was used, where participants had to determine whether the font 
colour was the same or different to the written word colour. For the DMT and the NMT, 
participants responded with either “same” or “different” (presented within a table on the 
answer booklet) for each trial, concurrently. The presentation contained additional blank 
slides as delay periods between trials to prevent potential performance issues arising as a 
result of a concurrent task. Within the DMT, these delays were controlled as a level of 
difficulty, with a 2 s delay for level 1 and a 10 s gap for level 2. As with the DMT, the NMT 
had two levels of progressing difficulty (to keep the participants engaged). Level 1 contained 
three colour words (shown for 5 s) and level 2 contained five colour words (shown for 7 s), 
each with a 2 s gap between trials. Participants were to determine whether there were more 
consistent (same) font colours than contrasting (different) font colours to the word colours.   
After the prior-task, the interference task took place, taking approximately another 11 
and a half minutes. The stimuli consisted of 20 facts which were presented for 8 seconds 
each, shown one after the other. Participants were then asked to attempt the S-T-D tasks 
provided for them within the answer booklet (for five minutes). Immediately following this, 
participants were asked to recall all the facts that they could, within any order, and to attempt 
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partial recall if the full facts could not be remembered. The free recall period lasted for four 
minutes. Once the four minutes were up, the test was over and participants were asked to turn 
over to the self-report questionnaire to rate how interesting they found the experiment, the 
facts, and the S-T-D tasks. Finally, participants were thanked for their participation and 
instructed to present an X on the front of the booklet if they wished to withdraw their data at 






As with Experiment 1, the following approach to scoring recall was used: 
 Half a recalled fact resembling a fact is counted as ½ a mark. 
 If the fact is fully incorrect, it isn’t counted. 
 If the phrase is half correct it’s worth ½ a mark 
✓ If the fact is different in only one way (i.e., number) it will be correct 
(only if the new meaning isn’t incorrect) 








Due to the experimental room change between experiments (classroom environment 
in Experiment 1 vs. a small, controlled experiment room in the current study), an 
independent-samples t-test was used to compare the situational interest ratings from 
Experiment 1 with the ratings for the current experiment (divided by 2 due to a 10 point scale 
used). This aimed to determine whether a closer interaction with the researcher biased the 
interest ratings. There was a strongly significant difference between the mean ratings, with 
participants in Experiment 2 (M  = 3.94, SD  = .94) rating fact interest as higher and with less 
variance than Experiment 1 (M  = 3.36, SD  = 1.08), t(121) =  -3.15, p =  .002, d =  0.57. 
Participants scored Experiment 2 consistently as more interesting, potentially indicating 
participant reactivity whereby participants wish to indicate that the experiment is more 
interesting due to close proximity to the researcher conducting it. 
With the current experiment taking place with smaller groups and involving more 
experimenter-participant interaction than Experiment 1, interest scores are compared through 




















In Figure 3.5 the interest ratings are greatly skewed towards the higher ratings, with 
no participants rating 2 or lower and only one rating 3. 
Figure 3.3. Topic interest scores showing that 56.5% of scores are between 
8-10 with no ratings of 2 or lower. 




Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show interest ratings for Experiment 2, which greatly exceed the ratings 
of Experiment 1 and are skewed from a normal distribution (Figure 3.6) towards higher 
interest ratings. As the task is highly similar to Experiment 1 this potentially demonstrates 
participant reactivity. Though participants may be more motivated in the current experiment 
as they seek the opportunity out themselves (vs Experiment 1, which was part of a practical).  
  





As the reported data is skewed outside of a normal distribution, a Spearman’s rho 
correlation compared topic interest, situational interest, and recall which was collapsed across 
prior task conditions. 
The results of the Spearman’s rho correlations showed no correlation between topic 
interest and recall (rs[60] = .03, p = .84) or situational interest and recall (rs[60] = .07, p = 
.6). Ratings of interest in the current experiment did not correlate with recall. However, topic 
interest and situational interest correlated (rs[60] = .73, p < .001), with high scores in topic 
interest matching the high scores in situational interest.   
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Impact of Prior-task condition on fact recall 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the mean recall scores for each prior-task group, along with the 
confidence intervals for each. The graph shows that the SMT had the lowest mean recall (M = 
4.5, SD = 1.66) followed by the DMT (M = 5.47, SD = 1.74). The control NPT group 
received the second highest recall score, with participants recalling almost one and a half 
more words than in the SMT (M = 5.77, SD = 1.53). Finally, the NMT had the highest mean 
recall score (M = 6.87, SD = 2.51)   
Figure 3.6. Mean correct recall for the four conditions of Experiment 2. 
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Preliminary analysis.  Levene’s test of homogeneity of variance for the four 
independent groups was non-significant (F(3,58) = 1.15, p = .34), therefore the assumption 
of homogeneity of variance for the ANOVA was met. 
Main analysis.  To measure whether there were any significant differences between 
recall scores when participants were exposed to different group prior tasks, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted. The results indicated a significant difference between the group 
recall scores, F(3,58) = 4.00, p = 0.01, ηp
2 = 0.15.  
To further explore the ANOVA recall Tukey HSD post-hoc tests were conducted and 
found the SMT to be significantly different to the NMT (MD = -2.14) p =.02. The Tukey 
HSD test results also found that the differences between each task group to be nonsignificant 
p > .05. Including the comparison between the SMT and the control group NPT (MD = -1.24) 
p = .23.  
To measure whether the SMT experienced a strong NRI/ late-occurring NRI effect 
expected a paired t-test compared recall scores for the early occurring control condition (M = 
6.93, SD = 2.02) vs. the late-occurring NRI condition (M = 4.5, SD = 1.66). As expected the 
t-test found a strong significant NRI effect t(14)= 6.01, p <.001 , d = .94. The results replicate 






The current experiment tested the role of prior-task involvement in the explaining the 
hindered recall scores from Experiment 1, through either similarity-based PI or cognitive 




A frequency analysis showed that although there appeared to be no impact of either 
individual or situational interest on recall scores, participants rated both the experiment and 
the facts as far more interesting than Experiment 1, even though the same facts were reused 
and so were identical to the previous experiment. Additionally, the experiment followed a 
very similar format (with the latter half of the experiment remaining identical).  Therefore, 
although the pages were blocked from the view of the researcher, this closer and more one-to-
one environment is likely to have increased a reactivity bias where participants responded 
that the experiment was more interesting in order to avoid offending the researcher. Although 
less likely, participants may have rated the experiment as more interesting as they chose to 
participate (vs. Experiment 1 where it was an optional part of a mandatory practical). The 
previously reported connection between interest and recall may therefore have been masked 




The Fatigue effect 
 
The results of this experiment provide tentative evidence for the importance of 
temporal isolation of the encoding phase in reducing the effects of both PI and RI, thus 
increasing memory recall (Brown, et al., 2006; Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 2015; Morin, et al., 
2010; Rönnberg, 1980). The NMT was low demanding (with participants often waiting for 
the slide to change having already answered) and thus may have served as a form of ‘active 
rest’ (Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 2015) leading to a reduction of any PI caused by prior lectures, 
seminars, or every day non-specific interfering tasks just as that caused by autobiographical 
thinking (Craig et al., 2014; Dewar et al., 2014). The low-demanding prior-task group 
achieved the greatest recall scores – greater than that of the NPT, further supporting the 
evidence which shows that a passive rest period, though helpful (i.e., Mercer, 2015), is not 
entirely necessary for consolidation of recall to occur (Varma et al. 2017).  A consolidation 
account could explain the greater recall as the result of the (Stroop) NMT preventing 
spontaneous rehearsal (or recollection) of prior-to-experiment memory traces (PI memories 
‘popping’ into thought), while also preventing autobiographical thinking, thus freeing up 
consolidation memory processes by reducing memory resource demand (Varma et al. 2017).  
However, Ecker, Tay, and Brown’s (2015) experiment tested the effect of temporal isolation 
against the freedom of consolidation process resources within their experiments 1 and 2. 
Ecker et al. measured recall of two lists (list 1 and list 2) which were separated by differing 
temporal delays to test pre-study and post-study rest and temporal isolation. Whilst Ecker et 
al. found strong pre-study rest effects similar to the present study for list 2 recall, a greater 
consolidation of list 1 (represented by greater list 1 recall scores) was not found, indicating 
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that the improved recall of list 2 following a longer pre-study rest was not explained by a 
freeing of consolidation processes following successful list 1 consolidation. 
Another explanation of these results is provided by the TBRS model and in particular, 
resource depletion (Chen et al., 2017).  According to Chen et al., resource depletion occurs 
when the prior task hinders performance of the later task by ‘using up’ the available cognitive 
resources within the WM capacity, and hindrance is considerably more potent when the two 
tasks are similar by requiring the same/ similar resources, or are more effortful, thereby 
increasing cognitive load. This effect is decreased by rest periods which enable the 
replenishment of the WM and self-regulatory resources (Tyler and Burns, 2008).  The results 
of the current experiment fit within this framework with the SMT performing the worse, 
followed by the DMT (though the differences between the two were small, the difference 
between SMT and NPT was approaching significance and may have increased with greater 
statistical power). The greater recall performance of the NMT over the NPT is coined within 
this framework as the “spacing effect” as opposed to temporal isolation, though they both 
contain similarities in functionality.  The spacing effect shows an increase in memory 
retention when information is ‘spaced out’ temporally vs. the same information presented all 
at once (crammed). This is sometimes known as the massed vs. spaced effect. Within this 
paradigm the spacing effect could allow the replenishment of WM resources required for 
regulating the encoding and retrieval process. The spacing effect is mapped out in a similar 
fashion to the temporal distinctiveness model, whereby the increased recall effect results 
from more temporally distinct memory traces. Though this pattern is found the statistical 
power provided may not be sufficient to make accept this conclusion and instead, the non-
significance of the differences between the NPT and the other tasks provides an argument 
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against the role of prior-task involvement fatiguing and hindering the late-occurring recall 
condition. 
Limitations 
The skewed interest ratings biased the analysis and so an interest conclusion cannot 
be obtained. The main issue with the current experiment is that of statistical power due to 
recruitment difficulties. Due to using the same stimuli as Experiment 1 the second-year group 
were unable to take part. With few first or third years getting involved with research the 
recruitment process was halted after taking up most of the second year of this thesis.  
Conclusion 
Whilst ‘Temporal Isolation’ and the ‘Spacing effect’ when combined within a WM 
resource sharing framework provide a plausible explanation for the results of Experiment 2 
and is in line with temporal distinctiveness theory (i.e., Glenberg, & Swanson, 1986), there is 
insufficient evidence to fully account for the NMT’s greater recall. In order to show that the 
Stroop task functioned as a temporally isolating/spacing task which did not drain attention 
and other WM resources necessary for encoding, rather than simply being a task which 
primed attention allocation, another experiment must be conducted which explores the impact 
of prior-Stroop tasks with differing cognitive loads. If a greater, more cognitively demanding 
Stroop task fatigues participants within the interference condition task and this reduces recall, 
then it would provide great evidence that temporal isolation and the spacing and 
distinctiveness of tasks/stimuli are primary components of resource sharing which account 
for ‘the fatigue effect’ of increased RI prevalence in hindering second task recall. In other 
words, the temporal isolation of a task may reduce the resource fatigue which leads to the 






The next experiment will include the educational psychological method of topic-based 
ratings of interestingness by measuring 15 facts (five per category, with two topic-specific 
fact categories and one non-specific fact category). Participants rated their interest in each 
topic using Rotgans’ (2015) six-point topic interest scale prior to the memory experiment.  
The current experiment is a short follow-up to Experiment 2 whereby the Stroop test 
was used as a prior NMT (to elicit extraneous cognitive load). The subsequent recall was then 
compared and contrasted with different memory prior-tasks and a no-prior control. The group 
that experienced the prior Stroop task had the greatest recall, which was significantly greater 
than the SMT, though not significantly different to the no-prior condition. For this reason, the 
role of the Stroop task as a cognitively fatiguing exercise was further explored within this 
experiment, in order to test the validity of the fatigue argument for the late-occurring NRI 
effect.  
Rauch and Schmitt (2009) were able to measure mental fatigue by utilising a Stroop-
task that lasted just 15 minutes by applying a more demanding task than those used in tasks 
applied over an hour to two hour period (Boksem & Lorist, 2006; Lorist et al., 2005; 
McMorris et al., 2018). Their task consisted of 480 single-word Stroop trials and found that 
over time participants became less effective at the task due to a loss of cognitive control. This 
occurred when participants were unable to inhibit the automatic process of reading the word 
and they struggled to maintain the goal-related focus on the colour, a finding which 
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reportedly supported a previous study (Hofmann et al., 2007) and was argued as a cause of 
distraction.   
The exertion of the cognitive control function could theoretically reduce on-task 
allocation of attention and motivation during the recall phase, reducing recall. However, this 
was not the case for prospective memory, which is the ability to recall an action at an 
appropriate time (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), such as everyday tasks. Cook et al. (2014) 
found that executive control depletion from a Stroop task did not hinder participant’s memory 
performance. Instead, a correlation was found between the participant’s personal reported 
experience of cognitive fatigue and their subsequent memory performance. This indicates that 
whilst participants feel that cognitive fatigue played a big part in their performance, not all 
forms of memory are hindered by the depletion of the executive control function.  
So, what of declarative memory? For serial recall, Mccabe et al. (2005) conducted an 
experiment encompassing both executive function (through the need to inhibit automatic 
reading processes) and memory load (through sequential recall of the colour trials). They 
found that the Stroop Task has an Interfering effect (known as ‘Stroop interference’) which is 
a function of the memory load, particularly in older adults. This was argued as a function of 
increased load in WM capacity decreasing the ability to allocate and maintain attention 
resources in older individuals, leading to an increase of errors (recall of incongruent colours). 
With the conceptualisation of WM as an attentional resource necessary for task performance 
within short term memory and executive functioning tasks, and as the Stroop task requires 
maintenance of this task related focus, it is plausible that a more demanding Stroop-task 
similar to Cook et al. (2014) would increase the interference effects similar to the Stroop 
interference found by Mccabe et al. (2005) and thus decrease recall performance.  
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A cognitive load- based explanation of the results in accordance with TBRS 
(Barrouillet et al., 2004) postulates that the cognitive load of a task is a function of the length 
of time it captures attention and impedes other attention-demanding processes and the 
conceptualisation of WM as an executive attention process (Engle, 2002). It is hypothesised 
that the more effortful Stroop task will increase cognitive load and decrease subsequent recall 
performance greater than the no-prior task due to the greater number of trials and cognitive 
demand of executive processes combined with a longer time-on-task factor (Barrouillet et al., 
2007).  
Alternatively, an interference-based explanation may be more pertinent due to the RI 
experimental design which frames the experiment for the specific exploration NRI within the 
retention interval. This would be in line with temporal distinctiveness theory and the finding 
that temporal isolation of the encoding phase increases recall by delaying the onset of, and 
therefore reducing the impact of, interference effects (Ecker, Brown, & Lewandowsky, 2015; 




The traditional approach of measuring interest within educational psychology 
involves the rating of participants’ interest in a topic followed by subsequent learning and 
testing of the information and concepts contained within a paragraph of prose of the said 
topic. This is a way of measuring text-based interest and learning (Garner et al., 1991; Hidi & 
McLaren 1988; Schiefele, 1990; 1991; Schiefele, & Krapp, 1996; Shirey & Reynolds 1988). 
The general consensus is that for text-based learning, topic interest is a positive predictor, 
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with a recent study by Soemer and Shiefele (2019) finding that topic interest mediates MW 
which increases during greater text difficulty. Within their study, Soemer and Shiefele 
measured topic interest by getting participants to rate the subjective interestingness of the 
topic shortly after the participants had read the text, thus incorporating the situational interest 
element of “interestingness” with the dispositional individual interest factor (this is 
considered further in Chapter 4). However, this was not used to test recall specifically, and it 
would have been useful to see whether the mediation would have continued within an 




The current experiment aims to explore the fatigue effect of NRI interpretation of 
late-occurring NRI by providing further understanding of the increased recall findings from 
the NMT in Experiment 2. The Stroop task therefore will be explored for its potential to be a 
low-level memory task sufficient to produce active rest (thus decreasing interference).  It is 
hypothesised that a simple Stroop task replicating the NMT from Experiment 2 will cause 
temporal isolation of memory resources, by being a low-demand task attempting to provide a 
form of ‘active rest period’ similar to Ecker, Tay, and Brown’s (2015) tone detection task, 
thereby decreasing PI and leading to greater or equal recall to the no-prior group.   
For interest, the current experiment aimed to measure interest in a topic by 
incorporating the previously used pre-study interest ratings design with a modern interest 
scale measurement – ‘the individual interest Questionnaire’ (Rotgans, 2015). This measures 
an individual’s prospective anticipation of how interesting they may find the facts within a 
92 
 
topic and how that may affect the recall of specific topic facts overall, rather than conceptual 
knowledge and understanding (similar to curiosity conceptualised as anticipated knowledge 
seeking; McGillivray, 2013). In line with previous text-based topic interest findings, it is 
hypothesised that an individual’s personal perception of their predisposition to interest when 
engaging in a specific topic will increase the subsequent recall of that topic’s items. It is 
important to note that any situational interest or interestingness will not be measured, as was 
the case in the study Soemer and Schiefele, as the positive valence of situational 
interest/interestingness upon learning and recall has already been well established within the 
literature. The experiment will contain two different subject categories and one control 
category (random not topic-specific facts) to test the reliability of prospective interest ratings 
(based on subjective individual previous interest experiences), rather than concurrent or 





Participants were recruited online due to the recruitment time limitations caused by 
Experiment 2 sample saturation. This involved online opportunity sampling through online 
advertisements and the University of Wolverhampton’s SONA participant pool consisting of 
undergraduate psychology students. Sixty participants, split evenly with 30 males and 30 
females, were recruited and aged between 17 and 64 (M = 27.98, SD = 10.73). Participants 
that did not complete the full process towards the debrief were removed. One participant was 
removed due to two empty recall phases.  
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As the current experiment was intended as an extension of Experiment 2 recruitment 
followed the G*Power analysis in Experiment 2 for replication of the C-I effect. Therefore, 
current experiment aimed to get at least 18 participants per group. Gorilla recruitment 
involves setting ratios. Ratios were weighted evenly as 10:10:10 but due to drop-out rates or 
missing data the group sizes were as follows: No-prior N = 23, Easier Stroop N = 19, and 
Harder Stroop N = 20. 
Materials 
A laptop or desktop computer with a computer keyboard and internet access to 
www.Gorilla.sc was required. 
Recruitment materials 
Upon clicking the study hyperlink prospective participants were presented with an 
information sheet detailing the nature of the experiment relative to the group (Stroop vs no 
Stroop). Following this, participants were provided with a consent box which had to be ticked 
in order to for them proceed to the experiment. Finally, upon completion of the experiment a 
full debrief of the experiment was provided. 
Questionnaires 
 Following consent participants were provided with a demographic questionnaire to 
optionally submit information on their sex and age. Then an interest questionnaire consisting 
of two sets of six Likert scales of interest were created. One set of scales for the topic “space” 
and one set for the topic “animals” were created. The scales were consistent with Rotgans’ 





  The stimuli involved 15 short facts that were sourced online using Google searches. 
This included five random facts for a control, five space-related facts and five animal-related 
facts. These categories were chosen to produce different topics for contrast between topic 
interest and topic recall and all of the facts were of similar length. The two topics were 
chosen as they were easy to source and in-keeping with the stimuli of the previous 
experiments (appendix A3). The free spot-the-difference task sheets from previous 
experiments were uploaded and combined with some independently created tasks using 
clipart and MS paint to prevent copyright infringement (appendix B2). The stimuli for the 
Stroop task were created reused from the previous experiment’s PowerPoint slides and 
exported as .JPEG files.  The S-T-D tasks were timed and upon clicking the mouse a red 
square would indicate where the participant believed there to be a gap (Figure 3.8). Gorilla.  
The experiment was programmed using Gorilla.sc which is an experimental software website 





Figure 3.7. Spot the difference task screenshot example. Red square representing a 
clicked mouse response. 
 





This was an independent-measures one-way design similar to Experiment 2. 
Measuring the effect of IV1, Prior-Task difficulty (control, easy Stroop, or hard Stroop), and 
IV2, topic type (space vs. animal), along with the predictor variable of topic/individual 




Upon clicking on the online experiment link participants read the information sheet, 
proceeded to the consent form consisting of a checkbox to continue, filled out (optionally) 
their age and sex, and then completed the interest questionnaire scales. Upon completion of 
the questionnaires, the main experimental task began. Participants were randomly assigned 
into one of three groups (control/no-prior task, easy Stroop, and harder Stroop).  
The easy Stroop contained 75 one-word trials lasting for 5 s per trial. Participants 
responded whether the colour word and font colour were congruent or not. If congruent 
(same), participants pressed ‘s’ on the keyboard, if Incongruent (different), they pressed ‘d’. 
The trial did not proceed until 4 s had elapsed and a timer was presented. This task lasted five 
minutes. 
The hard Stroop was conducted in the same format but consisted of two rounds. 
Round one contained three Stroop words where participants were tasked with testing the 
congruency of two out of three words (same ‘s’ or different ‘d’) for 4 s per trial. This section 
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was timed for 2 min 30 s. Round 2 involved five words where the congruency was tested for 
three out of five colour words (2 m 30 s).  Contrary to the easy Stroop, when participants 
responded the next trial was started, meaning that there was no rest period between time of 
response and the next trial. The no-prior group proceeded immediately with the facts 
All participants then experienced the facts presentation with 15 facts presented. One 
fact was shown per slide for 8 s. Immediately after the facts were shown, there were 10 spot-
the-difference tasks. One puzzle was presented every 30 s.  During this, participants were 
instructed to click and indicate where there was a difference. This was indicated on the screen 
as a red dot. Finally, participants received a recall page with a text box to record as many 
facts as possible for a maximum of six minutes, but they had the option of proceeding by 
clicking a button which stated that they had recalled as much as possible (bracketed 
recommendation of four minutes). This terminated the experiment and participants were then 





Scoring was similar to Experiment 1 and 2 with the main content of the fact being 
most important. Each fact list contained five facts with 15 facts in total.  
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Prior-task influence on late-occurring NRI  
 
Figure 3.10 shows the no-prior task recalling the most (M = 6.33, SD = 2.46) followed 
closely by the hard Stroop (M = 5.8, SD = 2.6) and finally the easy Stroop (M = 4.76, SD = 
2.6). The confidence in this trend is weakened by viewing the confidence intervals, which 
show a large overlap in variance between each of these mean scores.  
Variance across the three groups was found to be homogenous through a Levene’s 
test, F(2,59) = .19, p = .83, enabling a one-way ANOVA to be conducted. As foreshadowed 
by the descriptive statistics the differences were non-significant F(2,61) = 2.15, MSE = 
Figure 3.9. Mean total recall scores with 95% confidence intervals for each prior-task condition. 
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12.93, p = .13, ηp
2 = 0.07. This shows that although there appeared to be recall differences 
within the groups, this was not considered to be statistically different within the current 
sample. 
 
Topic interest  
 
Pearson’s correlations were conducted to measure any global effects of topic interest 
on subsequent topic recall totals for the animal and space facts. As the IV of prior-task group 
was nonsignificant it was removed; collapsing the variables in this way increases statistical 
power. Positive trends were found between both space interest and space recall and animal 
interest and animal recall, though these were non-significant: Space [r(58) = .23, p = .09]; 
Animals [r(58) = .17, p = .38].  
 However, there was a strongly significant positive correlation between participants 
animal interest ratings and their ratings of space interest r(58) = .36, p = .005, indicating that 
participants rated both topics similarly prior to the experiment. Secondly, recall of space facts 
was positively correlated with recall of the animal facts r(58) = .31, p. =  02, potentially 




Priming or Fact Similarity? 
Table 3. 1 
  Total Means and Standard Deviations of Recall for each Fact Category (MAX recall 
of 5) Collapsed across Condition 
 M SD 
Space Facts 2.11 1.17 
Animal Facts 2.19 1.3 
Other (Random) Facts 1.37 1.14 
 
Table 3.1 shows very little differences between the mean recall of the space and 
Animal facts but with a trend towards a reduced recall of the Other (random) facts.  
The assumption of homogeneity of variances for each of the recall groups was 
accepted F(2,183) = .4, p = .67. A one-way ANOVA was then conducted to explore the 
differences between the recall of the three fact categories. This aimed to test whether the 
interest questionnaire primed individuals to look-out for and thus recall the space and animal 
facts more so than the “other” random facts.  The ANOVA found a significant difference 
between the recall of the fact categories F(2,183) = 8.78, MSE = 12.74,  p < .0001, ηp
2 = .09, 
with both space facts and animal facts receiving one facts (out of five) more on average 
recalled than the other facts category.  
As there was no directional hypothesis for category recall, post-hoc tests were 
conducted in place of planned contrasts. The Tukey HSD tests found the other facts category 
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to be significantly different to the space and animal facts category, t(183) = 4.17, p < 0.001. 
The Tukey HSD test results also found that the differences between the space and animals 
categories were non-significant (MD = -.08) p < .93. However, both were significantly 
different when compared with other: Animal-other = .82,  p < .001, space-other = .74, p = 
.002 . This shows that the random fact category was recalled consistently less than the other 
categories.   
Discussion 
 
The current experiment expanded on the results of Experiments 1 and 2 by further 
exploring the potential fatigue effect induced by prior-tasks during the late-occurring 
interference condition. The role of anticipated topic interest was also explored in line with 
previous literature to explore whether anticipated dispositional interest led to greater learning 




In contrast to previous text-based research, topic interest was not correlated with 
recall (Garner & Gillingham 1991; Hidi & McLaren 1988; Schiefele, 1990; 1991; 1996; 
Schiefele, & Krapp, 1996; Shirey & Reynolds 1988). This may be due to the large priming 
effect (explained below) overriding any potential interest effects, though it is also likely due 
to the experimental design for measuring topic interest within this experiment.  
Participants’ interest with the topic was measured before the presentation of the topic 
stimuli. McGillivray (2013) found that when participants anticipated curiosity ratings were 
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lower than the interest ratings after seeing the stimuli, there was a significantly greater recall 
performance. Conversely, this positive attribution was not found when participants’ interest 
rating in the stimuli decreased in comparison to their anticipated curiosity.  As the current 
experiment is designed to measure an individual’s dispositional individual interest factor, this 
would not account for or measure the extent to which the individual experiences situational 
interest evoked by the stimuli. This form of interest leads to the greatest learning outcomes 
(Rotgans & Schmidt, 2018) and enables the researcher to measure the progression of 
developing interest through the four phases (Hidi, & Renninger, 2006), leading to greater 
measuring accuracy of interest effects and a greater understanding on the complexity of the 
mutable nature of interest salience, and its implications for recall performance and learning.   
In the most recent topic interest study, conducted by Soemer and Shiefele (2019), 
topic interest was assessed using three item measurements of situational interest and one 
scale item of individual interest, after the participants had read the text stimuli. This study 
found a highly significant influence of topic interest and its mediating effect of MW (hence 
focus of attention). Hitherto topic interest has been considered a factor of individual interest- 
an individual’s inclination towards a certain subject domain (Schiefele, 1996) rather than 
situational interest. It would instead be pertinent to explore topic interest with an individual 
interest focus initially (pre-stimuli), followed by a subjective situational interest element post-
stimulus to measure what effect this individual interest factor/general inclination towards 
topic domains has on the situational interest elicited. This would conceptualise topic interest 
as a factor of dispositional interest – a starting point which determines or moderates the 
experience of situational interest, the more salient emotional impact in the thirst for 






Although participants’ ratings of topic interest did not correlate with greater recall of 
the topic facts, space recall and animal recall positively correlated. This shows that recall of 
the stimuli from one category was linked to recall from the other, which indicates a potential 
category clustering effect or a priming effect. Clustering defined in free recall paradigms is 
the occurrence of a sequence of similar or associative material (Bousfield, 1953; Bousfield, & 
Bousfield, 1966; Bousfield. & Cohen, 1955; Frankel & Cole, 1971). Items in related 
categories form as sequence order clusters in randomised free recall as participants habitually 
link relational cues to form a priming response within a learning environment. In this case 
participants in the learning environment habitually linked information in attempt to impose 
some form of sequential order as a recall strategy, as argued by Bousfield and Bousfield 
(1966). In summary, the information became more clustered and was therefore easier to 
encode and retrieve.  
Similarly, the spreading-activation model of memory (Anderson & Pirolli, 1984) 
argues that the recall of one item actives the concept nodes of related items. This leads to 
easier recall of associative concepts/items and makes this an effective retrieval strategy. 
Furthermore, items from both topics (space and animals) were recalled significantly more 
frequently than stimuli from the random facts category. This could be due to the inclusion of 
the interest questionnaire prior to the experiment, priming participants and enabling them to 
anticipate stimuli from the two categories and use them as retrieval cues.  
‘Priming’ refers to the learned pairing/association of one stimulus onto a later similar 
item. I.e. the learning of the word ‘cat’ would lead to a faster more certain response of ‘dog’ 
through the association of animal/pet than of the response ‘fence’, with semantic priming 
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being a well-established phenomenon (Friederici et al., 1999; McNamara, 2005). According 
to the spreading activation model, this results from one cue ‘activating’ the association with 
the relational cues. In this way, clustering effects imposed by participants lead to a sequence 
of associative links between items whereby the recall of one item primes and cues the recall 
of associative memory items through spreading activation. Therefore, the spreading 
activation model and the explanation of priming explain the phenomena of clustered recall 
provided by Bousfield (1953) and combine to provide the best understanding of the category 
results. 
 The strong effect of category priming leading to greater recall within this NRI 
condition is not surprising as the positive effects of priming have been found to reduce RI in 
a study by Bower et al. (1994). They found that priming increased response certainty, the 
speed of learning, and thus reduced the effect of RI pairs. It was found that these effects 
decreased with a greater number of competing items within the response category; however, 
the current experiment contained just five stimuli items per category making it suitable to 
elicit a strong priming effect that efficiently explains the results.  
 
Cognitive Load vs. Cumulative RI: Prior-Task comparisons 
 
There were reasonable trends of differences between the recall groups, though these 
trending differences were statistically nonsignificant. However, the current experiment was 
specifically intended as a follow-up to Experiment 2 and was based on a power analysis using 
the effect size from the C-I group of Experiment 1. However, the sample size was likely too 
low to detect the modest effects shown here, as the effect included a no-interference control 
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looking for late-occurring interference rather than interference more generally. Instead, this 
experiment should be framed as an add-on to Experiment 2 by exploring the effects of 
hindered recall when NRI was late-occurring. Unexpectedly, the easy Stroop group had the 
worst recall, though this could be due to some confusion regarding the experimental set-up 
reported by participants afterwards; Gorilla had no option to maintain an incorrect ‘x’ signal 
to participant. After the first response was counted, if it was incorrect and participants then 
chose the correct answer, this would still show an incorrect ‘x’ each time (even though the 
answer was correct, only the first response can be counted as correct). This may have led to 
participant confusion or frustration that the Stroop may not be working, which could provide 
unmeasured negative effects on performance. Recall performance was then followed by the 
harder Stroop, then as expected the no-prior group.  
It is not clear whether five minutes is a sufficient period of time-on-task to fatigue the 
cognitive control of attentional resources to an extent which significantly decreases recall 
performance. As found by Rauch and Schmitt (2009) whose study lasted fifteen minutes and 
which was considered a short-term approach for this style of experiment. If the current 
experiment was replicated using a longer 15-minute Stroop task and a greater hindrance of 
recall is observed then that would provide strong arguments for the temporal argument for the 
TBRS account of the results (Barrouillet et al., 2004). However, due to the length of time 
theoretically required to cause this resource taxation when the cognitive task is not memory 
based, then the TBRS account may better explain the results of the Stroop task in Experiment 
2. If  the prior cognitive task uses different cognitive resources (such as non-memory 
resources) to the primary task objective (memory resources through memory recall), and the 
time spent on the task is short and low in cognitive load, then theoretically this reduces the 
fatigue of the executive attention resources in WM (Engle, 2002). This reduction may be 
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sufficient to resist the low-level cumulative load effects of NRI provided by the S-T-D tasks, 
by ‘freeing up’ enough attention resources within the working memory process, that are 
necessary for maintenance of a memory trace during the retention interval. This would lead to 
a less hindered recall performance (not significantly different from a fresh no-prior task 
participant).  
Combining Experiment 2 with the current experiment provides mixed to weak 
evidence for the fatigue effect of RI interpretation, with Stroop tasks not fatiguing the recall 
of subsequent stimuli greater than a no-prior control, and the SMT did not differ from the 
NPT in Experiment 2.  Whilst, as explained above, this could be explained due to the low 
cognitive load and resource depletion argument, the overall lack of fatigue induced within the 
five-minute prior-tasks of the last two experiments leads to greater strength of the cumulative 
interference argument for hindering recall scores, with similarity-based PI and NRI 




It would have been useful when comparing between fatigue and cumulative 
interference to have a condition without a prior-task or distractor for an additional control, 
along with a greater sample size. However, recruitment limitations such as lack of incentive 
beyond participant pool credits, and recruitment saturation (re-using of the facts from 






The two experiments combine to demonstrate that a Stroop task which lasts for five 
minutes is a non-fatiguing task upon a later memory recall task, and whilst the current trend 
of results may fit within a TBRS account of forgetting further experiments would be required 
to adopt this explanation. Instead, the results of the current experiment better befit a 
cumulative interference interpretation.  
Topic interest when measured prior to the stimuli leads to similar interest scores 
between participants indicating that they may be thinking of interest in the experiment 
generally or providing general feedback which was thereafter not significantly linked to recall 
performance. It is recommended that participant interest ratings are measured pre-stimulus 
using individual interest items followed by post-stimulus items measuring situational interest. 
This would measure the dispositional individual interest influence upon the situational 
interest evoked and it is predicted that situational interest will be most pertinent to learning.  
A potentially strong effect of priming/associative memory clusters was found by pre-
stimulus questions due to the low number of items for the two categories (five) showing that 
priming, and relational cues through the usage of categories can provide useful strategies for 






The current experiment is a follow-up from the findings of interest from Experiment 1 
which found that ratings of situational interest and fact interestingness differed as positive 
predictors of recall scores depending on the experimental conditions. However, for state-
dependent situational interest, participants were also asked to report their interest in a self-
report manner at the end of the experiment. It may, therefore, be worthwhile measuring 
interest at various stages during the experiment in order to get an active score and less 
reflective rating of interest. For example, Chen et al. (2001) argue that the measurement 
reliability of retrospective situational interest is questionable due to the lack of a cohesive 
reference point. For example, some participants may be comparing their interest in the stimuli 
with their interest in a book they had recently read, others may compare it to different 
subjects, etc. Therefore, to explore whether there is an interaction between interest and NRI it 
is important to utilise various methods of measuring the different forms of interest. Given that 
in Experiment 1 the individual fact interest ratings were associated with higher recall scores 
during an interference condition, it is theoretically plausible that an individual’s interest in 
each fact may increase the resistance of that specific fact’s memory trace to endure against RI 
during the retention phase and therefore lead to greater recall scores. To explore the validity 
of this hypothesis a different experimental approach is needed to that of Experiment 1, as 
Experiment 1 used global means and standard deviations to explore the effects. This provided 
an overall trend of interest effects on recall amongst a populous but not an individualistic 




Within the context of Experiment 1 interest was contextualised with reference to 
Renninger et al. (2014). Topic interest is contextualised as actualized interest, which is 
content specific with an intrinsic motivational orientation. This means that an individual with 
personal interest in the topic will be more motivated to continue learning. Situational interest 
is best conceptualized as a measure of interestingness of the learning environment and, 
therefore, interestingness of the stimuli and experimental task itself. As Krapp et al. (2014) 
mentions, situational interest is often collective and short-lasting, whilst actualised interest is 
personal and longer lasting (more perseverant). This may explain the context specific 
differing salience of interest. However, as there were two different methods used to measure 
topic vs. situational interest (topic displayed concurrently, situational explained separately), a 
further experiment is needed to reinforce the validity of the findings to support this concept 
and understand the role of interest salience in resisting forgetting/improving recall during a 
period of NRI. Furthermore, the interest results in Experiments 2 and 3 did not reliably 
correlate with recall, so this experimental approach will enable a further exploration of 
whether Experiment 1’s individual interest effects replicate. 
 
MW and TUT 
 
Previous research has also found that interest can decrease distraction by TUT. For 
example, Smallwood et al. (2009) conducted a study in which their second experiment tested 
the extent to which interest influenced TUT. A participant’s interest in the stimuli was 
measured on a self-report scale from 1-5. Results showed that interest greatly reduced TUT 
(or MW), leading to greater recall scores.  However, the study failed to take into account that 
there are two types of interest; situational interest (interest generated by the task itself) was 
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not measured. Therefore, the results are to be attributed to the influence of topic interest 
(naturally generated stimuli-based interest; Krapp et al., 1992). However, whilst MW was 
found to be a significant negative predictor of recall within both conditions in Experiment 1, 
there was no significant mediation of interest on MW and recall. One possible explanation is 
that the MW cue itself was too non-specific. Therefore, participants may report any external 
distraction as MW (internal distraction; Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). Stawarczyk et al. 
(2011) found that 21% of thought probes were MW-related and 20% were caused by external 
distraction. Therefore, TUT probes encompass both MW and external distraction and this 
experiment will distinguish these to examine any potential relationship between interest and 
specific TUT occurrences.  
Specifically, this experiment will contain probes for measuring MW and external 
distractions in both retrospective and concurrent conditions (Stawarczyk et al. 2011; 
Unsworth & McMillan, 2014). 
 
Subjective Interest    
 
 The closest experiment relating to individual item interest and recall was conducted 
by McGillivray (2013) whereby participants rated how curious they were about a question 
before being shown the answer and were asked to rate how likely they were to recall it. This 
was linked to the concept that interest and curiosity is about filling a gap in knowledge (Kang 
et al., 2009). The participants experienced cued recall on half of the 60 questions one hour 
after and the other half again six days later. A median split based on the participants’ average 
ratings of curiosity was used to split the data into high and low curiosity groups for specific 
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questions. It was found that during the hour delay younger adults recalled more of the high 
curiosity questions than older adults but there was no significant difference for low curiosity. 
However, the recall performance was very high with an average of 80.8% (SD = 14.2%) and 
84.4% (SD = 10.3%) for the questions and answers. Of the participants who recalled less than 
75% on average, there was a small though non statistically significant impact of curiosity (p 
= .08). Yet after the delay the impact of curiosity was much greater (p < .001), with benefits 
to recall for both younger and older adults (and there was no difference in impact between 
ages).  
In a follow-up experiment, McGillivray (2013) compared the initial curiosity linked 
as reward or knowledge seeking (Kang et al., 2009; Murayama & Kuhbandner 2011) with 
subjective interest (rating of the answer) argued as being akin to satisfaction with the 
curiosity reward. Subjective interest was a significant positive factor of recall performance 
for both ages during both delay periods. It was found that subjective interest (post answer 
interest) was correlated with curiosity, though greater recall was found with greater ratings of 
post answer interest through subjective interest than the pre answer interest of curiosity. 
When post answer interest was lower than curiosity that led to lower recall than when post 
answer interest scores were greater than curiosity. There was no attempt of conceptualizing 
and thus interpreting 'curiosity' or 'subjective interest' within the existing interest literature 
and so the attempt to interpolate these findings further using the four-phase model of interest 
development (Hidi & Renninger, 2006) is as follows: Curiosity generated by the question 
would be the experience of triggered situational interest (TSI) which is influenced further by 
dispositional factors of individual interest in the topic domain of the question (phase 1 
combined with Rotgans and Schmidt’s 2018 research). This develops into maintained 
situational interest when the answer is considered interesting (phase 2), explaining why 
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greater 'subjective interest' was more pertinent to learning as it would represent more 
developed and maintained situational interest which is seen as the most important factor to 
learning (Rotgans & Schmidt). The greater prominence of the effect through the longer delay 
can be interpreted using two possible explanations: (i) over time the developed situational 
interest evolved into emerging individual interest (phase 3) and developed individual interest 
(phase 4), leading to more engagement with the questions (discussing them with peers, 
spontaneous retrieval, more learning- more chances for rehearsal). Conversely situational 
interest is argued by Rotgans and Schmidt (2018) to be linked to knowledge acquisition 
greater than individual interest effects. This should have been evident within the current 
conceptualisation and hence be present within the hour delay results. This leads to the second 
interpretation: (ii) The high percentage recall (84-89%) during trials after one hour masked 
TSI effects, although the results speculatively show an effect, particularly of developed 
situational interest (post-answer interest). This explanation would negate the need for 
developed individual interest in providing positive interest effects on recall performance, with 
developed situational interest and dispositional individual interest elements better explaining 
the subjective interest and curiosity trends found. This fits in line with current research 
provided by Rotgans and Schmidt (2018). Before this interpretation is to be adopted it 
requires further investigation within a scenario whereby recall of most items is not feasible. 
Therefore, this experiment adopts the conceptualisation of subjective interest as TSI which is 






McGillivray’s (2013) experiment demonstrated that curiosity as a form of interest can 
positively impact the retention of a memory in the long term with a trend towards an impact 
when forgetting is low. The initial lack of an impact within the first hour recall is likely due 
to the experimental procedure of cued recall as the cued recall paradigm increased “memory 
performance near the ceiling" (McGillivray, 2013, p. 86). The premise is still open to 
investigation as an effect of interest was found during the one-hour delay during the second 
experiment, though recall was again very high at close to 90%.  
The current experiment will employ a more efficient way of exploring the initial 
interest impact on recall over the short term, reducing the speculative nature of the findings, 
by testing interest salience (split high/low) on learning during a free recall paradigm. The free 
recall paradigm would remove retrieval cues, which induce greater recall scores and add an 
unmeasured cue efficacy element to the experimental design. This experiment will also aid in 
the understanding of the results of MW in Experiment 1 by providing a deeper look at the 
role of MW as a form of distraction, leading to an evaluation of the different measurement 
results. 
As Experiment 1 showed a trend of decreased situational interest salience on recall 
scores during the NRI condition which could not be tested within Experiment 2, a more 
cognitively demanding NRI task was chosen. The NRI task is based on the experiment by 
Reed et al. (2017) and a non-verbal Sternberg task was implemented. This was intended to 
increase the cognitive load of the NRI task greater than the S-T-D tasks, but not be so 
demanding as to produce individual differences or large amounts of fatigue.  
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A more demanding NRI condition enables further exploration of whether an overall 
effect of NRI can be found, and if an overall effect is found, whether it will replicate the 
pattern of results from Experiment 1 of late-occurring interference. This would then be 
transferable to the understanding of NRI effects more generally. It will also allow for a 
further link between cognitive load and NRI salience to be tested, as Experiment 2 and 3 has 
found mixed to weak support for this interpretation.  
Hypotheses 
 It is hypothesised that: (i) Recall will be at its lowest during the late-interference 
condition. (ii) Retrospective interest ratings will mediate the effect of TUT on recall with 
higher ratings of interest reducing the effect of TUT, thus increasing recall potential. (iii) 
Retrospective interest ratings will be associated with higher recall in the control condition, 
but the concurrent ratings of subjective interestingness will correlate with recall in the 
interference condition, as more subjectively interesting facts will resist interference greater 
than less subjectively interesting facts. Secondarily this could reduce the effects of NRI with 
highly subjectively interesting facts increasing recall during the NRI condition. (iv) Facts 








42 participants (33 females, eight males, N sufficient to explore condition-order 
effects from the G*Power analysis in Chapter 3) were recruited through opportunity sampling 
and consisted mainly of undergraduate psychology students from the University of 





  The experiment was designed in SuperLab (version 5) which required a desktop 
computer with a functioning keyboard for responses and a standard monitor for display.  A 
standard consent sheet, demographic sheet (requiring age and sex), information sheet, and 
debriefing sheet was used. A new set of short facts from 8 to 12 words long were sourced 
through a ‘random facts’ google search (Appendix A4) to prevent participant saturation 
during recruitment. Participants were provided with two blank recall sheets to write the facts 
onto. A controlled lab experiment room was used. TUT probes appeared on the screen and 
each fact contained a Likert scale (from 1-5) for interest. The Sternberg distractor was 






The TUT probes appeared on the screen for participants to click the corresponding number 
key on the keyboard which best matched their conscious experience. The probes were as 
follows: 
1) I am totally focused on the current task 
2) I am thinking about my performance on the task or how long it is taking 
3) I am distracted by information present in the room (e.g. sounds or lights) 
4) I am zoning out/My mind is wandering 
5) Other  
 
Probe 1 shows task focus and probe 2 shows task specific interference. Probe 3 
represents external distraction whereas probe 4 shows internal distraction/ MW. 
 
Sternberg task. 
The distractor task is based on the classic Sternberg (1966) task modified by Reed et 
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Response “yes” or “no” 
 (6 s) 
 (4 s) 
Figure 4.1. Sternberg task example. Participants view a target array of numbers 





The task consists of numbers instead of letters to reduce similarity with the verbal fact 
stimuli (8 in round 1, 10 in round 2, and 12 in round 3). The numbers were displayed 
simultaneously for 4 s and followed by a delay slide containing an “+” fixation point in the 
centre. The delay lasted 6 s and was followed by a probe number. If the number was part of 
the sequence participants were asked to press a key for “yes”, whereas if it was not part of the 
sequence participants pressed a key for “no”. There were seven blocks per round, and three 




The experiment was approved by the university ethics committee. The design 
incorporated a quantitative 2x2 mixed experimental design with the repeated measures 
variable being condition (control vs. interference) and the independent measures variable 
being condition order (C-I vs. I-C).  The experiment contained two elements. Element one 
(exploring NRI): DV1 = total fact recall, IV1) Condition (control vs. interference), IV2) 
Condition order (C-I vs. I-C), Element Two (exploring interest):  DV2 = total interesting facts 
recalled, DV3 = total uninteresting facts recalled IV2.1) Initial individual interest rating, IV2.2) 
Retrospective interest rating. IV3) Task unrelated thought scores (DV2 and DV3 are measured 
on an individual participant level, see scoring section below). 
I-C and C-I groups were counterbalanced along with Lists A and B in an attempt to 
reduce list order effects and measure any condition order effects. This provided four groups 
(see table 4.1) Due to time constraints with the recruitment process, recruitment was 
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concluded early when the C-I and I-C groups and overall list presentations were roughly 
equivalent in size though differed in list order (Table 4.1). This means that two thirds of 
participants experienced List B during the late-occurring interference condition which has 
been shown previously to hinder recall. 
To control any primacy and recency effects in recall, facts were placed into six blocks (three 
blocks per list), consisting of six trials per block with each fact representing one trial. Trials 





As with Experiment 1, participants were split into four groups for counterbalancing 
condition and list order. Participants typically signed up for the experimental timeslot via the 
SONA participant pool. Upon arrival, participants were provided with an information sheet 
detailing all ethical concerns and a consent form. Once signed, they were requested (though 
optional) to fill out a demographic questionnaire requesting age and sex. Following this, the 
procedure was presented to the participants by the researcher via a PowerPoint presentation 
on the computer to increase familiarity with the procedure and prompts and to ensure 
 C-I I-C 
A-B 14 10 
B-A 6 11 
Table 4 1. 
 Number of participants per group split by list-order and condition-order 
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understanding. The participant’s unique anonymous participant pool number was placed on 
the recall sheets and entered into SuperLab (to link computer responses to written responses).  
As with Experiment 1, participants experienced a fact presentation consisting of 18 
facts for 8 s each. As each fact was presented, participants were required to rate their initial 
interest in that specific fact on a Likert scale from 1 (not interested) to 5 (very interested) by 
pressing the corresponding number on the keyboard. This was followed by the condition 
manipulation (controlled wait period or interference task) for five minutes. Then followed by 
a four-minute free recall period. This process was then repeated with the converse condition.  
At three fixed points (every six facts) during each fact presentation, participants were 
prompted to rate their conscious state via a keyboard response: 1 =  Focused on the task, 2 = 
Thinking about the task (task-related interference), 3 = Externally distracted, 4 = mind 
wandering, 5 = other (see TUT probes above). Once the experiment had concluded, 
participants were asked to provided retrospective ratings on each fact on a six-item scale 
similar to Rotgan’s (2015) scale of individual interest.  
Results 
 
List equivalency  
 
As with Experiment 1, recall scores for each individual fact for both List A and List B 
were calculated, along with List A vs. List B recall for each participant. This aimed to test for 
equivalency. There was no significant difference between List A (M = 6.98,  SD = 2.41) and 
List B (M = 6.89, SD = 2.74), for recall t(40) = .24, p = .81, d = 0.04, and no difference 
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between List A (M = 3.32, SD = .66) and List B (M = 3.25, SD = .67) averaged interest scores 
t (40) = 1.08, p = .29, d = .16. Therefore, the lists were equivalent.   
 
Condition and Condition Order (Global statistics) 
 
Next, total recall scores for the control and interference conditions were inputted 
without inclusion of subjective interestingness for this part of the analysis.  
 
Figure 4.2. Mean fact recall for control and interference conditions split by condition order 
(C-I and I-C). Error bars: 95% CI. 
Figure 4.2 shows the same pattern of results found in Experiment 1 with the greatest 
recall hinderance occurring in the late-occurring NRI condition. However, there is overlap 




As with Experiment 1, a two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the 
replicability of the previously found ‘fatigue effect’ by comparing recall scores of the control 
and interference conditions according to condition order.  There was a significant main effect 
of condition, with participants recalling more in the control condition (M = 7.44, SE = .36), 
than the interference condition (M = 6.4, SEM  = .42), F(1,39) = 8.38, MSE =  22.23, p < .01, 
ηp
2 = .18. Conversely, there was a non-significant effect for the condition orders (C-I: M = 
6.55, SE = .5, vs. I-C: M = 7.29, SE = .49), F(1, 40) = 1.58,  p = .22, ηp
2 = .04. The interaction 
displayed an effect which was approaching significance, but was above the .05 threshold, 
F(1,39) =  3.88, MSE = 9.74, p = 0.056, ηp
2 = .09. Though this effect was above the threshold 
of significance by .006, which appears to contradict findings of Experiment 1, the sample size 
and therefore statistical power was considerably lower. Additionally, examining the 
interaction in Experiment 1 as shown in Figure 2.5 and comparing it to Figure 4.2 shows an 
almost identical trend. Specifically, the greatest drop off for recall scores occurs within the 
control-interference group.   
Further paired t-tests supported this. The difference between recall scores for the 
control (M = 7.45, SD = 2.04) and interference (M = 7.12, SD = 2.66) conditions for the I-C 
order were non-significant t(20) = .6, p = .56, d = .13. The greatest difference occurred in the 
C-I group, which performed significantly better in the control (M = 7.43, SD =  2.55) than the 
interference condition (M = 5.68, SD = 2.72), t(19) = 3.91, p = .004, d = .87 (p value 
corrected using the Holm-Šidák correction).  Independent t-tests found no significant 
differences between recall scores for those who experienced interference first (M = 7.12, SD 
= 2.66) vs. second (M = 5.68, SD = 2.72), t(39) = -1.72, p = .09, d = .54, or those who 
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experienced control first (M = 7.43, SD = 2.55) vs. second (M = 7.45, SD = 2.04), t(39) = 
.97, p = .91, d = 0.01.2 
Condition, Condition Order, and Subjective interest 
 
Data scoring.  
To measure on an individual level whether a participant’s subjective interest in a 
specific fact led to that participant recalling it, a median split was conducted for interest 
ratings of each fact. These came from a Likert scale ranging from one to five. Ratings of one 
and two were labelled as low interest, three as medium interest, and four and five as high 
interest. Values of zero and one represented whether that specific fact (numbered 1-18) was 
recalled. Three recall variables were then created totalling how many of the facts recalled 
were rated as low, mid, or high by each participant.  When a fact was recalled but a rating not 
provided, the score was not added to any total. For this reason, two facts from each list (List 
A and List B) were removed as facts six and eight for List B received a technical fault on 
SuperLab and the interest ratings were not recorded. Facts six and eight were removed from 
List A scores for equivalence. Intrusion recall errors from prior lists were uncommon (< 20).  
Descriptive statistics are shown in Figure 4.3.   
 
 
2 The original p value (p = .001) was corrected to provide a family-wise alpha value 




Proportions were calculated for each interest level (low, medium, and high) using the 
equation: Proportions = (total N of facts recalled/ total N of facts rated) 
Subjective Interest 
 
To test whether differences resulted from interest valence or simply from participants 
rating more facts as interesting, proportions were calculated (N recalled/N rated) for high, 
mid, and low interestingness ratings. 




Figure 4.3 shows that mean recall is greatest for facts rated as high in interest than 
those rated ‘mid’ or ‘low’ for both lists. List B showed a linear decline from high to low. 
A 2x3 repeated measures ANOVA tested recall according to condition (control vs. 
interference) and fact interest (high, mid, and low). Condition was significant, F(1, 120) = 
5.47, MSE = .320, p =. 02), with better recall in the control condition than interference 
condition. There was also a significant effect of interestingness (F[1, 120] = 7.74, MSE = .53, 
p =.02), with facts rated as high in interestingness being recalled more than medium or low 
recall scores globally. This was explored further using planned contrasts to measure whether 
the facts recalled as high in interestingness were recalled more than those rated as medium or 
low. Facts rated as ‘high’ interest were recalled more than ‘medium’, K=-.12, p < .01, (SE = 
.04) and low, K = -.15, p < .001, (SE = .04) interest. This shows that participants recalled 
facts which they subjectively rated as high in interestingness more by than the facts they rated 
as medium or low in interestingness.  
There was no significant interaction between interest and condition (F (2, 120) < .01, 
MSE <.001, p =1). This shows that interest and condition effects are separate factors of recall.   
 
TUT and situational interest 
 
TUT was measured as N reports of task-thought or focus/N reports of MW or external 
distractions per condition (three probes per condition). To test whether situational interest in 
the experiment influenced incidences of TUT and thus mediates a relationship between TUT 
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and recall performance, a mediation analysis was conducted. This included recall as the 
outcome variable, TUT as the predictor variable and situational interest as the mediator. No 
significant effects were found in the control or interference conditions for the mediation 
analyses between variables. The only predictor of significance provided was the predictor of 
TUT on situational interest which explained 13.87% of variance in the model (b = -.75, t[30] 
= -2.2, p = .04 [-1.45, -.052]) during the interference condition. It was approaching 
significance in the control (b =-71, t[30] = -1.88,  p = .07). The overall model of these two 
factors as predictors of recall in the control condition was non-significant interest (b = .31 
t[30] = .66, p = .52) and TUT (b = .41 t[30] = .41, p = .69). The direct effect of TUT as a 
predictor separate from situational interest was also non-significant (b = .41, t[30] = .41, p = 
.69), and finally, the indirect effect (which represents the mediation effect) was 
nonsignificant as the confidence intervals of 95% cross 0 [-1.68, 2.51], b = -.22. Therefore, 
there was no significant mediation in the control condition. See Figure 4.4 for a visual 
representation of the analysis.  
  





This was the same for the interference condition with the predictors of recall being 
nonsignificant for both situational interest (b = .79, t[30] = 1.4, p = .17) and TUT (b = -.89, 
t[30] = -.78, p = .44). The separated direct effect of TUT on recall was nonsignificant (b = -
0.89, t[30] = -.78, p = .44). Finally, the mediation effect of TUT on recall was nonsignificant 
at confidence intervals of 95% (b = -.59, [-2.63, 0.12]). This shows that there is a speculative 
link between situational interest and TUT as there were trends which indicated that 
situational interest may reduce the impact of TUT on recall, though this was a nonsignificant 
trend with TUT not rated as a significant negative predictor. See Figure 4.5 for a visual 
representation of the analysis.  
 






Subjective interest conceptualised as the evocation and subjective experience of 
situational interest modulated by individual dispositions and contextualised through an 
individual’s interaction with specific fact stimuli, was tested for the ability to increase recall, 
or potentially negate NRI effects.  The NRI task itself was more demanding to further test 
whether an overall NRI based effect would be found, one which may also reduce the positive 
effects of situational interest in the experiment on recall but be resisted by subjective interest 
in the facts.    
 
Late-occurring interference effect  
The results provided a replication of the greatest decline in participant recall and of 
the worst recall/greatest hindrance of scores during the late-occurring interference condition, 
with the interaction between condition type and condition order approaching significance (p 
= 0.056). This supports the theory of a ‘fatigue effect’ or cumulative NRI. However, as 
Experiments 2 and 3 provide little evidence for the fatigue explanation, instead, the role of 
cognitive load of the NRI task in inducing further cumulative interference is highlighted.  The 
current experiment differs to the findings of Experiment 1, where no differences were found 
between the early-occurring interference vs. late-occurring interference groups, or the early-
occurring vs. late-occurring control group. This appears to show no cognitive load, or 
cumulative interference effects in hindering recall. Yet, as the primary issue with this 
experiment was recruitment and the sample size of Experiment 1 was much larger (N = 121), 
it is plausible that there was not enough statistical power and balancing provided to tease out 
these differences in the between-subjects analyses. Indeed, the differences between I-C and 
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C-I interference recall scores was nearly one and a half facts, which was actually a slightly 
larger difference than Experiment 1 (mean difference of 1.14). This would not be the case for 
the within-subjects results of the late-occurring interference condition as a G*power analysis 
was conducted in Experiment 2 which found that for a replication ‘fatigue effect’ of the 
within-subjects C-I effect found in Experiment 1, a sample size of 19 was sufficient.  A 
greater sample size in the final experiment will provide a more in-depth replication of 
Experiment 1 to measure the results of any cognitive load effects vs. interference effects in 
the late-occurring conditions.  
 
Low level NRI vs. memory-based interference (S-T-D vs. Sternberg) 
  The current experiment used a Sternberg task and found a significant difference 
between the mean recall scores of the control and interference conditions, without the need 
for condition order effects to explain them. This is different to Experiment 1 which used S-T-
D tasks as the form of NRI and the hindering effects of such interference required condition 
order effects to explain the pattern of results, with the late-occurring interference group 
experiencing lowest recall. This may explain the findings of Fatania and Mercer (2017) and 
Martini et al. (2017), which appears to show that non-specific interference does not greatly 
hinder recall.  
Additionally, the complicated finding of Varma et al. (2017) did not support 
interference effects or the positive effects of wakeful rest. Each of those experiments were 
conducted using a counterbalanced within-subjects design similar to Experiment 1, but 
without incorporating condition order effects. This negated the important interaction caused 
by the late-occurring interference condition.  In other words, although non-specific 
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interference effects are low in salience when compared to other more interfering factors (i.e., 
associative interference, memory interference etc.) it is a highly prevalent form of every day 
forgetting, as argued by Keppel (1968), and it contains a strong cumulative element in which 
the salience of the interfering effect increases the later the interference is introduced within a 
task. This trend is consistent within the current experiment too. It could be that the Sternberg 
task intended to elicit larger NRI increased this difference as it was more demanding and 
therefore induced a larger NRI effect, and thus greater cumulative interference. 
Finally, the more intense NRI Sternberg task produced overall main effects of NRI, 
indicating that the strength of the NRI is highly linked to the likelihood of it being detected 
overall, providing further evidence for the existence of NRI as a form of forgetting and 
further context for the salience of the effect. 
TUT and Interest.  
 Smallwood et al. (2009) found a link with self-reported interest in the stimuli 
reducing instances of TUT and the current experiment provides tentative support for this with 
situational interestingness in the experiment showing a trend of a reduction too. The TUT 
probes contained a lot of words which were displayed in a large size and covered most of the 
screen due to the software used (SuperLab) and were placed for just 8 s, leading to a lot of 
missed responses. It is possible this caused a lot of confusion as there were a lot of elements 
to this experiment and participants had to respond to the probes quickly, hindering the 
potential response accuracy. Though situational interest and TUT appeared to be linked, they 
were not significant predictors of recall. A measured relationship between situational interest 
and TUT within this experiment would rely on situational interest to remain stable over the 
course of both conditions (with participants receiving TUT probes in both), as situational 
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interest was only measured at the end of the experiment rather than each condition.  It would 
be useful to explore the speculative relationship between MW/TUT and interest more 
specifically within a more straightforward memory design. One possibility would be to 
explain thoroughly what constitutes MW or TUT before the experiment begins and probe 
participants at numerous points but have just one condition for participants to rate for 
interestingness (some may have found the wait period too long to sustain interest but enjoyed 
the S-T-D tasks and vice versa). This would home in on the interest and attention effects 
during the specific event rather than over time when interest may later develop or decrease. In 
the event of numerous conditions, probing situational interest at the end of each condition 
would provide more accurate measures of interestingness.  
 
Subjective Interestingness and Interference 
It was hypothesised that facts rated high in subjective interest would be recalled more 
in the interference condition and that this would reduce the condition-order effects with 
highly interesting facts resisting interference during the retention interval. What the 
experiment found was that subjective interestingness was a highly significant predictor of 
positive recall scores with participants recalling facts they rated as interesting significantly 
more than those they rated as low in interest. This occurred consistently regardless of 
condition type and condition order. Items rated as subjectively interesting, then, were easier 
to recall during the free recall task but still subject to hindering interference effects. Should a 
stronger and less speculative link be made between subjective interestingness and a reduction 
in TUT/MW as a predictor of recall, it would be plausible that high interest in the stimuli 
increases attentional focus during the encoding of the memory trace. Increasing the likelihood 
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of successful encoding, but the memory trace will then experience the same disruption 
through RI during the retention interval.     






Situational interest in Experiment 1 was conceptualised as state-dependent interest 
(Hidi & Renniger, 2006; Krapp et al., 1992) that was measured through a self-reported one-
item scale (Fulmer & Tulis, 2013; Tapola et al., 2013). Experiment 1 found improvements 
with recall performance in the control but not interference-based conditions. This was 
consistent with previous literature which, as stated by Tapola et al., found weak/small effects 
of situational interest on academic task performance and learning outcomes (Harackiewicz et 
al. 2008; Tapola, et al., 2013; Zhu et al. 2009). Experiment 4 found that situational interest 
when measured as high subjective interestingness led to the greatest recall scores. As 
situational interest can be shared globally and elicited based on text-based characteristics, the 
current experiment will measure interest using global situational interestingness ratings of 
text-based interest (these were taken from Experiment 1 interest ratings).    
Within an interference framework the more associative the items are within a list the 
greater the interference effects. Temporal distinctiveness theory is primarily a time-based 
account of interference that rates the timescale of a stimulus in comparison to other stimuli as 
a factor of distinctiveness. However, there is another established factor of distinctiveness 
known as the ‘Von Restorff effect’, whereby the distinctiveness of a memory trace is a 
function of its physical dissimilarity to or ‘isolation’ from other items and therefore a distinct 
(dissimilar/isolated) memory trace is easier to recall than less distinct items of a 
similar/associative nature (Hunt, 1995; McGoech, & McDonald, 1932; Mensink, & 
Raaijmakers, 1988; Von Restorff, 1933; Wixted, 2005). The isolated item then captures 
attention and receives greater item-specific processing than the other less distinct items 
(Bellezza & Cheney, 1973; Guérard et al., 2008; Huang, & Wille, 1979).  This can explain 
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some of the distortion caused by memory items within a similarity-based interference 
paradigm such as A-B A-C (Parkin, 1980; Watkins & Watkins 1975; Watkins & Watkins, 
1976; Wixted, 2005), with similarity interference decreasing distinctiveness.  
The impact of distinctiveness has been found on meaningful material too (Crouse, 
1971; Osgood, 1946), making novelty a positive predictor of retrieval efficacy (Reggev et al., 
2017). Within the interest literature the novelty of learning material (such as unexpected 
information in texts) is a characteristic of interestingness which leads to greater learning 
outcomes (Hidi, 1990). Chen et al., (2001) argue that the characteristics of the learning 
material should be the base of situational interest measurements and that situational interest 
should be made using comparisons. Novelty and instant enjoyment were two of the five 
characteristics/ sources of situational interest (the other three are not relevant to, or explored 
within, the text-based learning found within this experiment: Challenge, exploration 
intention, and attention demand). These characteristics were found through a comparison 
between two learning tasks: Low situational interest task vs. high situational interest task 
(Chen et al., 1999). Other characteristics of interestingness linked to text-based interest are 
provided by Krapp et al. (1992) and include novelty, character identification, life themes, 
intensity of actions, and the imagery value (Anderson et al., 1987; Hidi & Baird, 1988).  
With novelty as a factor of both ‘distinctiveness’ and ‘interestingness’, and 
interestingness being one of the two main facets of situational interest highlighted by Böhm 
(2017) and a main characteristic of text-based interest (Krapp et al. 1992), the current 
experiment aims to further investigate the situational interest findings of Experiment 1 which 
found situational interest to be a significantly positive predictor of recall in the control but not 
the interference-based condition. In the latter condition, participants’ individual interest in the 
facts was a salient predictor. The current experiment is a replication of Experiment 1’s 
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experimental design, manipulation, and stimuli facts. However, the facts themselves have 
been manipulated based on previous interestingness ratings (with facts with interest values 
close to the median removed- further increasing the interest difference) to measure the role of 




The current experiment aims to further test the replicability of the late-occurring 
interference effect found in Experiment 1 whilst further exploring the role of interest. 
By conceptualising situational interest through interestingness of the facts in 
Experiment 4, rather than state-dependent interest (short-term interest in the environment) as 
in Experiment 1, the present study aims to explore interest as a factor of distinctiveness by 
comparing recall of high and low interesting facts within an interference vs. non-interference 
context. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: Interestingness as a form of person-object interest which is linked 
to both situational and early-developed individual interest will lead to greater recall of the 
high interest facts than the low interest facts in both control and interference conditions.  
HYPOTHESIS 2: State situational interest (interest in the memory experiment) will 
be a positive predictor of recall in the control but not interference condition. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: There will be a linear trend of recall from worst to greatest: Low 
interestingness/ interference, high interestingness/ interference, low interestingness/ control, 
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high interestingness / control. Interestingness will be less prominent than the condition effects 
(concurrent with Experiment 1).  
HYPOTHESIS 4: Overall effects of NRI will not but found but NRI will be found 
from the late-occurring interference condition which will recall the fewest facts; replicating 





The experiment contained 100 participants 84 females and 15 males (one sex 
unreported). Participant ages ranged from 18 to 52 with a mean age of 23.93 (SD = 9.25) and 
consisted solely of first year undergraduate psychology students from the University of 
Wolverhampton on an introductory research methods module. The participants were recruited 




The booklets from Experiment 1 were edited to remove the Likert scales for interest 
and then reused. The booklets differed only in the order of the conditions and consisted of a 
demographic information sheet requesting the age and sex of the participant followed by 
either the instruction “please wait five minutes” (for the control condition) or some S-T-D 
tasks (interference condition). This led to the blank recall page with the instruction “recall as 
136 
 
many facts as possible”. This was then repeated with the converse condition. Finally, the 
back page contained a single self-report Likert scale for participants to rate how interesting 
they were in the experiment as a whole from one (not interested) to five (very interested).  
A PowerPoint presentation, displayed via a projector, presented the information about 
the experiment/research and how/why it was being conducted (supplementary to the 
information sheet provided).  This was followed by slides containing the facts and timings for 
each part of the experiment which were presented via a single large projector at the front of 
the classroom with participant in rows. A debrief was presented on the slides in complete 
detail as the experiment provided students with learning material used on the course.  
Scoring of interestingness 
  All facts were reused from Experiment 1. A frequency analysis was conducted on 
the combined total of interest ratings for each of the 40 facts. Twelve of the values closest to 
the median from the combined total were removed to provide a high/low split between facts 
rated as highly interesting and facts rated low for interestingness. This provided 28 facts split 
into two lists, with each list containing 14 facts. These lists were split again with seven high 
in interest and seven low in interest. The facts were mixed and reordered between the two 
lists in order to make sure that total interest ratings were equivalent. This resulted in a 
combined total interest rating of 373.27 for List A and 373.79 for List B. A list of 14 facts 
was sufficient as the maximum recall scores did not exceed 11.5 in previous experiments, 






The design was similar to Experiment 1: A quantitative mixed experimental design 
consisting of the repeated conditions (control and interference) but independent condition 
orders (C-I and I-C). The key differences involve interest: concurrent ratings of individual 
interest were removed, and facts divided into high or low interest based on ratings from 
Experiment 1.  The number of facts recalled were measured through a free recall paradigm. 
This led to three IVs: IV1) the within subject variable of condition: control vs. interference; 
IV2) the between subjects group variable of condition order (C-I, Vs. I-C); and IV3) 
interestingness of stimuli (high vs. low interest). 
For the counterbalancing of the groups, 34 participants experienced the control 
condition first with List A (C-I, A-B) whilst only 16 experienced the control condition first 
with List B (C-I, B-A). This provided a total of 67 participants for List A, and 33 participants 
for List B for the control condition. The reverse pattern occurred for interference, with 67 in 
List B and 33 in List A. Thirty-four participants experienced interference second for List B 
(C-I, A-B) and 16 experienced interference second for List A. This meant that list order (A-B, 
N = 51; B-A, N = 49) and condition order (C-I, N = 50; I-C, N = 50) had equivalent 




The experiment recruitment happened across two days. Fifty participants on day one 
experienced control followed by interference (C-I) whilst fifty participants on day two 
138 
 
experienced interference followed by control (I-C). List orders A-B and B-A were counter-
balanced across the six lessons (three per day). However, not all students appeared within 
their allotted lesson times leading to balancing issues for list order (discussed and explored 
further below).   
Students/participants were provided with an information sheet, consent form, and 
answer booklet at the desk they were seated at within the classroom (with one chair space 
between each person). The experimenter informed participants of the reason behind the 
research and what it would involve using a PowerPoint presentation. Students who did not 
wish to take part but wished to watch were allowed to do so in silence. Participants were 
asked to fill in the demographic information sheet provided before the experiment began and 
then they were presented with 14 facts. One fact was shown per slide, for 8 s, followed by 
either a controlled wait period or spot-the-difference tasks. Both events lasted five minutes. 
After the interval, there was a four-minute recall period on the next page of the booklet. This 
was then repeated with the converse condition.  The experiment lasted a total of 22 minutes. 
At the end there was a Likert scale for participants to rate how interesting they found the 
experiment as a whole. All participants were debriefed fully regarding the experiment as it 
formed as part of a lesson. This taught them about the stimuli selection method, group 




Scoring of recall  
 
Scoring of recall followed the same structure as prior experiments with .5 of a fact 
rewarded for the recall of half a fact. The scoring was more lenient as participants were 
instructed that the exact wording was not necessary, but the overall meaning/understanding 
must be evident. This is more indicative of an everyday learning context. Intrusive recall 
errors from the previous recall list are not scored but have not been prevalent during the 
experiments in this thesis. Intrusion recall errors from prior lists were uncommon (< 25). 
 
List equivalence: Overall list recall  
 
To measure list equivalency for recall scores, a paired t-test compared total recall 
scores for List A (M = 5.62, SD = 2.26) and List B (M = 5.14, SD = 1.95). The results showed 
that the recall scores between the lists were non-significantly different, t(99) = 1.72, p = .09, 






Figure 5.1 shows an almost identical pattern of results to Experiment 1 and 3. Late 
occurring conditions show a drop-off in recall performance; however, the late-occurring 
interference condition shows the lowest recall performance for both the within (C-I) and 
between (C-I vs I-C) comparisons. 
Figure 5.1. Mean recall of high and low interesting facts according to condition and condition 




 Figure 5.2 shows that interference recall scores for high (solid line) and low (dashed 
line) are very similar whilst control high (solid line) vs. low (dashed line) scores differ, with 
greater recall for the high interesting facts in both orders. Recall patterns for the control and 
interference conditions are consistent with previously found condition-order effects 
regardless of interestingness. The differences between the recall scores are most prominent 
between conditions, with control recalling more than interference for both high and low 
interestingness. High interestingness leads to greater recall than low interest for both 




Figure 5.2. Mean recall of high and low interesting facts according to condition and condition 






A Levene’s test was conducted to test the homogeneity of variance for each recall 
condition in the I-C and C-I orders. Results of the Levene’s test show that there are no 
significant difference between the variance of the groups (control high interest: F[1,98] = 
1.26, p = .26; control low interest: F[1,98] < .01, p = .96; interference high interest: F[1,98] = 




A Three-Way Mixed ANOVA was conducted to measure average recall of the high 
and low interest facts for the control and interference conditions with the between groups 
factor of condition order.  
Interest (high vs low) was a significant factor, with facts previously rated as higher in 
interestingness (M = 2.83, SE = .11) being recalled more than those rated low in 
interestingness (M = 2.54, SE =.1), F(1,98) = 5.73, MSE = 8.57,  p = .02, η2 = .06. 
Condition (control vs. interference) was a strong significant factor too, with the 
control conditions (M = 2.95, SE = .1) recalling more than the respective interference 
conditions (M =2.42, SE =  .09), F(1,98) = 27.1, MSE = 27.30, p < .0001, η2 = .22 This shows 
a main effect of NRI. 
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The between-subjects effects of condition order showed a non-significant difference 
between the two groups overall, F(1,98) < .01, MSE = .01, p = .97, η2 < .001, highlighting 
equivalency in overall recall for the two counterbalanced groups; C-I (M = 2.69, SE = .12) 
and I-C (M = 2.68, SE = .12).  
There was no significant interaction between interest level and condition type, F(1,98) 
= 1.69, MSE = 2.48, p = .2, η2 = .08, and no interaction between interest level, condition, and 
condition order, F(1,98) = .07, MSE = .11, p = .79, η2 < .01.  
However, as with Experiment 1, there was a highly significant interaction between 
condition and condition order, F(1,98) = 40.98, MSE = 41.28, p < .0001, η2 = .3. Subsequent 
t-tests explored whether this replicated the late-occurring NRI effect.  An independent t-test 
compared recall scores between groups for when control was presented first (M = 6.54, SD = 
2.13) vs. second (M = 5.24, SD = 1.95). There was a strongly significant difference t(98) = 
3.17, p < .01, with the first control task experiencing superior recall. The same test found a 
strongly significant difference between when interference was presented first (M = 5.49, SD = 
1.92) compared with second (M = 4.24, SD = 1.86), t(98) = -3.31, p < .005. The pattern of 
Experiment 1’s late-occurring NRI results are replicated. 
Two additional paired-samples t-tests were conducted to measure participants own 
recall scores in the first task vs. the second to measure any potential decline in recall for the 
interference-control group, when interference was first (M = 5.49, SD  = 1.92) and control 
was second (M = 5.24, SD = 1.95). There was no significant difference between mean recall 
scores, t(49) = -.84, p = .41, d = 0.12.  Therefore, there was a non-significant drop off from 
task one to task two. Unlike with the I-C group, for the group where control was first (M = 
6.54, SD = 2.14) and interference was second (M = 4.24, SD = 1.86), there was a strongly 
significant effect, t(49) = 8.47, p < 0.005, d = 1.18. This result shows that there was a large 
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effect and highly significant drop in recall scores when the interference condition was second. 
All t-test were adjusted using the Holm-Šidák correction. 
A between-subjects comparison of the group conditions shows that participants who 
experienced the control condition first had a mean recall score of 6.45, whilst those in the 
opposing group (who experienced the control condition second) had a mean recall score of 
5.24, representing 1.31 less facts recalled on average during the late occurring condition. This 
between-subject difference was also found in the interference conditions too, with recall 
when interference was first (M = 5.49) being higher than when interference was second (M = 
4.24), This represents a similar though lesser difference of 1.25 fewer facts recalled.  
To measure the independent condition positioning difference, an independent samples 
t-test was used measuring late occurring control (M = 5.24, SD = 1.95) with late occurring 
interference (M = 4.24, SD = 1.86). There was a significant difference between late 
conditions (t[98] = -2.62, p = .01, d = 0.53). This indicates that although performances 
between groups for both conditions indicate some fatigue, the hindered recall (lower recall 




To test whether interest in the experimental task itself correlated with recall performance 
in both conditions, or replicated the results of Experiment 1’s regression (null effect in the 
NRI condition), two Spearman’s correlations were conducted. Results showed that state 
interest positively correlated with recall scores in both the control (rs[98] = .27, p <.005) and 
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interference (rs[98] = .31, p <..001) conditions.  This indicates that interest in the 
experimental task overall is linked with greater memory recall performance.  
Experiment 1 comparison.  
Following the positive correlations in both conditions, a reanalysis of the Experiment 
1 data has been conducted to explore state interest using correlations. Although state interest 
contained a stronger correlation with recall in the control than interference condition, both 
conditions positively correlated (control: rs[119] = .31, p < .001; interference: rs[119] = .19, p 
=.04). The positive correlations replicate, though weakly, in the interference condition. This 
may have resulted in the nonsignificant predictor in the Experiment 1 regression when fact 




The current experiment was a replication and extension of Experiment 1 intending to 
test the reliability and validity of the late-occurring RI effect. The experiment consisted of the 
same facts from Experiment 1, differing in their list representation as the stimuli were 
manipulated based on previous situational interest ratings, as the experiment also aimed to 
explore the impact of global ‘interestingness’ on the recall of meaningful items. 
Condition and condition order had the most prevalent effects on recall (explored 
further below), which better explain the difference between recall scores, with the effect of 
interestingness having a lesser, separate, and positive impact. More interesting facts were 
recalled more than the facts rated low in interest.  
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The tentative interpretation of a reduction of the positive effect of interestingness 
caused by interference was not supported by the results of this experiment.  High 
interestingness in the control condition led to the greatest recall scores—though this effect 
appears to make little difference to the rate of decline when the task is second, showing that 
the effect does not reduce hindered recall by cognitive load or interference effects. Instead, 
interestingness within this experiment is best conceptualised as a factor of increased recall 
independent of NRI and condition order. According to the Von Restorff effect, the more 
distinct a memory trace, the easier it is to recall amongst the “clutter” of similar stimuli; 
therefore, novelty increases the likelihood of recall. As novelty is a factor of interestingness 
highlighted by Krapp et al. (1992), it was originally hypothesised that highly interesting facts 
would be more distinct within an interference paradigm. Although Experiment 1 indicated 
that initial individual interest in the facts may be important during the interference condition, 
the current study found that the same facts and ratings when used as a measure of salience for 
interestingness improved recall scores regardless of the condition. A reanalysis of the 
Experiment 1 data finds (and is replicated with the current study) positive correlations of state 
situational interest in both conditions. Therefore, as interest in the facts and state situational 
interest in the experiment itself both increased recall independent of condition, the hypothesis 
was not supported. This suggests that interestingness of the stimuli and experiment task can 
have a positive impact on learning of meaningful material, but the salience of this 
improvement occurs separately from interference effects (and interference does not decrease 
interest effects). 
Why does interest not reduce/interact with interference effects? Rather than being a 
strong cognitive factor of maintenance during retention it could be argued that prior studies 
find increased learning effects of interest through a more motivational factor, leading to a 
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greater willingness to engage and persist with more demanding tasks (Krapp & Prenzel, 
2011). This larger impact would not be measured within the initial cognitive experiment 
(which found small positive improvements of recall but primarily in controlled and less 
demanding conditions) but may be indicative of rate of learning over time given multiple 
trials, with greater interest leading to more frequent engagement (Krapp & Prenzel, 2011, 
Schiefele, Krapp, & Winteler, 1992). Instead, a cognitive argument for could be made for the 
importance and salience of interestingness during the encoding phase. Within this 
explanation interestingness contains an emotional valence factor (Schiefele, 1999), or a sense 
of novelty to the individual which in turn makes it more isolated and ‘distinct’ (Von Restorff, 
1933) and provides that memory item with greater item processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; 
Craik & Tulving, 1975; Guérard et al., 2008) thus increasing recall. With situational interest 
being linked as a form of emotional valence and the Von Restorff effect being shown to 
contain an emotional factor that captures attention during encoding (Wiswede et al., 2006), 
both may lead to increased learning and recall. This connection contains merit within the 
literature.  
Late occurring conditions and interestingness 
In the previous experiments (1 & 4), the between-subject comparison of control 
condition recall in the C-I and I-C conditions showed a small non-significant decline when 
control was positioned second. This experiment found this effect to be more pronounced and 
thus significant. So why is this difference more pronounced in this experiment than the 
previous two? The method of investigating interest effects of the stimuli in this experiment is 
different from the previous two methods: Exploratory research of interest effects of 
equivalent stimuli (Experiment 1 & 4) vs. confirmatory research through deliberate 
interestingness manipulation in the current experiment. Participants in the late-occurring 
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control condition recalled high interest facts at the same rate as the interference condition but 
experienced the same rate of decline from one task to another for the low interest facts.  
These findings further support the interestingness evaluation above with 
interestingness being a positive indicator of recall performance during the early control 
condition group but experienced the same rate of decline (same amount of hindered recall) 
during the late occurring control period due to the increased difficulty of the task through 
either associative PI of the prior-condition or increased cognitive load effects. 
 
Overall and Late-occurring RI effects 
The pattern of results showing hindered recall during the late-occurring interference 
condition from Experiment 1, 2 (when comparing control vs interference recall in the SMT), 
and 4 are replicated for the fourth time, providing high confidence in the replicability and 
scientific validity of this finding. Interestingness had no impact on the hindered recall found 
in the late-occurring interference task. However, the current experiment differed from the 
findings of Experiment 1 by finding an overall effect of NRI. So why is NRI from the same 
distractor more prevalent in this experiment than in the initial experiment?  
The current experiment found overall NRI effects, and the main manipulation of this 
experiment was provided by changing the method of measuring interestingness valence. In 
Experiment 1 participants were asked to rate how interesting they found each individual fact. 
This involves a greater level of individual evaluation and reflection of each item, providing a 
deeper level of cognitive processing (Craik, & Lockhart, 1972; Craik, & Tulving, 1975). This 
contrasts with more passive (or maintenance) rehearsal of the facts in the current experiment. 
Once the NRI task occurs the maintenance rehearsal strategy is interrupted thus preventing 
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maintenance and increasing interference effects. This would mean that participants in the 
current experiment experienced a greater drop-off in recall due to the absence of elaborate 
encoding and the interruption of the maintenance rehearsal. 
 
Limitations 
As noted above, there were some issues with counterbalancing in this experiment. 
However, List-A and List-B were equivalent for recall. The two experiments by Tapola, et al. 
(2013) and Tapola et al. (2014) failed to replicate the situational interest effects on increasing 
task performance as found in their initial study (Niemivirta & Tapola, 2007). Such conflicting 
findings are found again for grade scores with situational interest as either a positive predictor 
(Harackiewcz et al., 2008) or a non-correlate (Harackiewicz et al., 2000). Rotgans and 
Schmidt (2017) argue that these findings result from the operationalisation of the 
measurement, lack of repeat testing and lack of experimental manipulation. Similar to Tapola 
et al. (2013), the current experiment operationalised situational interest using a singular item 
self-report scale. Tobias (1994) noted that participants may use different reference points to 
compare how interesting the stimuli is. An example of this is provided by Chen et al. (2001), 
who state that some participants may rate the text as more interesting by comparing it to 
previous texts, whilst others may rate it as less interesting in comparison to playing a video 
game, thus questioning measurement reliability. The implementation of the Rotgans scale 
(2015), repeated measurements, or repeated testing of the effect would lead to greater 
confidence in the measurement accuracy. Although previous learning studies may implement 
more rigorous re-testing and multiple-scale measurements of a topic, these cognitive memory 
experiments were concerned with the direct short-term effects of the stimuli and 
manipulations (measuring each 28-40 facts per experiment on a six-point Likert scale is 
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experimentally unfeasible). The previously used Likert-scale provided comparable results 
with previous literature and was more experimentally testable and comparable with the 
individual item-specific ratings of individual interest implemented within this thesis and was 
measured accordingly.  
Conclusion 
The results of this experiment support the findings of the previous experiments of 
hindered recall through both cognitive load and interference in the late-occurring conditions 
(specifically NRI). A more elaborate rehearsal of stimuli during the encoding phase may 
decrease NRI effects, indicating that NRI’s hindrance of recall may occur more prominently 
when interrupting maintenance rehearsal. The results are also consistent with the previously 
mentioned literature on the motivational factor of interest and interestingness on learning, 
with the main result clearly showing that interestingness is a positive factor of recall. This 
positive valence is independent of the retention phase which is where NRI occurs and 
hinders. Combining the cognitive literature on distinctiveness and NRI with the educational 
literature on interest provides a clear picture of increased learning through the positive 
emotional valence of interest during the encoding phase (increasing the likelihood of a 







Aims of the Thesis 
 
This thesis attempted to combine two approaches of psychology: Cognitive 
psychology and educational psychology.  All five experiments used a ‘free recall’ 
experimental design to explore the intricate nature of NRI. The primary goal of the thesis was 
to contribute to the existing interference-based forgetting literature by providing a greater 
contextual understanding of NRI, in order to ‘shed light’ on conflicting findings of NRI 
effects. Experiments 2 and 3 explored the role of differing types of prior tasks and difficulty 
in inducing late-occurring NRI effects whilst Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5 explored the 
educational psychology domain of motivated learning through ‘interest’ in, and 
‘interestingness’ of, meaningful text-based stimuli (facts). The intention was to examine the 
role interest plays in the retention and subsequent recall of these items and to measure, if any, 





Summary of key NRI findings 
 
A main effect NRI has not been very prevalent in the recent literature (e.g., Varma et 
al., 2017) and an overall null effect was found in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2). However, the 
findings of main effects in Chapters 4 and 5 (and the SMT in Chapter 3) provide an effect 
that is more robust than was initially thought. With this taken into account, NRI appears to be 
more complex than initially hypothesised.  
One key finding which remained consistently replicated across all experiments (1, 2 
[SMT], 4, & 5) was the finding of hindered recall performance in the ‘late-occurring 
interference’ condition; the condition with the least amount of facts recalled when compared 
with any other condition and condition order. So, whilst three of the four experiments 
reported NRI, this was driven by the point at which NRI was experienced; considering the 
order in which these conditions occur leads to differing recall performances.  
These differences were consistently found to be significant for late-occurring 
interference, whilst the comparisons between the control conditions and condition orders 
were typically non-significant. This indicates that there was a significantly greater salience of 
the NRI effect when participants were subjected to interference later into the task which 
consistently hindered subsequent recall performance.  
This was explored as either a ‘fatigue effect’ or cumulative effect of RI salience. In 
the current literature NRI is seen as a highly prevalent form of everyday forgetting while 
remaining a low-level and mild form of interference. The current thesis demonstrates, 
through use of a low-level RI task (S-T-Ds) of just five minutes, that NRI effects may be 
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resisted to the point of negligible during the start of a task, but this interference phenomena 
contains a cumulative element which grows in ‘potency’ the later it occurs in a task. Another 
function which may modulate the cumulative salience element is that of prior-task similarity. 
The more similar the prior-task before the NRI to the recall task, the worse the recall scores. 
The extent to which this can be explained by cognitive load theory, PI or ‘distinctiveness’ is 




NRI is argued to be the most prevalent source of everyday forgetting (Keppel, 1968, 
Wixted, 2004) as the ‘nonspecific’ description encompasses any stimuli/information that is 
not considered to be related to the learning material or memory event. NRI was 
operationalised through a post-encoding condition consisting of S-T-D tasks (and a Sternberg 
task in Experiment 4) and is considered a form of diversion interference (Dewar et al., 2007). 
The interference condition was contrasted against a post-encoding ‘wakeful rest’ control 
condition of the same length.  
The Experiment 1 results from a large sample size (N = 121) showed no significant 
overall main effect of NRI, which appeared to support the similar null findings of Varma et 
al. (2017). However, the experiment contained highly significant condition-order effects with 
the later-occurring conditions experiencing a drop-off in recall performance. This drop-off 
was non-significant for the control condition, indicating that wakeful rest may be effective at 
reducing cognitive load effects and the trend of results did not support rehearsal effects as the 
I-C recall scores were not significantly different (see Chapter 2). Most prominently, the 
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strongest main effect indicates a potential ‘fatigue effect of NRI’ whereby the late-occurring 
interference group experienced the most hindered recall performance between-subjects and 
the greatest within subjects drop-off in recall. To understand the nature of these findings 
within the literature other alternative explanations needed to be explored. Subsequently, 
Chapter 3 explored the role of prior-tasks in causing cognitive fatigue and cumulative 
interference, while Chapter 4 utilised a stronger form of RI task to measure overall main 
effects for this late-occurring interference interaction.   
How reliable are the findings of NRI salience? The recent literature on the presence of 
pervasive NRI effects has lacked congruence (Fatania, & Mercer, 2017; Martini et al., 2018; 
Martini, Martini, & Sasche, 2019; Martini et al., 2017; Varma et al., 2017). Within this thesis, 
however, there has been a consistently replicated effect of late-occurring RI hindrance greater 
than that of any condition or condition order in Chapters 2, 4, and 5; with Chapter 3 
providing understanding of the similarity function (stimuli, and or memory task) and Chapter 
4 utilising a stronger form of NRI.  The experiments showed that the point at which NRI was 
experienced was crucial to the presence or absence of NRI. Therefore, in prior experiments 
which measured NRI effects, the main effects may have ‘masked’ the more intricate function 
of NRI induced by S-T-D tasks. Also, Chapter 5 (N = 100) found an overall effect of NRI in 
an almost identical experiment whereby the concurrent rating task was removed. Why was an 
overall effect found in Experiment 5 but not Experiment 1? In Experiment 1 participants were 
asked to rate how interesting each individual item was, creating a form of elaborate encoding 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). As NRI occurs whilst interrupting 
maintenance rehearsal, the influence of a deeper and more elaborately rehearsed encoding 
phase may have enabled participants to resist NRI, but not the cumulative (thus more salient) 
late-occurring interference effect.  
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Similarly, Chapter 4 utilised a Sternberg task (a quick item-recognition task with 
meaningless numerical stimuli) during the retention interval to elicit a greater amount of NRI 
and compare recall patterns. With the more demanding NRI task, an overall main effect of 
NRI was found within the same experimental design. These results of Chapters 4 and 5 also 
followed the same late-occurring interference drop-off for recall performance, indicating that 
more demanding RI tasks which produced main effects may have continued to experience the 
same increased salience in the unexplored late-occurring interference group. Due to this, it is 
firstly argued that overall effects of NRI (particularly from distractions such as S-T-D tasks) 
were more prevalent than expected. Secondly, NRI is a low-level form of diversion 
interference and this interference becomes more pervasive the later it occurs within a task and 
can accumulate with similarity interference. There are two current explanations which could 
explain this consistent pattern: 
 (i) The greater hindrance of recall may result from a cumulative interference effect 
whereby the prior memory task created a form of associative PI from recall of List 1, which 
interferes with the subsequent learning (though this is not supported by the prior control 
groups) and maintenance of List 2 stimuli during a NRI task. Tentative evidence for this is 
provided by the SMT during Chapter 3, which reported the lowest recall performance. This 
supports the concept of ‘distinctiveness’ of the memory trace through attention and 
maintenance, and of cue-overload theory (PI) during retrieval. Within this paradigm, the 
positive effects of wakeful and active rest result from breaking-up and preventing the 
cumulative interference build-up, thus increasing recall scores. 
(ii) The second explanation relies on cognitive load or mental fatigue (with cognitive 
load of the tasks increasing interference whilst mental fatigue may increase susceptibility to 
interference). Specifically, prior-tasks and TOT makes an individual more susceptible to NRI 
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and increases the salience of NRI effects, in particular through resource depletion. This 
would explain the greater decline resulting from C-I than I-C along with the trends in Chapter 
3 whereby the similar task incurred the most hindered recall performance, followed by the 
dissimilar task, with the role of executive functioning playing a slight role.  However, this 
explanation is a speculative deduction based on non-significant differences but trends within 
a small sample size. This would mean that the cognitive resources needed for the declarative 
semantic memory task may have been depleted by the SMT, while the DMT used declarative 
memory resources but of a different (visual) memory system enabling slightly better recall, 
and the executive functioning task was a mental NMT, which would lead to lessened taxation 
of these memory resources and thus enabling greater recall. Within this framework the 
benefit of ‘wakeful rest’ found by Mercer (2015) would reduce cognitive load and allow the 
replenishment of these resources. This effect can also be found using a low-level active rest 
as long as the task is of a dissimilar nature to the primary memory task, as found by Ecker, 
Tay, and Brown (2015). 
Chapter 3 provided a deeper understanding of the results found in the Chapter 2 
experiment by looking into the role of the prior-task condition and measuring whether similar 
or dissimilar stimuli and memory prior-task groups experience the same ‘fatigue’ or a 
‘cumulative interference’ effect of hindered recall when the NRI condition was late-
occurring. As expected, the worst performing recall group consisted of a similar prior 
memory task using associative verbal stimuli, followed by the dissimilar task group. 
However, the group which experienced a NMT (Stroop) achieved the greatest recall, which 
was significantly greater than the SMT but not significantly different to the control group 
who were fresh and received no-prior task. The results of Chapter 3 highlight the importance 
of the type of cognitive prior-task on subsequent recall performance. The greater performance 
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of the NMT provides strong support for the importance of temporally isolating the encoding 
phase for the to-be-recalled stimuli in order to increase the subsequent recall of those items, 
by reducing forgetting caused by interference. PI caused by every day thinking, or prior 
lectures (the participants were students) may have been reduced by the ‘active rest’ provided 
by the Stroop task by further temporally isolating the encoding phase from resource 
demanding or interference inducing tasks (Brown et al., 2006; Ecker, Tay, & Brown, 2015; 
Morin et al., 2010; Rönnberg, 1980), though further investigation is needed to uncover 
whether a Stroop task could be utilised as a form of active rest. Experiment 3 did not find 
significant differences between the prior-Stroop task groups and the no-prior task, 
questioning whether everyday sources of PI were reduced, but supporting the concept that the 
Stroop provides low cognitive load for memory tasks which does not decrease recall 
significantly compared to a control. This would fit within the theory of temporal 
distinctiveness but with an additional cognitive load resource sharing function. That is, whilst 
an empty wakeful rest period is advantageous to recall (Mercer, 2015), this isolation can be 
achieved through non-effortful tasks that are different to the task aim (recall, hence memory) 
and thus lower resource demand (Chen et al., 2017). This would be particularly advantageous 
prior to a task to reduce PI, though must be treated with caution after learning so as not to 
induce NRI greater than that naturally elicited during wakeful rest (i.e., MW).  
A consolidation account would explain the greater recall as the result of the Stroop 
task preventing spontaneous rehearsal and autobiographical thinking, thus freeing up 
consolidation memory processes by reducing memory resource demand (Varma et al., 2017). 
However, Ecker, Tay, and Brown’s (2015) experiment tested the effect of temporal isolation 
against the freedom of consolidation process resources within their Experiments 1 and 2. 
Ecker et al. measured recall of two lists (list 1 and list 2) which were separated by differing 
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temporal delays to test pre-study and post-study rest and temporal isolation. Whilst Ecker et 
al. found strong pre-study rest effects (similar to Chapter 3) for list 2 recall, a greater 
consolidation of list 1 (represented by greater list 1 recall scores) was not found this indicates 
that the improved recall of list 2 following a longer pre-study rest was not explained by a 
freeing of consolidation processes following successful list 1 consolidation. Instead, this 
isolation may be best contextualised as a reduction of interference. For this the Stroop task 
would need to be low enough in cognitive demand to reduce the PI caused by previous 
everyday interfering tasks such as autobiographical thinking (Craig et al., 2014; Dewar et al., 
2014). Experiment 2 further supported this by finding no significant recall differences 
between different prior Stroop tasks and a controlled no-prior group. This finding is 
consistent with the literature as it is unclear if the Stroop task which lasted just five minutes is 
lengthy enough to induce fatigue. For greater reference, a similar study was conducted by 
Rauch, Wolfgang, and Schmitt (2009) which increased cognitive demand of the Stroop task 
(see Chapter 3) over a 15-minute period and that was considered a short-term approach with 
previous studies typically opting for a Stroop task that takes around one to two hours 
(Boksem & Lorist, 2006; Lorist et al., 2005; McMorris, Barwood et al., 2018).  This means 
that an active prior-task which included a short-duration Stroop task was not sufficiently 
cognitively demanding to cause interference. This reduced cognitive load demands to non-
significantly different to a no-prior task for NRI effects but does not indicate an advantageous 
isolation from every day forgetting, but further indicates that cognitive fatigue did not induce 
the late-occurring recall hinderance within this thesis. Finally, when combined, the 
experiments in Chapter 3 show tentative support (through trends) for the cognitive load 
explanation, which is worth exploring in future experiments. However, for the current thesis, 
the results better befit the explanation of cumulative interference rather than a fatigue 




Interim conclusion for NRI effects 
 
It has been established that temporal isolation through wakeful rest is highly 
advantageous to recall through the reduction of both PI and RI. It is asserted within this thesis 
– and congruent with the current literature – that isolation of the encoding items can be 
achieved through a wakeful and active rest period prior to the encoding phase to help reduce 
sources of everyday PI, and cognitive load. Furthermore, the results of these chapters are 
better explained as a function of distinctiveness of the memory trace, diversion interference 
(NRI of the retrieval phase), and cognitive resource sharing (modulating the salience of 
interference). Combining CRS, cumulative interference, and interestingness explanations 
together demonstrated that distinctiveness of the memory trace is multidimensional, and that 
isolation is achieved temporally, physically (text-based stimuli characteristics), 
mentally/emotionally (interest salience) and through understanding the role of prior-task 
interference in inducing cognitive load and PI.  
It is argued that prior research into NRI has previously missed the important 
interaction produced by condition-order effects explaining the varied impact of NRI. It is 
concluded that NRI is a highly prevalent but low-level interfering effect which increases 
forgetting as a power function of its cumulative function, whereby prior-task cognitive load 
and/or interference effects combine to hinder subsequent recall performance. This may be 
reduced by enabling greater elaborate encoding, and through isolation by understanding the 






Summary of key interest findings 
 
Various forms of interest were explored in a number of different ways within the 
current thesis, including situational interest, topic interest, overall interestingness (of the 
stimuli) and subjective interestingness. The most substantial finding was found in Experiment 
4 This experiment applied a relatively new approach with an individual differences, item-
specific focus of rating subjective interestingness of the facts. Most prior research in 
interestingness and memory applied global main effects that measure overall 
interest/interestingness with overall recall/ recall type (categories etc.). This misses out the 
important individual differences found with the personal, subjective level of interest 
experienced by the participants for each specific fact. This means that if a fact is rated by the 
sample as uninteresting overall, another participant may rate the same fact as highly 
interesting and therefore be more likely to recall it – this interaction would be missed.  By 
comparing Experiment 4 (of subjective interestingness) and Experiment 5 (of overall 
interestingness), it is clear that the individualistic way of measuring interest provides a clearer 
view of the impact of positive interest valence on short-term learning performance, with facts 
rated as highly subjectively interesting leading to the subsequent recall of those facts. 
Although both types of interest were significant positive effects, subjective interest had the 
larger effect size.  
The various forms of interest found to increase recall performance were consistently 
shown to be a separate effect which did not interact with the control or interference 
conditions. This indicates that over a relatively brief memory experiment, high interest 
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valence increases the likelihood of item recall in comparison to lower interest valence. 
However, this occurs regardless of the retention period, meaning that interest valence does 
not aid in the maintenance of a memory trace during retention and does not, therefore, 
decrease the amount of information lost through interference.  
 
Interest and Interestingness 
 
Interest was conceptualised within this thesis in two main ways; individual interest 
was conceptualised as ‘self-actualised interest’ and the ‘interestingness’ of both the 
environment and of the stimuli was classed as a factor of situational interest. With a lack of 
cohesion between researchers on the definitions of interest and, therefore, the optimal way to 
measure interest (Rotgans, 2015), each experimental chapter assessing interest explored the 
role of varying forms of interest within the same short-term learning3 and memory 
experimental design. This is particularly pertinent as cognitive memory studies which 
included interest as a factor typically used one scale ratings of interest without exploring or 
understand the different conceptualisations to provide accurate contextualisation, and hence 
interpretation of interest effects (for an example see the Chapter 3 introduction for an 
interpolation of Mcgillivray’s [2013] memory findings with the interest literature).    
Individual interest and situational interest are each argued to contain two phases of 
development within the most commonly accepted model – The four-phase model of interest 
development by Hidi and Renninger (2006). This includes Phase 1 triggered situational 
 
3 Short-term here refers to brief learning episodes, not of short-term memory lasting seconds. 
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interest, Phase 2 developed situational interest, Phase 3 individual interest, and Phase 4 
established individual interest. TSI refers to the positive experience of interest which can be 
shared between groups as an environmental response to a stimulus/trigger (such interest in 
the experiment, or the interestingness of text). This may develop and be maintained when the 
task or scenario is seen as meaningful (Harackiewicz et al., 2000; Hidi & Renniger, 2006). 
This may then develop into individual interest, however, as Hidi and Renniger define this 
phase as an enduring predisposition to reengage with a specific topic or content, the findings 
of the current thesis, which measures engagement with the facts over a short-term recall 
paradigm, are better explained by the first two phases of situational interest development. 
 
Situational interest through interestingness 
 
Chapter 2 found that situational interest measured as overall interestingness of the 
experiment was a significant predictor of recall, but only when interference was not present, 
and although there is consistently no interaction between condition and interest this similar 
trend was replicated in the findings of Chapter 5. This indicates a weak relationship that may 
be worth investigating between task difficulty, interference type, and interest salience. 
However, the current thesis finds little significant evidence for interest dampening NRI. 
Instead, situational interest shall be discussed for its positive impact on successful recall and 
consequently greater learning outcomes.   
The positive influence of situational interest conceptualised as text-based 
interestingness upon learning outcomes has long been established (Garner et al., 1991; Hidi 
& McLaren 1988; Krapp et al., 1992; Schiefele, & Ulrich, 1996; Shirey & Reynolds 1988) 
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though sometimes weakly (i.e., Chen et al., 2002; Zhu et al., 2009) But what makes a 
stimulus text (situationally) interesting? There are two main components: (i) characteristics of 
the text (e.g., novelty, instant enjoyment, challenge, exploration intention and attention 
demand); (ii) personal aspects to the reader (and the reader’s engagement with it; Bernstein, 
1955). Chapter 5 explored whether global interestingness captured concurrently with the 
presentation of the facts (making ratings linked to instant enjoyment and likely elicited by 
novelty) were transferable across samples to increase recall performance. Chapter 4 explored 
the relationship between the specific stimuli and the subjective individual experience with it 
and whether that leads to greater recall of that stimuli item specifically.  
The Chapter 5 experiment tested the recall of the facts used in Experiment 1 when the 
facts were split by high and low interestingness based on global ratings from a separate 
cohort. As anticipated, the experiment supported the previous literature as the facts rated 
higher in interestingness were recalled greater than those rated lower. This further supports 
the assertion that situational interest effects, when conceptualised as interestingness, can be 
consistent across groups to increase learning and recall outcomes. Therefore, Chapter 5 
shows no need for personal identification, and that the positive effects of interest on recall 
can be found without measuring the subjective individual participant rating. This has benefits 
for future application, i.e., learning materials used yearly may be rated for global 






What makes the interesting facts easier to remember and recall? 
 
 Marton and Säljö (1984) found that students who were less interested in a text 
demonstrated considerably less understanding of said text. Conversely, those who were 
interested in the material had a greater understanding which led to greater semantic 
processing. Craik and Tulving (1975), through the ‘Shallow Processing effect’, found that 
this greater or ‘deeper’ level of cognitive processing during the encoding phase leads to 
greater recall potential and better comprehension— resulting in a greater learning outcome. 
These findings were then supported by Schiefele and Krapp, (1996) who found that interest 
and deep comprehension questions were the greatest predictors of recall. In a later study, 
Sanford et al. (2006) used ‘attentional capturers’ within written language such as italics for 
emphasis and word stressors and found that these elicited greater levels of processing through 
increased focus and change detection. A cognitive explanation for this is provided by the 
‘Von Restorff’ effect whereby novel and more ‘distinct’ items are easier to recall than non-
distinct items (Huang & Wille, 1979; Hunt, 1995; Von Restoff, 1933). For example, a red 
stimuli item amongst a list of blue items would be more ‘isolated’ and hence distinguishable.  
Merging these findings provides a preliminary model of stimuli recall (see Figure 6.1) 
awaiting further explanation: The characteristics of a text (such as novelty) influences the 
level of situational interest evoked and the way the stimuli is presented as a function of its 
isolation (through attentional capturers or ‘the spacing effect’ mentioned previously) is an 
interlinking factor which captures attention and focus during the encoding phase. This leads 
to a deeper level of cognitive processing which increases both recall and comprehension of 
the text, resulting in both greater memory performance and overall learning outcomes.  
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However, whilst this form of distinctiveness has increased memory performance 
through isolation, it has not been shown (as a function of interestingness) within this 
experiment to modulate interference effects—unlike time-based isolation discussed below. 
This shows that whilst physical distinctiveness of – and interest effects from – a stimulus 
leads to greater recall; this does not decrease the rate of overall forgetting caused by NRI 
during the retrieval phase. More interesting items are encoded than uninteresting items but 
experience the same susceptibility to RI.  
 
Subjective interest and topic interest  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 tested elements of the second type of interest, individual interest, as 
individual interest is argued to be a primary motivator for participants to engage with a more 
difficult task (Hidi, 2006; Krapp, 2009; Krapp & Prenzel, 2011). This could potentially 
explain the positive effect of interest ratings found during the interference condition in 
Experiment 1. However, as this form of interest develops over time from situational interest, 
a true measure of individual interest is not plausible within this cognitive memory 
experiment. Instead, factors of interest are measured, such as the efficacy of prospective 
ratings of participants’ interest in the topic (based on their previous experiences of interest 
and subjective beliefs (Rotgans & Schmidt, 2018) in predicting recall performance of topic-
related facts in Chapter 3. Dispositional individual differences factors of interest experience 
were conceptualised as ‘subjective interest’ which was then tested in Experiment 4. 
Subjective interest ratings were measured concurrently for each fact and represent the rating 
of a participant’s subjective experience of TSI evoked by the specific stimuli.  
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Firstly, topic interest effects on recall were not found when measured pre-stimulus, 
indicating that a participant’s dispositional beliefs or emotions around their interest of a topic 
does not directly impact immediate recall. Instead, ratings of the individual interest 
questionnaire (Rotgans, 2015) for both topics were correlated. As the ratings were similar 
across the different topics (‘space’ and ‘animals’), it is likely that some participants were 
comparing anticipated interest in the experiment or comparing with other topics not 
mentioned (Chen et al., 2001). This questions the validity of a pre-stimulus test for immediate 
recall performance. Alternatively, the more modern approach of incorporating situational 
interest as the base for topic interest in accordance to the four phase model – and similar to 
Soemer and Shiefele (2019) – may lead to greater recall performance and be more indicative 
of a precursor to enhancing developed individual interest but cannot be tested within the 
current experimental design.     
Secondly, as mentioned previously, Chapter 4 investigated dispositional interest 
factors on an individual- and item-specific level. This aimed to test whether a fact rated as 
interesting by a participant would lead to the subsequent recall of that specific fact by 
measuring the subjective/individualistic interest experience. (This was followed by Chapter 
5’s ‘global interest’ finding of interestingness to test the individual engagement factor of text 
interestingness (Bernstein, 1955).  The first study to measure subjective interestingness was 
conducted by McGillivray (2013) whose stimuli included questions rated for curiosity (pre-
answer stimuli) as a phenomenon of knowledge seeking (Kang et al, 2009; Murayama & 
Kuhbander, 2011) and answers rated for interest (post-answer stimuli). McGillivray reported 
speculative findings of subjective interest leading to increased recall for participants whose 
recall scores were lower than the average (which approached the ceiling) during the shorter 
term (one hour) cued recall. These effects were later established during the longer recall 
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period which took place after one week. To account for this, Experiment 5 utilised a more 
demanding recall task (free recall) within an even shorter memory task (retrieval after five 
minutes) to increase the validity of the findings and reduce speculation. The results of 
Experiment 4 strongly supported McGillivray’s findings of subjective interest valence, as 
facts rated as highly interesting were recalled more than facts rated as low in interestingness 
on an individual level. This means that a participant’s TSI experience of a stimuli may 
directly influence the subsequent recall of that stimulus. These effects were evident within a 
short-term experimental paradigm negating the need for factors of individual interest such as 
re-engagement and enduring motivation, and interest effects were more prominent when 
measured using individual subjective interest vs. Experiment 5’s global interestingness. This 
provides further support for Rotgans and Schmidt’s (2014; 2018) assertion that situational 
interest is the main form of interest to impact learning and that the extent to which this occurs 
is influenced by dispositional individual interest. 
In other words, an individual’s dispositional interest factors influence the salience of 
positive interest valence experienced from the stimuli, modulating the state of TSI evoked 
from text-based interestingness characteristics of the stimuli items. The greater the experience 
of TSI the better the encoding of the memory trace is for that specific item and that specific 
individual, leading to greater recall.  
Interim conclusion: The role of interest 
 
The positive impact of interest on recall was found predominantly from situational 
interestingness of the stimuli (Chapter 5) – the experience of which was modulated by an 
individual’s dispositional interest (see Chapter 4). To provide an explanation within a 
cognitive memory framework, it is asserted that interest behaves as a function of 
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distinctiveness of a memory trace. This memory trace distinctiveness encompasses both 
physical and mental properties of distinctiveness: (i) the physical isolation through 
characteristics of the text; (ii) the mental state of emotional valence, such as interest 
experience indicative of the ‘individual experience’. Both forms of distinctiveness have a 
function of allocating attentional resources during encoding thereby enabling a deeper level 
of cognitive processing leading to greater comprehension and, subsequently, learning. 
Additionally, it is asserted that a more distinct memory trace is not only better encoded, but it 
is easier to retrieve amongst less distinct items consistent with cue-overload theory and thus 




Figure 6.1. Preliminary model graphically representing the link between situational 





The link between MW and Interest as found by Smallwood et al. (2009) was not 
established within Experiment 1, and the trend between subjective interest or situational 
interest and TUT (MW and external distraction) within Experiment 4 was speculative and 
nonsignificant. Although MW and NRI are linked as a form of recall hinderance that occurs 
when an individual is distracted away from task-related information (Craig et al., 2014; 
Dewar et al., 2014) the lack of an established link of interest on both MW and NRI meant that 
the extent to which MW’s recall hindrance is the result of- or overlaps with- NRI effects was 
not measured. As both MW and NRI hindered recall during the current thesis, but operated 
separately from interest effects, it is put forward that within this thesis both concurrent 
internal distractions (MW) and retrospective external distractions (NRI) hindered learning 
and recall, and further experiments must establish the overlap or difference (if any) between 
the two factors.   
Implications 
 
This thesis provides a more intricate understanding of the nature of NRI. When 
applied, this explains the previously conflicting findings of NRI effects. The emerging focus 
on distinctiveness as a multidimensional factor could have both theoretical and practical 
applications. A model of distinctiveness could be created and tested to explore different 
cognitive explanations such as cognitive load, interference, consolidation, physical stimuli 
characteristics, temporal, and emotional factors (i.e., interest). This understanding would 
better aid stimuli presentation during educational settings which also uses meaningful 
semantic chunks of information, particularly for free recall during exams.  
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Chapter 4 showed that a stronger form of NRI produces overall effects in a similar 
pattern to the S-T-D tasks as the more demanding NRI task also followed the late-occurring 
interference pattern. Therefore, other forms of RI may experience this cumulative interfering 
effect, thus highlighting a potential function of RI salience generally.  
The current thesis provides a cognitive explanation for subjective interestingness and 
furthermore reinforces the argument put forward by Rotgans and Schmidt (2018) to modify 
the four-phase interest model (Hidi, 2006) to incorporate dispositional interest factors.   
 
Theoretical implications and development 
 
The results, along with the researcher’s current understanding, led to the interpretation 
of a preliminary model of forgetting and recall (Figure 6.2.). Within the model the forgetting 
of a memory trace occurs as an inverse function of its distinctiveness across three key 
dimensions: Physical characteristics (of the stimuli), temporal positioning (e.g., isolation or 
spacing of the stimuli/task), and experience (person-object interaction with — and emotional 
significance of — the stimuli or task).  
Distinctiveness through isolation is multidimensional (temporal, personal, and 
physical-stimuli characteristics). This aids in the allocation of attention and subsequent 
retrieval of items, which can explain cue-overload and diversion interference (by moving 
attention away and decreasing prominence and therefore distinctiveness and leading to more 
distracting information).  
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Temporal isolation helps reduce the cognitive resource depletion caused by TOT or 
mentally demanding tasks though further research must be done into the role of cognitive 
load before it is to be included into the model. If a link is found these two factors could 
potentially be combined to help provide an understanding of interference as the behavioural 
aspect of forgetting whilst enabling the consolidation account to be the physical neurological 
explanation. In other words, perhaps interference is another function of distinctiveness and 
attention allocation which is modulated by mental effort and available mental resources to 
decide which memory traces become physically, neurologically consolidated. In this way, the 
behavioural forgetting occurs as a power law of the multidimensional factors of 
distinctiveness. Evolutionarily it would make sense: A hierarchy of importance (to survival) 
would dictate the tasks to which an individual should allocate their limited attention. Those 
which were seen as more important (emotional experience) gained more attention and thus 
were more distinct and led to greater outcomes and reinforced learning. Those which did not 
were not maintained and thus were less prominent or less likely to lead to an adaptation (in 
the case of the memory trace this adaptation would be neuroplasticity). Those actions done 
repeatedly gain greater consolidation as they are leading to survival. Those no longer used 
would become weaker and less maintained due to the adaptive nature of memory and 
survival, and the necessity for current demands, current fitness, adaptability and changing 
needs and demands. More prominent stimuli capture our attention in return for a response. A 
large bright colour may indicate poison, or attraction (more of an animal/insect example). 
Conversely, size and boldness may indicate significance (e.g., a Von Restorff effect). Perhaps 
an individual has been/can be conditioned to find certain stimuli more distinct, through 
emotional valence and interest. As with the physical and temporal dimension, interest has 
been shown in this way to increase learning through attention during the encoding phase. 
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However,  interest has been shown to be separate from the effects of interference within this 
thesis, creating a separate experiential domain/dimension of significance. 
This also fits in with directed forgetting; the idea that one can effectively pay attention 
to maintaining information deemed more important (for an introduction to directed forgetting 
see Anderson [2015]). Considering forgetting as a function of a power law of distinctiveness 
in this multidimensional way was initially extracted from this thesis. A study published post-
interpretation provided greater credence to this interpretation. Georgiou et al. (2019) 
demonstrated that a power law of forgetting via a RI model produced patterns consistent with 
the historical forgetting curve, with the newer information receiving a valence value of 
importance (power) and this power valence, if greater than previous information, displaces it. 
It is put forward that a more ‘fleshed out’ explanation of the power function could be that of 










With the lack of cohesion over the contextualising and measurements of 
interest/interestingness, there was a difficulty in exploring these as a factor within a short-
term memory experimental design. The six-item IIQ by Rotgans (2015) was attempted to be 
implemented within Chapter 4 (Experiment 4) but was too numerous to do for each item 
(36*6 = 216 item responses) and thus produced patterned responses and was omitted. 
Multiple scales are not feasible during a cognitive memory test and so single item scales were 
used which captured TSI. Measures of situational interest in Chapter 4 and 5, whilst fitting 
within the previous literature which suggests that situational interest in an environment is 
low-level and short-lasting, would have been better measured at the end of both conditions. 
This would have allowed for a more accurate situational interest measurement and a more in-
depth analysis. As the primary aim of this thesis was to measure hindered recall and NRI, this 
was not feasible (as the environmental situational interest scale may increase interference) but 
could be explored in future research.  
Chapter 3 contains sample sizes calculated by G*Power analysis to replicate the C-I 
effect from Chapter 2. This means that the conclusions must be focused on the role of late-
occurring NRI and cannot fully determine the role of prior-task type and interference outside 
of that framework. A larger sample size could provide a greater exploration of the cognitive 







Overall effects of NRI have been found to be more consistent than previous literature, 
though the most replicated and consistent finding is that of the late-occurring NRI condition, 
which has been prevalent in hindering recall scores more than any other factor throughout 
this thesis. The results show that NRI is a highly prevalent form of interference which 
increases in potency through cumulative effects of similarity interference and (plausibly) 
cognitive load. Nonetheless, further research must be conducted to fully explain the role of 
cognitive load and fatigue with respect to NRI. The current thesis provides context for the 
previous lack of congruence of NRI effects within the literature by presenting NRI as a more 
complex effect and highlighting the importance of the role of condition-order effects.  
The positive effects of interest on recall do not decrease NRI effects during the 
retention phase but occur separately, indicating that interest increases learning during the 
encoding and retrieval phases but not the storage phase. While the situational interestingness 
of an item increases recall potential through the globally rated interestingness of the fact, the 
most prominent/potent form of situational interest that leads to the greatest recall scores 
occurs on an individual level. This demonstrates that the experience and extent to which 
situational interest is evoked is modulated by dispositional individual interest factors, 
providing further support for the modification of the current Four Phase Model of Interest 
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Facts for Experiment 1, 2, & 5 
List A (Experiment 1; Experiment 2 SMT) 
1. Squirrel comes from a Greek word translated to “shadow-tail” 
2. People are less likely to remember good news, than bad 
3. In Russia beer was considered a soft drink until 2011 
4. A giraffe can clean its own ears with its tongue 
5. The first fortune cookies were created in the United States 
6. Donald Duck was banned in Finland for lack of pants 
7. French was the official language of England for 600 years 
8. Every year about 98% of atoms in your body are replaced 
9. Elvis Presley got a grade “C” in his music class 
10. Coca-Cola would be green if colouring wasn’t added to it 
11. Earth is the only planet not named after a God 
12. A “jiffy” is actually one hundredth of a second  
13. Camouflaging polar bears cover their black noses with their paws 
14. The average NFL game consists of 12 minutes playing time  
15. When breathing your ribs move 5 million times a year 
16. Since 1945 British tanks have come with tea making equipment 
17. "Rhythm" is the longest English word not containing a vowel 
18. Pure honey is the only food discovered not to spoil 
19. Just like with your fingerprints, everyone’s tongue print is unique 





List B (Experiment 1; Experiment 2 interference task, & 5) 
1. Queen Elizabeth I claimed that she bathed once every three months 
2. “The last scattering” in space is too dense for light to travel through 
3. An individual blood cell can travel around your body in 60 seconds 
4. The world’s first paper money was created in China 
5. Pound for pound muscle burns 3 times more calories than fat 
6. Facial symmetry is highly linked to greater levels of attractiveness 
7. The Ancient Egyptians used slabs of stones as pillows 
8. Heart attacks are more likely to happen on a Monday 
9. Pirates wore earrings because they believed it improved their eyesight  
10. The Bible is the most shoplifted book in the world 
11. Owls are the only birds that can see the colour blue 
12. Sound travels 15 times faster through steel than through the air 
13. For every human on earth there are over 1 million ants 
14. Handshakes originated to test whether the person had a concealed weapon 
15. Two-thirds of the people on earth have never seen snow 
16. The dot over the letter ‘i’ is called a tittle 
17. School’ comes from the Greek word meaning ‘leisure’ or ‘spare time’ 
18. Coffee was called ‘Arabic Wine’ when it was introduced in Europe 
19. Before mercury, brandy was used to fill thermometers 









Facts for Experiment 4 
 
 List A 
1. Earth is the only planet not named after a God 
2. Squirrel comes from a Greek word translated to “shadow-tail” 
3. Donald Duck was banned in Finland for lack of pants 
4. When breathing your ribs move 5 million times a year 
5. Every year about 98% of atoms in your body are replaced 
6. Just like with your fingerprints, everyone’s tongue print is unique 
7. Since 1945 British tanks have come with tea making equipment 
8. "Rhythm" is the longest English word not containing a vowel 
9. A giraffe can clean its own ears with its tongue 
10. Coca-Cola would be green if colouring wasn’t added to it 
11. The dot over the letter ‘i’ is called a tittle 
12. Queen Elizabeth I claimed that she bathed once every three months 
13. Before mercury, brandy was used to fill thermometers 
14. A “jiffy” is actually one hundredth of a second  
 
List B 
1. Handshakes originated to test whether the person had a concealed weapon 
2. Heart attacks are more likely to happen on a Monday 
3. The first fortune cookies were created in the United States 
4. The Ancient Egyptians used slabs of stones as pillows 
5. ‘School’ comes from the Greek word meaning ‘leisure’ or ‘spare time’ 
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6. Facial symmetry is highly linked to greater levels of attractiveness 
7. Coffee was called ‘Arabic Wine’ when it was introduced in Europe 
8. The average NFL game consists of 12 minutes playing time  
9. Elvis Presley got a grade “C” in his music class 
10. An individual blood cell can travel around your body in 60 seconds 
11. Two-thirds of the people on earth have never seen snow 
12. Owls are the only birds that can see the colour blue 
13. Penguins have an organ that converts seawater to fresh water 





Facts for Experiment 3 
Animals 
1. Bats always turn left when they leave a cave 
2. Dolphins are able to sleep with one eye open 
3. The heart of a shrimp is located inside its head 
4. Armadillo is a Spanish word meaning “little armoured one” 
5. A seahorse can move its eyes in opposite directions 
Space 
1. The face of the sun is 10 earth lengths long 
2. Cola was the first drink ever consumed in space 
3. A single day on Pluto lasts for over 6 earth days 
4. In Greek the name astronaut means “space sailor” 
5. Typically clouds cover around 50% of the Earth 
Other 
1. Human Thigh bones are stronger than concrete  
2. Around 100 cups of coffee is considered a lethal dose 
3. Leonardo Da Vinci invented the first pair of scissors  
4. Water is heavier when it’s hot than when it’s cold 






Facts for Experiment 4 
Two lists of facts 
1. The average person falls asleep in seven minutes 
2. No word in the English language rhymes with month 
3. The voice actor of Bugs Bunny was allergic to carrots 
4. The electric chair was invented by a dentist 
5. More people are killed by donkeys than airplane crashes 
6. A giraffe can go without water longer than a camel 
7. 90% of all species that have become extinct have been birds 
8. Winston Churchill was born in a ladies' room during a dance 
9. St. Patrick, the patron saint of Ireland, was Welsh 
10. The state of Florida is bigger than England 
11. Sarcasm comes from the Greek term “to tear flesh” 
12. The world’s oldest piece of chewing gum is 9000 years old 
13. 2% of all Accident and Emergency cases are sports related 
14. The Great Barrier Reef is the largest living structure on Earth 
15. Vin Diesel's name is an anagram of "I end lives” 
16. A song that is stuck in your head is called an “Earworm”  
17. The man who owned Segway died by riding one off of a cliff. 
18. Sound travels 4 times faster through water than through air 
 
1. The music in the “Piracy, it’s a crime” advert was pirated 
2. Hercules gave us the saying “Taking the bull by its horns” 
3. The first product to have a bar code was Wrigley’s gum 
4. The 100 years war lasted for 116 years 
5. Apples are a member of the rose plant family 
6. A newborn child can breathe and swallow at the same time 
7. King Henry VIII slept with a giant battle axe beside him 
8. 8 out of the 10 largest statues in the world are of Buddha 
9. Baked beans are actually not baked, but stewed 
10. ‘Almost’ is the longest word to be written in alphabetical order  
11. The like button on Facebook was originally going to say “awesome” 
12. Mars has the largest dust storms in the solar system 
13. 85% of all known plant life is found in the ocean 
14. The first speeding ticket was issued for driving 8mph 
15.  The U.S has deemed haggis to be unfit for human consumption 
16. More languages are spoken in London than any City in the world 
17. In France it is possible to marry a dead person 








A strict scoring procedure for marking the accuracy of the responses was adhered to 
and was as follows:  If the participant had reported half a recalled fact which is still 
resembling a fact, it was given ½ a mark.  A fact which was fully incorrect scored 0, 
however, if the full phrase was half correct, half incorrect, it was awarded ½ a mark. Also, if 
the fact was different in only one way (i.e. number) it was classed as correct and awarded 1 
mark, but only if the new meaning was not incorrect. Finally, if a fact was presented and 
correct but details were lost that are greater than one difference, ½ a mark is awarded 
 
Facts scoring example 1:  
Fact: Queen Elizabeth I claimed that she bathed once every three months 
1 Mark: Queen Elizabeth I claimed that she bathed once every three months 
1 Mark (one detail incorrect): Queen Elizabeth I claimed that she bathed once a month 
1 Mark (one detail incorrect and minor information difference: clear recall): Queen 
Elizabeth bathed once a month 
1/2 Mark (half a fact): Queen Victoria bathed 3 times a month 
1/2 Mark: Queen Elizabeth claimed she bathed often 
No Mark: Queen Elizabeth did not bathe  
Facts scoring example 2: Penguins have an organ that converts seawater to fresh water 
 1 Mark (one detail missing): Penguins can covert seawater to fresh water  
 1 Mark (correct and retains understanding): Penguins can make seawater drinkable   
 1/2 Mark: Penguins have an organ to drink water  





















































































Appendix C2  






Appendix C3   Stroop Answer sheets experiment 2 




Appendix D1 (Experiment 3)  
Individual/Topic Interest 
Please indicate in the box below how well each statement fits the fact: 1 (not true at 
all), 2 (not true for me), 3 (neutral), 4 (true for me), and 5 (very true for me). 
“The music in the “Piracy, it’s a crime” advert was pirated” 
 
1) I am very interested in this type of fact  
 
2) I would be interested in seeing facts similar to this 
 
3) I really enjoyed this fact  
 
4) This fact stood out to me  
 
5) I found this fact to  be humorous  
 
6) I was curious about this fact  
 
Rotgans, J. I. (2015). Validation study of a general subject-matter interest measure: The Individual Interest 
Questionnaire (IIQ). Health Professions Education, 1(1), 67-75.  






 Measure of situational interest 
 Please indicate in the box below how true each statement fits your experience of this 
experiment: 1 (not true at all), 2 (not true for me), 3 (neutral), 4 (true for me), and 5 (very 
true for me).  
 
1: “I enjoyed working on this memory experiment” 
2: “I want to know more about Memory/the results of the experiment” 
3: “I think this experiment was interesting” 
4: “I expected to perform reasonably well on this experiment”  
5: “I was fully focused on this experiment” 
6: “I felt bored (reversed)”.  
 
 
Rotgans, J. I., & Schmidt, H. G. (2014). Situational interest and learning: Thirst for knowledge. Learning 
and Instruction, 32, 37-50. 
  
















Experiment: Measurement of TUT 
 
Thought probes: 
1) I am totally focused on the current task 
2) I am thinking about my performance on the task or how long it is taking 
3) I am distracted by information present in the room (e.g. sounds or lights) 
4) I am zoning out/My mind is wandering 
5) Other  
 
Probe 1 shows task performance focus 
Probe 2 shows task specific interference 
Probe 3 represents external distraction 
Probe 4 shows internal distraction/ Mind Wandering 
Probes 3 and 4 Represent TUT 
 









Experiment 1 Equivalence ANOVA 
List Order (A-B vs. B-A). 
To further test the equivalence of the facts list, a two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted for 
the conditions; control and interference vs. List order to determine whether the order the lists were 
displayed (A-B or B-A) significantly impacted the recall scores for the interference or control 
condition. Recall scores for List A and List B did not differ F(1,119) = 0.72; p = 0.4.  
The interaction which tested the order in which the condition was presented compared with the List 
type was found to have a non-significant difference on recall scores (F = (1, 119) = 0.43; p = 0.7). 
The condition in which the lists were presented (control vs. interference) was found to have a 
non-significant difference on recall scores, (F(1,119) = 0.16; p = 0.7) showing that the facts 
presented were equivalent and therefore useful stimuli for measuring the condition effect providing 
no significant confounding variables when compared and contrasted.  
  





Experiment 4 list equivalency 
Table 5.1 
 Means and Standard Deviations of recall for condition and condition-order 
 C-I I-C 
 control interference control interference 
M 7.43 5.68 7.61 7.23 
SD 2.55 2.72 2.13 2.65 
 
Order effects equivalency (List order vs Condition)  
A Two-Way Mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the equivalence of the stimuli lists’ 
order (A-B vs. B-A) as a factor of recall within the interference vs. non-interference (control) 
condition.  
There was a non-significant difference between list orders (A-B) and (B-A) (F(1, 39) = 
.21, MSE = 2.12 p = .65, ηp
2 < .01 , There was a robust significant effect of condition type 
(F(1,39) = 6.27, p = .02 ηp2 = .14). With higher recall in the control condition. However, there 
was no significant interaction between list order and condition type (F(1,39) = 1.96,  MSE = 
5.45, p = .17 ηp
2 < .01). with a lack of interaction indicates that differences between the lists 
result from an interference effect (condition type). Thus, List A and List B are equivalent. 






Figure 5.1 Mean recall scores and confidence intervals for condition split by list order 
 
Confidence intervals show large overlap between means for list order a-b and b-a. 
Differences between the lists for the interference condition is likely to be due to the Late-
occurring interference condition, with the graph following the same pattern of the fatigue effect 
(consistently most hindered recall group between experiments) containing N = 6 participants for 
A-B vs N = 14 participants in B-A  
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